Abstract
This article investigates the role of mandatory interim financial reporting in financial analysts’ annual earnings forecast errors. We provide large-scale evidence from 49 countries that a mandatory quarterly (as compared to semi-annual) reporting regime is associated with lower analysts’ annual earnings forecast errors. This conjecture is further supported when we exploit an exogeneous change in the mandatory frequency regime from a semi-annual to a quarterly reporting mandate in Japan. Consistent with an improvement in the information environment, our findings are more pronounced for firms and analysts subject to higher information acquisition costs and in countries where the institutional setting is less able to meet analysts’ information needs. We corroborate this conjecture by documenting that more frequent mandatory reporting decreases analysts’ forecast dispersion and improves the profitability of their stock recommendations. Overall, our findings extend the research on the role of the institutional setting in analysts’ output, suggesting that the mandate of more frequent reporting improves analysts’ forecasting process.
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