Increasing worker participation in decision-making can often increase productivity, but remains uncommon in the US. This paper reviews theories of why the market may produce less than the efficient amount of worker participation. A novel policy intervention in which tax subsidies are tied to multiple imperfect measures of participation is proposed.
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