Abstract
Rudolf Otto remains one of the most influential theologians of the early 20th century. One area where he made a sizable impact was on the âfear of Godâ discussion. From Ottoâs influence emerged the theory of Numinous Fear as a means of explaining the âfear of the godsâ in the ancient world. However, there are misunderstandings regarding Numinous Fear and Ottoâs role in its conception. To this end, this article investigates the extent of Ottoâs influence regarding Numinous Fear and the consequential effects to the âfear of Godâ discussion.
Imagine a lush valley teeming with vegetation and life. Then a meteorite irrupts through the atmosphere smashing into the hillside. The resultant impact scars the geography, devastates the area, and changes the landscape forever. Rudolf Otto was such a force (for his contribution to theological and biblical studies, see Twiss & Conser 1992: 77â85; for how he influenced theology in the 20th century, see SchĂŒz 2016: esp. 363â408). Regarding the landscape of biblical scholarship, there is a discernable before and after effect regarding the impact of Ottoâs works and ideas. His influence is so far reaching that he altered the nature of discussion for topics that he was not directly invested. The clearest example of this is how he altered the underlying conception of fearing God to Numinous Fear in western thought (for how he influenced the theology of âfear of God,â see Engleman 2009: 41â54; for his influence on the Hebrew behind âfear of God,â see Lasater 2019: 26â29; for an appraisal of his influence on âfear of Godâ in wisdom studies, see Ellis 2014). With this in mind, this article investigates the extent of Ottoâs influence regarding Numinous Fear. It explores this in four areas: 1) identifying Ottoâs specific contribution; 2) explaining how scholars developed Numinous Fear based on Ottoâs ideas; 3) exploring how âfear of Godâ was interpreted before and after Ottoâs impact; and, 4) delving into the critical reception of Otto and Numinous Fear.
Rudolf Ottoâs Contribution to the âFear of Godâ Discussion
As a philosopher-theologian, Otto researched the applications of phenomenology on world religions. His most prominent workâwhich greatly (re)shaped the scholarly terrainâis Das Heilige originally published in 1917 (Eng. The Idea of the Holy, 1950). The work essentially triangulated the theological, philosophical, and psychological reflections (which had been developing over the last few centuries) regarding fear and its relationship with religion. As such, Otto interacts with the works of Fries, Kant (mostly in agreement), and Schleiermacher (mostly in disagreement). Of particular importance are Friesâ Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung, Kantâs Kritik der Urteilskraft (Eng. Critique of Judgment) and Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Eng. Critique of Pure Reason) as well as Schleiermacherâs Sendschreiben ĂŒber seine Glaubenslehre an LĂŒcke (Eng. On the Glaubenslehre) and Ăber die Religion (Eng. On Religion) (for a discussion on Schleiermacherâs influence on âfear of Godâ [esp. in the theological domain], see Lamm 2020). A major reason why Otto is so significant for the âfear of Godâ discussion is that he was one of the first modern theologians to introduce philosophical and scientific advancements into his discussion on the concept of fear of the divine (see SchĂŒz 2016: 22â23). The result was a new systematic approach to the conception of Godâs holiness and manâs interaction with it. This marks the turning point for modern scholarship regarding the âfear of God.â
In order to convey his theories, Otto pioneered language that remains common throughout theological discourse as well as standard for âfear of Godâ discussions today.
Except for mysterium, the other definitions are my attempt at providing a succinct description that is accurate to his language and usage.
Otto 1950: 5â7.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 18â24.
Ibid., 31â32.
Otto employs these terms for his system regarding man encountering the numen. He based much of his conceptualization of âholy,â ânumen,â and ânuminousâ on his understanding of mysticism (both eastern and western). He further explored this in West-östliche Mystik (Eng. Mysticism East and West) in which he provided background for his thinking on the numen while also building upon it. For a thorough discussion, the reader is encouraged to consult SchĂŒz 2016 (esp. pt. 2, ch. 3: 244â98). To summarize, when a man comes before the mysterium of the wholly otherâwhich is by definition incomprehensibleâhe does not fully encounter the divine. The divine entity radiates out power, majesty, and awefulness which overwhelms the mortal. The majesty that radiates outward and the overwhelming sensation experienced by the mortal is the numen. Through this encounter with the numen the individual experiences what Otto dubbed numinous Scheu (dread) (1950: 16â18; cf. SchĂŒz 2016: 277â80). The moment of the numinous is an a priori experience that simultaneously incites the (mysterium) tremendum and the fascinans which is a concurrent repulsion/attraction to the divine (numinous) presence. As Otto summarizes, âThe daemonic-divine object may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his ownâ (1950, 31). While it is common to find discussions attributing this idea of tension before the divine presence to early 20th century scholarship, these sorts of ideas were already expressed as early as the mid-19th century. For example, H. Wheeler Robinson (1946: 52â53) draws attention to St. John Newmanâs poem The Dream of Gerontius:
And these two pains, so counter and so keen,â
The longing for Him, when thou seest Him not;
The shame of self at thought of seeing Him,â
Will be thy verist, sharpest purgatory [1903: 58, ln. 744â47].
The problem as Otto saw it is that we attribute âholinessâ with absolute moral goodness. So, when we refer to God as âholy,â we are imposing a qualifier onto something that cannot be qualified or quantified. We are saying: He is the epitome of goodness, righteousness, love, etc. As Otto further explains,
We generally take âholyâ as meaning âcompletely good;â it is the absolute moral attribute, denoting the consummation of moral goodness. In this sense Kant calls the will which remains unwaveringly obedient to the moral law from the motive of duty a âholyâ will; here clearly we have simply the perfectly moral will. In the same way we may speak of the holiness or sanctity of Duty or Law, meaning merely that they are imperative upon conduct and universally obligatory. But this common usage of the term is inaccurate. It is true that all this moral significance is contained in the word âholy,â but it includes in additionâas even we cannot but feelâa clear overplus of meaning, and this it is now our task to isolate [1950, 5â6].
When we talk about God, we talk about him by attributing rational (quantifiable) and non-rational (unquantifiable) attributes. This gives the impression that God is either a non-rational or supra-rational subject (see his first chapter âThe Rational and the Non-Rationalâ). In order to address this, he coined his own term which is both morally neutral and non-rational: numen/numinous.
Ottoâs intent was to uncover the essence of religion (see SchĂŒz 2018: 57â63). He therefore described manâs encounter with the divine in natural language. As profane beings, we lack adequate means of grasping âholiness.â So, the only means for us to encounter the divine is when it breaks through into our plane of existence. Only, it is not the divine being but rather its numen which we interpret as and through religious experience. Thus, our encounter with the non-rational being becomes a type of rational experience. It is important to note: this is a naturalistic way of explaining the phenomenon of man encountering the divine. As Otto illuminates, these factors (magic, worship of the dead, spirits, power [mana], natural forces [e.g., sun, moon, volcanoes, etc.], myths) serve as âthe vestibule at the threshold of the real religious feeling, an earliest stirring of the numinous consciousnessâŠâ (1950: 126; cf. 121â26). He goes on to explain that religion developed as humans began to attribute these forces to personalized entities: i.e., daemons. The numen is just as much an aspect attributed to the deityâs power as it is a sensation that the supplicant interprets then internalizes.
The Legacy of Ottoâs Mysterium tremendum et fascinen
Typically, when scholars discuss Ottoâs systematic presentation of âfear of God,â they use the phrase numinosen Furcht (Numinous Fear). However, Otto (seemingly intentionally) opted for the expression numinosen Scheu (numinous dread) to describe manâs initial reaction upon the advent of the numen (for Ottoâs conception and use of âScheu,â see SchĂŒz 2014: 134â37). His primary interest was in the holiness of God as a real phenomenon that man can experience and interpret. With this in mind, Otto only broadly applied his theory to the biblical concept of âfear of Godâ and never directly to the OTâs yirat YHWH (
) âfear of the Lordâ (comp. Lasater who points out that Otto never delved into the specific meaning or nuances of yrâ (
). [2019: 26â27]). Instead, he compared it to âÄmat YHWH (
), deima panikon (ΎΔĩΌα ÏαΜÎčÎșÏΜ), and sabastos (ÏαÎČαÏÏÏÏ) (Otto 1950: 14â15). However, none of these terms even occur in the OT (MT or LXX respectively).
It was later scholars who developed the theory of Numinous Fear in a way that equates Ottoâs numinous dread with the ancient worldâs âfear of the godsâ concept. As Roland Murphy admits, âAlthough Rudolph Otto did not set out to investigate exclusively the biblical experience of the numinous, his study of the Holy does provide us with concepts that help to explicate the biblical fear of the Lordâ (Murphy 1992: 175). Overtime, Ottoâs âfear of Godâ theory became enmeshed with the biblical concept âfear of the Lord/God.â Siegfried Plath provides us the earliest account of the philosophical/theological development of the âfear of Godâ in the early 20th century. His list of contributors include Johannes Hempel, Johannes HĂ€nel, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and Ludwig Kohler (he admits that he neglected the âDutchâ works of [Barend] J. Engelbrecht and B. J. Oosterhoff) (1963: 9, fn. 1). This article focuses on the first three.
Hempelâs Gott und Mensch im Alten Testament (1st ed. 1926; 2nd ed. 1936)
Johannes Hempel was among the first to apply his own âfear of Godâ theory, which closely resembles Ottoâs numinous dread, to ANE religion. He describes this in chapter 1: âDie Furcht vor Jahve.â As he explains, âThe simplest motive, as far as manâs relationship with God is concerned, is fear, and the one which best correlates divine action with human [response] is the belief in retributionâ (1936: 276 [authorâs translation]). He initially characterizes âfear of Godâ as a recognition of the distance between man and deity (1936: 4â8). This distance applies to every sphere of comparison; God is in heaven/we are on earth, he is big/we are small, he is strong/we are weak, he is holy/we are unworthy. Secondly, he emphasizes that the deity is an ever-present danger. Bothâthe distance and dangerâhold true for all ANE religions. This refers to those occasions when God interacts with humanity which is often characterized by judgement and terror (1936: 8â21). However, Israelite religion is unique in that fear became a motivation for their religious ethic. He explains, âAs much as the terminology of the âfear of Yahwehâ essentially represents the overall religious development, it differs greatly at individual times in terms of intensity, motive and emotional qualityâ (1936: 32 [authorâs translation]). Israelite âfear of Godâ developed into a state of ambivalence. The individual becomes caught between the polarities of desiring to maintain distance all the while longing to be close to Yahweh: analogous to fear and love (1936: 21â24). He elaborates, âIt isâI repeat: in various shades!ânot pure fear, but it is also not a limitless longing to become one [with God], it is a feeling of distance and solidarity in oneâ (1936: 29â30 [authorâs translation]). He further clarifies, âThe analysis of âfearâ shows as its end result that both the feeling of distance from Yahweh and the feeling of connectedness are conditioned by its characteristics. The distance of man from Yahweh is powerlessness and unworthiness. Yahwehâs power and holiness, however, have both typical and highly individual traits that have to be consideredâ (1936: 32 [authorâs translation]). There is an undeniable similarity between Hempelâs distance/longing and Ottoâs repulsion/attraction. Hempel even employs some of Ottoâs terminology (e.g., numen/numinous) and grants Otto a passing nod, confirming his influence (1936: 50).
HĂ€nelâs Die Religion der Heiligkeit (1931)
Johannes HĂ€nelâs work describes Israelite religion as a âReligion of Holinessâ (1931: 1). This is founded upon a recognition of the distance between man and God often described as âfear.â At this point, religion was reduced to a âfear of the holyâ (Otto) which was then explained as an ambivalent tension between being close to God and maintaining distance (Hempel). As HĂ€nel explains:
But that this fact is not determined as the basic phenomenon of all pious impulsesâwhether of fear or of trustâ, not as the basic phenomenon of all ideas about Godâwhether that of his anger or his love, his power or his wisdomâ, but that it sinks to the mere experience of fearâbe it the natural fear of the dangerous nearness of God, be it the ethical fear of the judging Godâ, indicates a limitation that must be broken. This constriction occurs where the feeling of distance is explained by the âfear of the holy,â accordingly also for prophetic religiosity holiness is determined as the divine power âwhich punishes all sin;â and therefore, from the feeling of distance [derives] the feeling of closeness, by holiness love is distinguished as the opposite pole [to fear]. But with the requirements that have been made, this is not balanced and it cannot be balancedâŠthe too rigid connection with fearfulness limits the actual breadth of the holiness-testimonyâ [1931: 2â3 (authorâs translation)].
However, HĂ€nel felt that this was too simplistic. He develops his argument regarding the nature of the âfear of Godâ in chapter 2, §9: âDie Ehrfurcht vor Gott.â As he describes, the âfear of Godâ is a fear of Godâs wrath, whereas, âawe for Godâ is a recognition of Godâs holiness (1931: 106â07). Across the ancient world, religion was based on the fear of the gods, but what began as fear (Furcht) developed into awe/reverence (Ehrfurcht) (1931: 110 [unfortunately, we lose the wordplay in English]). He goes on to suggest that while it appears to be true that systems of piety developed within the various cultures, these systems were largely based on their âfear of the gods.â Even within Israel, behavior would be dictated by âfear.â However, Israel was supposed to base its piety on its âawe for Godâ (1931: 110). He then spends the majority of this section explaining how the Israelite religion evolved its conception of piety from a fear-based system to an awe-based one. It was this belief in Godâs holiness that was to be their center for religion. While he does not consistently mention or cite Otto, this whole discussion is reminiscent of Ottoâs writings.
Van der Leeuwâs PhĂ€nomenologie der Religion (1933; Eng. 1986)
Gerardus van der Leeuw further developed these ideas in his work, especially part 3, §68: âGottesmei-dungâ (Eng. The Avoidance of God). Here he incorporates into the discussion the works and ideas of Kierkegaard (Begrebet Angest [Eng. The Concept of Anxiety]) and Heidegger (Sein und Zeit [Eng. Being and Time]) (for Kierkegaardâs influence on âfear of Godâ esp. in the theological domain, see OâRegan 2020). He begins by explaining that â[awe appears] ambivalent, as involving the fascinans just as it does the tremendum. Thus man fears the sacred, but loves it also: he attempts to elude it, yet seeks for it too. In fear therefore, which we are now about to examine, we shall discover not avoidance alone, but within and about this always a simultaneous attractionâŠâ (1986: 463). He then distinguishes between primary fear (the irrational fear of the unknown [similar to Kierkegaardâs âdread conceptâ]) and secondary fear (the rational fear of danger). An illustration he provides is a boy who wanders into a forest. At first, the boy is filled with dread because he does not know what is lurking in the forest (primary fear). As the boy becomes acquainted with the forest, his knowledge allows him to discern what is dangerous and what is safe (secondary fear) (1986: 463â64).
For van der Leeuw, this primary fearâmankindâs instinctual excitement/anxiety towards the unknownâis the origin of religion. This applies to the OT as he explains, âThere always persists in [the fear of God] something of that instinctive and irrational fear which is occasionally manifested without any concealment in the Old Testament itself, to whatever degree the Old Testament idea, in the course of time, may have accumulated ethical contentâŠâ (1986: 464). He further elaborates: ââŠin fear there is always an element of love, however feeble this may be, and in love an element of terror, however refined it may have become; and there are no religious ideas from which awe, as corresponding to the primeval experience of dread, is wholly absent. Only thus, in fact, can we understand that to fear God, to love and to serve Him, appear as related conceptsâŠâ (1986: 465â66). Here we can clearly see his reliance on Kierkegaardâs description of âanxietyâ (fear) as both a âsympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathyâ (see Kierkegaard 1980: 42).
Additional Contributions
In addition to these, other significant works helped promote and advance the growing discussion surrounding âfear of Godâ with an assumed connection to Numinous Fear. These works include: Johannes Pedersen (1920â1934; Eng. 1926â1940), especially vol. 2, part 3 âSacred and Profaneâ which thoroughly covers the nature of holiness in Israelite culture; Adolph BĂŒchler (1922); Paul Volz (1924); Albrecht Alt (1929; Eng. 1966); George Foot Moore (1927â1930), especially vol. 2, pt. V. âMorals;â Johannes Fichtner (1933), especially pt. 1, C âWeisheit als Frömmigkeit;â Reinhold Sander (1935); and finally Walther Eichrodt (1933â1939; Eng. 1961â1967), especially part 3 âGod and Man.â In particular, Eichrodt has an excellent summation on the âfear of Godâ discussion. He presents the matter from the theological side while engaging Otto, Hempel, and van der Leeuw (Eichrodt 1961â1967, see esp. 2:268â77). It may not be a stretch to suggest that he (more than any other singular figure) helped standardized the âfear of Godâ discussion around the Numinous Fear theory for the general populace during the mid-20th century.
How Numinous Fear Marked a Shift in the âFear of Godâ Discussion
The discussion around âfear of Godâ underwent a profound change across Europe around the beginning of the 20th century. It may be an exaggeration to attribute all credit to Rudolf Otto. However, it is undeniable that he was at the epicenter of this revolutionary shift. This transition can only be appreciated if you understand how âfear of Godâ was discussed before Otto then compare that to the discussion after Otto.
âFear of Godâ Before Otto
From the time of the church fathers up to the modern period, Christian theologians wrestled with the tension between fear and love. This tension is based on passages in the NT that seem to be in conflict. For example, Paul instructs Christians to âwork out your own salvation with fear and tremblingâ (Phil 2:12â13), but also that âGod did not give us a spirit of fear, but rather a spirit of power, love, and of self-control (1 Tim 1:7). Perhaps most importantly, John writes, âperfect love casts out fearâ (1 John 4:18). Recognizing the âparadoxâ this presented for Christian theologians, Andreas BĂ€hr discusses how the fear-love dichotomy developed in Christian thought (beginning with Augustine, then Aquinas, and through the Reformation) (2013: 79â95). For the purpose of this article, we will examine a few key examples.
John Donne expresses this tension eloquently in his sermon on Psalm 34:11, âCome ye children, hearken unto me, I will teach you the fear of the Lordâ:
So the fear and love of God will be one; for jealousy is but a fear of losing. Brevissima differentia Testamentorum, timor et amor; this distinguishes the two Testaments, the Old is a Testament of fear, the New of love; yet in this they grow all one, that we determine the Old Testament, in the New, and that we prove the New Testament by the OldâŠ. For, this fear is inchoative love, and this love is consummative fear; the love of God begins in fear, and the fear of God ends in love; and that love can never end, for God is love [1839, 288â89].
Herein Donne references St. Augustine who wrote, âFor this is the most concise and apparent difference between the two Testaments, fear and love: the former refers to the old man, the latter belongs to the new man; nevertheless, one of Godâs most merciful dispensations brought forth both of them and linked [them together]â (Adim. 17.2 [authorâs translation]). For Donne (and Augustine) fear is akin to an imperfect virtue, one that is necessary and eventually blossoms into love.
Throughout his classic piece, A Treatise of the Fear of God, John Bunyan reflects on the relationship between fear and love (1981: e.g., 57, 59, 74, 75â76, 89â90, 107â08, 20, 28â29). For Bunyan, fear is a type of grace alongside faith, hope, and love (1981: 51â56, 107â108). He defends this by distinguishing between godly and ungodly fear (1981: 22â34). This bifurcation of fear goes back as early as the 2nd century AD. For example, Clement of Alexandria distinguished between rational (logikos) and irrational (alogos) fear (phobos). He labeled ârational fearâ eulabeia which he understood to be the appropriate interpretation for âfearâ in the OTâs âfear of the Lordâ (Strom. 2.7). However, the bifurcation was popularized by St. Augustineâs categories of timor servilis and timor castus (Tract. Ev. Jo. 43.5â7; see also Tract. Ev. Jo. 85.3; Tract. ep. Jo. 9.5â8; and Enarrat. Ps. 18[Eng. 19].10). The aptly designated timor servilis is a restraining phenomenon where the individual is enslaved to his dread of punishment, whereas timor castus is a motivation to retain something so it is not lost. According to this rationale, for Bunyan (and Augustine again), there are two types of fear: bad fear and good fear. The labels and definitions vary, but the basic logic is consistent. We approach God through our bad fear, but over time it evolves into good fear.
A final example is found in Catherine Cavadiniâs article (2020) where she discusses Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas of Perseigne. The article is fascinating because it examines two 12th-century Cistercian monks, who both wrote commentaries on the Song of Songs, and both discuss the fear of God. However, they reconcile the underlying tensions differently. For Bernard, fear is something that will ultimately be replaced by love. As he writes, âWhen the soul ascends to the mystical and ecstatic âkiss of the mouth,â fear is cast out, and all things, for the bride, then consist of loveâ (2020: 111). However, for Thomas, fear is not inherently bad but needs perfection. âAs the bride kisses the feet with fear, she is in turn kissed with forgiveness; as she kisses the hands, she is in turn kissed with the gift of virtue; as she kisses the mouth, she is in turn kissed with a contemplative revelation of secretsâ (2020: 114). We see in Bernard and Thomas both approaches which emerged from Medieval thought: fear replaced by love, and fear perfected through love resulting in a new kind of fear.
âFear of Godâ After Otto
Otto and Numinous Fearâs influence can be felt in almost every aspect of âfear of Godâ discussions from the 20th century to today. For the purpose of this article, we will briefly examine three: lexical studies about yrâ (
), general depictions of âfear of God,â and the âfear of the Lord in wisdom scholarship.
Regarding yrâ studies, we find Ottoâs influence as early as the late 1940âs. Hendrik Brongers writes, âIn the Old Testament, religious fear corresponds to the notion of holiness⊠Attention has been drawn to the fact that religious fear, the thrill of the numen, has two faces, namely tremendum and fascinansâ (1948: 152â53 [authorâs translation]; see also 157â58). As Brongers argues, the OTâs yirat YHWH âfear of the Lordâ may have conveyed Ottoâs numinous concept in the past, but over the course of time this quality fades into something more practical (1948: 164â65). The subsequent lexical studies by Siegfried Plath (1963: 127), Joachim Becker (1965: 57â59), and Louis Derousseaux (1970: 18â21) all discuss the numinous aspect of fear as part of the semantic development of yrâ (comp. Fuhs TDOT: 6:300â03). However, recent studies such as those by David Clines (2003: 62â64) and Philip Lasater (2019: 26â34) also include discussions regarding the numinous quality of yrâ, but they tend to be more skeptical.
In broader âfear of Godâ discussions, we find Ottoâs influence everywhere. For example, James Muilenburgâs article on âHolinessâ in the Interpreterâs Dictionary of the Bible (1962) is heavily influenced by Otto. In the OT section, his 4th heading is âHoliness and fearâ (2:616â618) where he redirects the reader to Samuel Terrienâs âfearâ article. There, Terrien writes,
It would be a grave error, however, to soften the meaning of the expression [âthe fear of the Lordâ (Yirat YHWH)] and to ignore its central element of mysterium tremendum. Although many commentators and historians have fallen into this error during the past hundred years, the fear of the Lord is not merely to be equated with reverence, piety, or religion because it is impossible today to revaluate and again charge these terms with their ancientâbut now largely lostâconnotation of awesomeness [2:258].
Just by these two articles, we can see how Ottoâs conception of holiness and fear are influencing each other on an academic level. âFear of Godâ articles constantly reference Otto, his ideas, and Numinous Fear (see e.g., Balz 1969: 637; Cate 1987: 45; Murphy 1992: 175â77; Loader 2001: 268â69; Castelo 2008: 151â52, see fn 11; and Astell 2020: 3). Even in popular literature we see the strong connection fear maintains with holiness. For example, the third chapter in R. C. Sproulâs book, The Holiness of God, discusses âfear of Godâ in relation to Otto (1998: 35â45).
Ottoâs contribution to wisdom studies has already been the focus of publications. For example, Ettienne Ellisâ articles (2014 and her follow up article 2015) are examinations of Ottoâs impact on biblical scholarship with an emphasis on wisdom. While her articles are informative, they are not comprehensive. She overlooks how later scholars (e.g., Hempel, HĂ€nel, and van der Leeuw) helped develop Ottoâs ideas. She also focuses too much on the acceptance of Otto and ignores criticism. However, she is correct that within wisdom studies Otto is regularly discussed (see e.g., Blocher 1977: 7; BarrĂ© 1981: 42). The best available synopsis is Bruce Waltkeâs article (1992). Here he defends the integration of âOttoâsâ Numinous Fear with wisdomâs yirat YHWH. The article is expertly written. However, he fails to address the development of Ottoâs ideas or the philosophy behind them. Furthermore, he also ignores any criticism of Ottoâs theories.
To summarize, prior to the 20th century, fear was understood as resembling a virtue, but in contradistinction to love. The debate for most of this time was over how to reconcile the tension between fear and love with multiple approaches proposed. After Otto, âfear of Godâ is understood as manâs reaction to the numen. While it can be described as manâs ambivalent response to the (mysterium) tremendum et fascinen, it is widely discussed in relation to Godâs holiness (i.e., the numen).
Critical Reception of Ottoâs Numinous Fear
So much literature has adopted Ottoâin one form or anotherâthat it can easily convey the misconception of consensus. Furthermore, most of the reviews of his work shy away from negative critiques. However, Otto has received criticism from the areas of philosophy (e.g., Todd Gooch points out that some philosophers are dismissive of Otto because he was motivated by âtheological interestâ [2000: 25â27]; David Bastow criticizes Ottoâs integration of philosophy with phenomenology [1976: 175â76]; Thomas Ryba is critical of Ottoâs use of Kantâs a priori category [1991: 38]), psychology (e.g., see Dawson 1989: 307â08), and philology (e.g., see Lasater 2019: 26â34). For the purpose of this article and in the interest of biblical research, we will focus on the reactions from three demographics: Dutch, German, and American biblical scholarship.
The Dutch Resistance
Berend J. Oosterhoff is an unfortunate figure in the history of âfear of Godâ research. His monograph (1949) is possibly the oldest dissertation on the âfear of Godâ topic. Plath was even aware of Oosterhoffâs work but for whatever reason did not consult it for his own dissertation (1963: 9, see the last paragraph of fn 1). It is intriguing to consider how Oosterhoff might have altered the course of the conversation had he made a bigger splash in the 1950âs. Essentially, he attempted to shift the discussion from the philosophical/theological to the theological/exegetical without jettisoning the former. He covered this in chapter 10: âHet Karakter van de Vreze des Heren,â where he synthesized the ideas of Otto, Hempel, and van der Leeuw. Overall, he agreed with what had already been discussed concerning religious fear (1949: 123â24). The question that he took up was: Does this innately hold true for the OTâs yirat YHWH, fear of the Lord? As he explains, âAlthough it is true of all religious fear that there is a sense of distance and connection, nevertheless, the [yirat YHWH] in the Old Testament religion takes on its own character, distinguishing it from any other religious fearâ (1949: 125 [authorâs translation]). He elaborated that this is initially due to the fact that Yahweh is the sole source of religious dread for the OT religion which creates a unique dynamic (1949: 125â26). Second, since Yahweh is both holy and moral, when man comes before him the distance generates fear and guilt. This guilt leads to a longing to please God and not simply appease him. Here we see the moral quality (zedelijk karakter) of fear explicitly introduced (1949: 126â29). As he summarizes, âThus, in the Old Testament religion the feeling of distance and dependence acquires a character of its own, as in no other religionâŠâ (1949: 126 [authorâs translation]).
Oosterhoff effectually asked a question that no one up to this point had raised: Is Ottoâs Numinous Fear an appropriate way to describe the yirat YHWH in OT wisdom? And his answer is no. This objection was taken up later by Kornelis Miskotte,
Faith is not without experience, which surrounds like an aura the act of entrusting oneself. Or are we to say that they did not really find reconciliation and receive forgiveness? Or is the yirâath YHWH (âfear of Yahwehâ) nothing but a variant of the mysterium tremendum? Is the Old Testament only a primitive prefiguration of Kierkegaardâs dialectical analysis of dread? Is the fear expressed here completely stripped of love? And what is the basis of this love? Is not the heâemin, the trusting and venturing, an affirmation of the âmiracleâ (des EntrĂŒckten), a response to the revelation of this God, who as God becomes man in all the acts of his progress over the earth? Is not certainty an accompanying experience, an outflow of their experience of the steadfastness of the berith, the Covenant? [1967: 263; comp. his remarks in 2016: 165, 91; cf. Vreekamp 1982, 6â8).
Karl Barth and the Neo-Orthodox Response
Ottoâs harshest criticism came from the Neo-Orthodox. For example, Barth was adamant, âThe holy God of Scripture is certainly not âthe holyâ of Otto, that numinous element which, in its aspect as tremendum, is in itself and as such the divineâ (CD, 2:1, 360â361; for a summary of how Barthâs view of fear and religion differed from Ottoâs, see SchĂŒz 2016: 75â78). He elaborated on this in âThe Homecoming of the Son of Man:â
The numinous is not by a long way the holy. It is certainly quite inadequate as our present reference to the Holy Spirit because in practice it is a reference to the unknown, and the unknown may actually be, in part or in whole, the demonic. Even at best it is only a title or concept for what has to be said formally in elucidation of the process of revelation and the corresponding process of knowledge, and what is perhaps better said without this concept and title if in any case they do not lead us any nearer to that which is elucidated [CD, 4:2, 127â129].
He further stressed the difference between Ottoâs numen and his view concerning the revelation of the Word of God. âWhatever âthe holyâ of Otto may be, it certainly cannot be understood as the Word of God, for it is the numinous, and the numinous is the irrational, and the irrational can no longer be differentiated from an absolutised natural force. But everything depends on this differentiation if we are to understand the concept of the Word of Godâ (CD, 1:1, 135; for further discussion, see 3:3, 266â267; 4:2, 310â311; 4:3:3, 513â514; 4:4, 180â181). Robert Davidson summarizes the contention between Barth and Otto as a theocentric (Barth) vs. anthropocentric (Otto) view on the nature of religion (1946: 73). Barth understood religion as God revealing himself to man, whereas Otto emphasized manâs reaction to the divine.
Now it is true that Barth was criticizing Ottoâs depiction of Godâs holiness (numen) and not the Numinous Fear theory directly or broadly. Yet, to criticize Ottoâs ideas regarding the numen is to critique the foundation of Numinous Fear as we currently understand it. Similar critiques were raised by Paul Tillich (2009: 170â71; cf. SchĂŒz 2016: 158; 74â78) and Rudolf Bultmann (1969: 130â39; cf. Lattke 1985: 355â60; SchĂŒz 2016: 157â59).
Objections by American Scholars
Like Barth, Walter Kaiser raises concerns over Ottoâs understanding of the numen (2007: 145â46). As he describes, in Deuteronomy âfear [of God] was not a worked-up feeling of some numinous awe, but it was the result of hearing, learning, and responding to Godâs wordâ (2008: 135). He then suggests that this carries throughout the wisdom books as well (2007: 134â36). Most telling is his detailed discussion on âfear of the Lordâ where he never engages Otto or his ideas (1978: 137â45). Another scholar who is openly critical of associating Ottoâs theories with the OT concept of yirat YHWH is Leo Perdue who writes:
Fear of the Lord, which provides the major inclusio for the entire book of Proverbs (1:7 = 31:30), is not terror of divine power or what Rudolf Otto calls the religious experience of awe occasioned by standing in the presence of the Holy (mysterium tremendum). Rather, it is a religious piety characterized by faith in God as the creator and sustainer of life (see 9:10; 15:33; 31:30; Job 28:28; Ps. 111:10) [1994: 79].
Perdue further writes in his Proverbs commentary, â[It] is neither the terror occasioned by the supposition of a powerful yet unknown, even capricious deity, about which Qoheleth later speaks, nor the awe evoked in the presence of the holy God who is wholly other. For Proverbs, the âfear of Yahwehâ is the stance of the believer who confesses God is the creator and sustainer of life and the source and provider of all wisdomâ (2000: 74). Here Perdue sounds closely aligned with Oosterhoff and Miskotte.
Final Remarks
The purpose of this article is not to undermine Ottoâs contribution to 20th century scholarship, but to recognize legitimate concerns regarding some of his theories. In particular, how his theory of the numen has informed and dictated the âfear of Godâ discussion ever since. Does the âfearâ of God (for lack of a better word) describe the deityâs irruption into our plane of existence or merely manâs emotional response? Or could it be something in between? Or something altogether different? Is religion the byproduct of fear or manâs answer to fear? Finally, should the fear of God (as expressed in the Bible) be understood as the mechanism that drives the progression of religion or is it something different entirely? These are valid questions that biblical scholars should be asking both in light of Otto and in response to him. While his ideas may help explain the natural evolution of religion, there are concerns for applying them to the divine as a real experience such as the Bible describes and assumes (e.g., see Derousseauxâs critique of Ottoâs Numinous Fear (crainte sacrĂ©e) (1970: 16â21). This is why we should take careâwhen engaging Ottoâto recognize potential problems, appreciate how later theologians filtered and developed his ideas, and not embrace them uncritically.
References
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