This paper examines the role of leadership structure and board composition in the context of poison pill adoptions. We distinguish, for the first time, independent, separated leadership structures from non-independent, separated leadership structures. Our results suggest that there is an important interaction effect between board composition and the independence of the board Chairman, and that while there is a critical monitoring role for outside directors, inside directors also provide a critical informational role in board decision-making.
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