Motivated Use of Numerical Anchors for Judgments Relevant to the Self

Abstract

The anchoring effect has been replicated so extensively that it is generally thought to be ubiquitous. However, anchoring has primarily been tested in domains in which people are motivated to reach accurate conclusions rather than biased conclusions. Is the anchoring effect robust even when the anchors are threatening? In three studies, participants made a series of probability judgments about their own futures paired with either optimistic anchors (e.g., “Do you think that the chances that your current relationship will last a lifetime are more or less than 95%?”), pessimistic anchors (e.g., “more or less than 10%?”), or no anchors. A fourth study experimentally manipulated motivation to ignore the anchor with financial incentives. Across studies, anchors that implied high probabilities of unwanted events occurring were ineffective. Together, these studies suggest that anchoring has an important boundary condition: Personally threatening anchors are ignored as a result of motivated reasoning processes.