We are grateful for comments made by participants at the Symposium on the “Measurement of Profit and Productivity: Theory and Practice,” on December 16, 1988, in the University of Florida, cosponsored by the Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, the Public Policy Research Center, Graduate School of Business, University of Florida, and The Kruger Center of Finance, Jerusalem School of Business Administration, Hebrew University; at workshops at the Leonard M. Stern School of Business, New York University; at the Accounting Research and Education Center of McMaster University; at the European Accounting Association meeting in Stuttgart, Germany; at workshops at Wharton School University of Pennsylvania; University of California at Berkeley; Northwestern University; French Finance Association Meeting.
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