Borah's (1963) version of the Deutsch and Krauss (1960) trucking game was employed under three experimental conditions-no gates, bilateral gates, and bilateral gates plus a capacity for threatening to fine the other for gate use. The original finding, that presence of the gates interferes with cooperation, was replicated. Introduction of the threat capacity caused cooperation to increase, suggesting that the likelihood of reaching agreement is enhanced when two people can threaten to punish one another for taking independent, as opposed to interdependent, action.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Borah, L. A., Jr.The effects of threat in bargaining: Critical and experimental analysis . Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 37-44.
2.
Deutsch, M.The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1973.
3.
Deutsch, M. , and Krauss, R. M.The effect of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 181-189.
4.
Kelley, H. H.Experimental studies of threats in interpersonal negotiations . Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1965, 9, 79-105.
5.
Nardin, T.Communication and the effects of threats in strategic interaction . Peace Research Society Papers, 1968, 9, 69-86.
6.
Smith, W. P. , and Anderson, A. J. Threats, communication and bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 76-82.
