Abstract
The efficiency of reputation in promoting cooperation relies on reputation accuracy. Yet, people often dishonestly upgrade their reputation for potential benefits. To date, it remains unclear whether reputation-based cooperation would break down when reputation systems contain cues of dishonest reputation upgrading and whether trust and perceived trustworthiness could explain this effect. We addressed these questions across three studies (total N = 643) using hypothetical scenarios and incentivized games. In each study, participants interacted with high- and low-reputation targets with or without exposure to cues of dishonest reputation upgrading. Overall, compared to the baseline condition, dishonest reputation upgrading cues undermine cooperation with high-reputation targets, which was explained by lower trust and perceived trustworthiness in these targets. These findings suggest that reputation becomes a less reliable cue for cooperative decisions in reputation systems tainted by dishonest upgrading, reducing the trustworthiness of high-reputation targets and their attractiveness for cooperation.
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