Is Social Psychology Really Different?

Abstract

Gergen (1976), outlines a number of problems that make it difficult to apply general social psychological the ories, or to assess their validity unequivocally. These dif ficulties are not unique to social psychology, however. The application of general scientific principles has never been a simple matter, not even in the well-established physical sci ences. Moreover, there are formidable difficulties in asses sing general theoretical propositions in every field of in quiry, since empirical procedures will inevitably depend on assumptions about local field conditions, the adequacy of meas urement techniques, and the like. As a consequence, if re sults are inconsistent with theoretical expectations, there will always be some uncertainty as to where the problem lies. Social psychologists should not assume that their difficulties are totally unlike those encountered in other fields of sci entific inquiry. The problems raised by Gergen do not, con sequently, rule out the possible development and application of general social psychological theories.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Cronbach, L.J. Beyond the two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psychologist, 1975, 30, 116-127.

Duhem, P. The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1954 (original publication date: 1906).

Fishbein, M. , and Ajzen, I. Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple behavioral criteria. Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 59-74.

Forsyth, D.R. Crisis and the crucial experiment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 453-458.

Gergen, K.J. Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 26, 309-320.

Gergen, K.J. Social psychology, science, and history. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 373-383.

Greenwald, A.G. Consequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82, 1-20.

Hendrick, C. Social psychology as history and as traditional science: An appraisal . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2, 392-402

Homans, G.C. The nature of social science. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967.

10.

Lewin, L. The conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian modes of thought in contemporary psychology. In A dynamic theory of personality. New York : McGraw-Hill, 1935.

11.

Manis, M.

Comments on Gergen's "Social psychology as history." Person ality and

Social Psychology Bulletin, 1975, 1, 450-455.

12.

Mischel, W. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley, 1968.

13.

Reitman, W. Cognition and thought. New York: Wiley, 1965.

14.

Schlenker, B.R. Social psychology and science. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29, 1-15.

15.

Scriven, M. Views of human nature. In T. W. Wann (Ed.) Behaviorism and phenomonology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

16.

Wicker, A.W. Attitudes vs. actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. Journal of Social Issues, 1969, 25, 41-78.