Attribution theory sometimes confuses phenomenological understanding with scientific theory. Kruglanski's (1977) comments on the endogenous-exogenous distinction are analyzed as an important case of such confusion. Phenomenology is rejected as a substitute for scientific attribution theorizing.
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References
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