The distinction between scale value and weight in integration theory is elucidated by considering parallels in Newtonian Mechanics. It is shown that if the impact or force of a piece of information varies from situation to situation, at least a two parameter model, one of which is not a constant, is necessarily required. This is true even for a change of scale value theory. It is further argued that direct empirical proof for the assumption of scale value constancy is not necessary. The validity of the model rests on goodness of fit as must alternative theoretical formulations.
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