Three studies indicated that valenced events and self-motives have implications for understanding processes underlying counterfactual thinking. Moods (Study 1) and outcome valence (Study 3) influenced counterfactuals when self-motives (self-improvement, mood-repair, mood-maintenance, and self-protection) were manipulated directly. Agreement and reaction times (Studies 1 and 2), as well as time pressure (Study 3), indicated that counterfactual responses can be quick or slow depending on whether self-motives suggest a direction either consistent or inconsistent with direction activated initially. In Study 2, responses to manipulated outcomes by high- and low-self-esteem persons, who differ naturally in self-motives, provided further evidence for proposals when task repeatability was varied. Implications for antecedents and consequences of counterfactual thinking, self-motives, and dual-process models, are discussed.
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