Abstract
Previous research suggests that self-deception is maximized when (a) there is a lack of concrete information, and (b) the motivation to self-deceive is high. In applying this model to past, present, and future judgments about the self, the future is unique because of its uncertainty, whereas the past is unique because of its lesser relevance to current motivations. We therefore predict that people will be the most self-deceptive when thinking about their future, a prediction supported in four studies ( Ns = 96, 125, 40, and 298) using various measures of self-deception and subjective well-- being. Studies 1 and 2 provide basic evidence for future self-- enhancement, whereas Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that concrete information about the future reduces this bias. More generally, the findings highlight the special status of future well-being judgments as well as the flexible link between self-deception and self-evaluation.
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