These studies were designed to test cognitive dissonance theory’s assertion that alternatives are not reevaluated before a choice. Participants viewed information about horses in a simulated race and rated each one’s chance of winning three times before placing their bet and once after placing it. It was found that ratings of the chosen horse increased within the predecision period as well as after betting. Predecision bolstering occurred even when participants did not expect to bet, and predecision preference increased with task importance and participant expertise. The findings are attributed to maintenance of consistency throughout a cognitive system.
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