The Missing Link in the Paradox of the Linda Conjunction Problem: Beyond Knowing and Thinking of the Conjunction Rule,the Intrinsic Appeal of Heuristic Processing
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online February, 1999
The Missing Link in the Paradox of the Linda Conjunction Problem: Beyond Knowing and Thinking of the Conjunction Rule,the Intrinsic Appeal of Heuristic Processing
Participants who adopted an intuitive-experiential but not an analytical-rational mode of information processing reproduced the usual finding for the Linda conjunction problem of a preference for a heuristic, representativeness over a statistical, conjunction-rule solution. Many who knew and thought of the conjunction rule (the absence of which previously were considered the major reasons for the prevalence of representativeness solutions) preferred a representativeness solution. The widely held belief that people prefer the outcome of their rational more than their intuitive processing when both are equally accessible is of limited generality. The preference by many who know the conjunction rule for a heuristic, representativeness solution can account for both the very high rate of conjunction errors to the Linda problem and their resistance to elimination by training. A finding of a surprisingly strong priming effect suggests that once people engage in a processing mode, it tends to be self-maintaining.
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