The present research investigated the psychological correlates of counterfactual thinking. Building on existing research in this domain, it was predicted that empathic focus would exert considerable influence on the magnitude of counterfactual effects on social judgments. More specifically, it was predicted that whereas a victim set would amplify the effects of counterfactual thinking on accident-related judgments, a perpetrator set would attenuate them. The results obtained strongly supported this prediction. The implications of these findings are considered, and suggestions are offered for future research.
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