An Empirical Test of the Signaling Effect of Management's Earnings Forecasts: A Decomposition of the Earnings Surprise and Forecast Surprise Effects

Abstract

When corporate management issues an earnings forecast there are potentially two surprises. One potential surprise is that a forecast was issued and the other is the surprise in the earnings forecast. Accordingly, the observed stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts may be due to one or the other, or both. This study decomposes the cross-sectional variability in stock market reactions to management earnings forecasts into the portions attributable to the forecast surprise and the earnings surprise. The results indicate that the market's reaction is a function of both the earnings surprise and the forecast surprise. However, the market reaction is more associated with forecast surprise than with the earnings surprise. This suggests that results in previous studies on the market reactions to management earnings forecasts may need to be reconsidered.

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