Belief persistence was examined as a function of dogmatism. In a self perception paradigm, subjects persisted in their belief in apparent success or failure after discrediting of the original evidence. However, belief persistence was much greater for those high than for those low in dogmatism. These findings were replicated in a social perception paradigm where subjects evaluated the outcomes of psychological experiments. Subjects persisted in their beliefs even when told that the experimental outcomes were fictitious. Again, belief persistence was much greater for those high than for those low in dogmatism. Subjects generated significantly more reasons supporting the reported outcome than the opposite outcome. Those high in dogmatism generated fewer reasons for the opposite outcome than those low in dogmatism. Differential reason generation accounted for some of the belief persistence effect and for most of the differences in belief persistence as a function of dogmatism.
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