Previous social dilemma research has shown that sanctioning defection may enhance cooperation. The authors argue that this finding may have resulted from restricting participants to two behaviors (cooperation and defection). In this article, the authors introduce the concept of a “social trilemma” (a social dilemma in which an alternative option to defect is present) and tested the effect of a sanction. The authors show that a sanction only increased cooperation and collective interests in the traditional social dilemma. In a social trilemma, the sanction failed because it caused some people to choose the alternative option to defect. Moreover, the results indicate that this was especially the case when people did not expect fellow group members to cooperate. In this case, the sanction even worked counterproductive because it decreased collective interests. It is concluded that allowing individuals to consider alternative options to defect can reveal the potential detrimental effects of sanctioning systems for the collective.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
2.
Bruins, J. J., Liebrand, W. B., & Wilke, H. A. (1989). About the saliency of fear and greed in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 155-161.
3.
Caldwell, M. D. (1976). Communication and sex effects in a five-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33, 273-280.
4.
Cialdini, R. B., Kallgren, C. A., & Reno, R. R. (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 201-234.
5.
CNN. com. (2003). Becker given suspended jail term. Retrieved September 25, 2003, from http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/24/germany.becker/
6.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169-193.
7.
De Cremer, D., Dewitte, S., & Snyder, M. (2001). “The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not)?” The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 93-107.
8.
Eek, D., Loukopoulos, P., Fujii, S., & Gärling, T. (2002). Spill-over effects of intermittent costs for defection in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32, 801-813.
9.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137-140.
10.
Giebels, E., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Van de Vliert, E. (2000). Interdependence in negotiation: Effects of exit options and social motive on distributive and integrative negotiation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 255-272.
11.
Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Hoyle, R. H., Dardis, G. J., & Graetz, K. A. (1990). Individual group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 68-79.
12.
Kerr, N. L. (1983). Motivation losses in small groups: A social dilemma analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 819-828.
13.
Komorita, S. S., & Lapworth, C. W. (1982). Alternative choices in social dilemmas. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 692-708.
14.
Kopelman, S., Weber, J. M., & Messick, D. M. (2002). Factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas: a review of experimental psychological research. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, P. C. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.), The drama of the commons (pp. 113-156). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
15.
Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking relationships. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
16.
McCusker, C., & Carnevale, P. J. (1995). Framing in resource dilemmas: Loss aversion and the moderating effects of sanctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 61, 190-201.
17.
Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In L. Wheeler & P. Shaver (Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 11-44). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
18.
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1-25.
19.
Miller, D. T., & Holmes, J. G. (1975). The role of situational restrictiveness on self-fulfilling prophecies: A theoretical and empirical extension of Kelley and Stahelski's triangle hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 661-673.
20.
Miranda, M. L., & Aldy, J. E. (1996). Unit pricing of residential municipal solid waste: lessons from nine case study communities. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/payt/pdf/unitpric.pdf
21.
Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006). Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 147-162.
22.
Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust and reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 134-151.
23.
Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7-63.
24.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363-392.
25.
Rapoport, A., & Eshed Levy, D. (1989). Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44, 325-344.
26.
Robbins, T. L. (1995). Social loafing on cognitive tasks: An examination of the “sucker effect.”Journal of Business and Psychology, 9, 337-342.
27.
Schnake, M. E. (1991). Equity in effort: The “sucker effect” in coacting groups. Journal of Management, 17, 41-55.
28.
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684-707.
29.
Van Lange, P. A. M., Liebrand, W. B., Messick, D. M., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1992). Introduction and literature review. In W. B. Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. A. M. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings (pp. 3-28). Oxford, UK: Pergamon.
30.
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Visser, K. (1999). Locomotion in social dilemmas: How people adapt to cooperative, tit-for-tat, and noncooperative partners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 762-773.
31.
Van Meegeren, R. C. F. (1997). Communicatie en maatschappelijke acceptatie. Een onderzoek naar de houding ten aanzien van de “dure afvalzak” in Barendrecht [Communication and social acceptation: A study of the attitude to the “expensive garbage bag” in Barendrecht]. Wageningen, the Netherlands: Wageningen Universiteit.
32.
Van Vugt, M. (1999). Solving natural resource dilemmas through structural change: The social psychology of metering water use. In M. Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, & M. Hogg (Eds.), Resolving social dilemmas: Dynamic, structural, and intergroup aspects(pp. 121-133). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
33.
Van Vugt, M., & De Cremer, D. (1999). Leadership in social dilemmas: The effects of group identification on collective actions to provide public goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 587-599.
34.
Wit, A., & Wilke, H. A. M. (1990). The presentation of rewards and punishments in a simulated social dilemma. Social Behaviour, 5, 231-245.
35.
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116.
36.
Yamagishi, T. (1988). Exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the free rider problem in the United States and Japan. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 24, 530-542.
37.
Yamagishi, T. (1992). Group size and the provision of a sanctioning system in a social dilemma. In W. B. G. Liebrand, D. M. Messick, & H. Wilke (Eds.), Social dilemmas: Theoretical issues and research findings. International series in experimental social psychology (pp. 267-287). New York: Pergamon.
