Abstract
Recent literature in economics and political science has drawn attention to the impact of institutions on the development of advanced capitalist economies and revived interest in the spread of corporatism in postwar Europe. The slowdown in productivity growth during the past two decades has sharpened the debate on the effects of market regulation in countries such as Britain and Sweden. There is a formidable body of writing which attributes low growth to the interference of collective organizations, and to trade unions in particular. This paper surveys the arguments on the comparative growth of bargaining institutions in the two countries and offers a critical review of the definitions of 'corporatism' and 'institutional sclerosis' which have figured so prominently in the discussions of the performance of modern industrial economies. In contrast to much recent scholarship in economic history and industrial relations, the paper argues that any assessment of the origins and impact of bargaining institutions must be framed by an analysis of the wider political and cultural forces which have shaped the 'rational' expectations and behaviour of economic actors in the two societies during the middle decades of the 20th century. The divergence in behaviour and the effects of this behaviour on productivity growth must be explained, to a large extent, in terms of the distinctive values and political economy devised by the labour movements in Britain and Sweden. Models which assume standard, common motivations are invariably flawed.
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