Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Between 2020 and 2022, Thailand instituted a series of policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. However, many of the regulations were rooted in structural discrimination against the migrant population. This paper reveals how the discriminatory nature of the government’s policies heightened the vulnerability of migrant workers in Thailand’s commercial fishing and seafood processing industries. COVID-19 containment measures and immigration policies, coupled with the exclusion of migrant workers from social protection programs, inadvertently subjected migrant workers in Thailand’s seafood industry to increased risk of forced labor. At the same time, further restrictions on freedom of association rights and the weakening of labor inspections during the pandemic hampered workers’ ability to report labor abuses and the government’s ability to identify and remedy cases of forced labor.

Keywords

migrant rights fishing discrimination COVID-19 forced labor Thailand

Introduction

Thailand has nearly four million migrant workers from neighboring countries Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—comprising 10 percent of the Thai workforce, with the majority of workers in several low-wage sectors, including the seafood industry. In 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) expressed its “deep concern” regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the protection of migrant fishers’ rights in Thailand (CEACR, 2022). Migrant workers are three times more likely than other workers to be subjected to forced labor, defined by the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (C29) as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (ILO, 2022a: 4). Situations of forced labor can be identified using the ILO indicators of forced labor (ILO, 2012; ILO, 2023). The disproportionate risk of forced labor among migrant workers stems from the structural discrimination that migrant workers face, in violation of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Excluded from key protections such as long-term legal status, union rights and access to social protection programs, migrant workers in Thailand were thus particularly vulnerable to forced labor when the pandemic hit in 2020 (Verité, 2020).

Worth about USD 5.6 billion, Thailand’s seafood industry employs more than 350,000 workers, including 60,000–70,000 fishers and approximately 300,000 seafood processing workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (DOF, 2019–2021; ILO, 2020b: 1). Dangerous and inadequately regulated, the industry constitutes one-fifth of Thailand’s total food product exports and relies on the “severe labor exploitation of impoverished migrants” (Clark and Longo, 2021: 2). In 2014, the prevalence of forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry made international headlines, contributing to the downgrade of Thailand to Tier 3 in the U.S. Department of State, 2016 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report and the issuance of a “yellow card” by the European Union in 2015 (Marschke and Vandergeest, 2016: 40–41; Wilhelm et al., 2020: 2).

With its profitable seafood export industry endangered, the Thai government instituted a series of reforms. These included enacting the Ministerial Regulation on Labour Protection in Sea Fishing Work, B.E. 2557 (2014); establishing Port-In/Port-Out (PIPO) centers to inspect fishing vessels in 2015; and enacting and amending the Royal Ordinance Concerning the Management of Employment of Foreign Workers, B.E. 2560 in 2017 and 2018. Other measures included ratifying the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, No. 29, 1930 (P029) in 2018 and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention (ILO, 2007) (C188) in 2019. Additional reforms involved amending the Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act, B.E. 2551 (2008) to include a stand-alone offense of forced labor in 2019 and enacting the Labour Protection in Fishing Work Act, B.E. 2562 (2019) (ILO, 2020b: vii; United Nations Network on Migration, 2022; Kadfak and Widengard, 2022: 8–10). Due to these reforms, Thailand returned to the Tier 2 Watchlist in 2016–2017 then upgraded to Tier 2 in 2018, and had its yellow card lifted in 2019 (U.S. Department of State, 2016; U.S. Department of State, 2018; European Commission, 2019). Nonetheless, the exploitation of migrant workers in Thailand’s seafood industry persisted (HRW, 2018; SWG, 2022). In March 2020, the ILO reported that approximately 14 percent of fishers and seven percent of seafood processing workers were found to be in situations of forced labor (ILO, 2020b).

Since the first wave began in March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic quickly exposed and exacerbated societal inequalities in Thailand and around the world (Jones et al., 2021: vii; Rani, 2021: 80). The vulnerabilities of all marginalized populations, including migrant workers, became stark. In light of these developments, this article addresses the following questions: (1) What policies did Thailand enact in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that compromised the labor rights of migrant fishers and seafood processing workers? (2) How did these policies adversely impact many migrant workers’ vulnerability to forced labor? These questions are important not only within the Thai context, but also globally, because they reveal the governance gaps across the global seafood supply chain.

The authors found that Thailand’s COVID-19 containment measures, immigration policies and social protection programs during the pandemic discriminated against migrant workers and fostered conditions for seven ILO indicators of forced labor: Debt bondage, deception, abuse of vulnerability, retention of identity documents, excessive overtime, abusive working and living conditions, and restriction of movement. Meanwhile, further restrictions on freedom of association rights and the weakening of PIPO inspections hampered workers’ ability to report labor abuses and the government’s ability to identify and remedy cases of forced labor. After providing an overview of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies, this paper analyzes the discriminatory nature of these policies, which are rooted in long-standing structural discrimination against migrants, and their impact on migrant workers’ risk of forced labor. The paper concludes with actionable recommendations to help eliminate forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry.¹

Literature review

We used a labor rights practitioner framework to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migrant workers’ vulnerability to forced labor (ILO, 2007). Several scholars have examined the problem of forced labor in the global seafood industry at large (Mileski et al., 2020; Yuliantiningsih and Barkhuizen, 2021; Lozano et al., 2022), and those who have used Thailand as a case study are yet to address the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (Clark and Longo, 2021; Musikawong and Rzonca, 2021). Some scholars analyzed the impact of COVID-19 on the risk of forced labor (Rojanaworarit and El Bouazidi, 2021) or exploitation more broadly (Aziz and Basir, 2020; Kunpeuk et al., 2022) among migrant workers in Thailand, but not specifically on the seafood industry. Other scholars have studied the impact of COVID-19 on migrant workers in the seafood industry, either globally (Havice et al., 2020; De Beukelaer, 2021) or in Thailand (Marschke et al., 2020; Vandergeest and Marschke, 2021), but not focusing on the risk of forced labor. More recently, some scholars have written narrative reviews of the impact of COVID-19 on the vulnerability of migrant workers to forced labor in Southeast Asia, with Thailand as one of several case studies (Buckley et al., 2022).

Filling the research gap, this article analyzes how the discriminatory nature of policies in response to COVID-19 affected migrant workers’ vulnerability to forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry. Discrimination against migrant workers includes racist and xenophobic societal attitudes, which intensified during the pandemic, fueling segregationist policies, strict immigration control and the suppression of migrants’ rights (Chan and Lan, 2022; Marschke et al., 2020; Guadagno, 2020: 5, 12; ILO, 2020c: 1). The structural marginalization faced by migrant workers resulted from their precarious legal status, limited access to health care and social security, as well as legal barriers to unionization (Suhardiman et al., 2021; Rogovin, 2021; Vandergeest et al., 2021). In the commercial fishing industry, isolation at sea, as well as crowded and hazardous living and working conditions on vessels, further compounded migrant workers’ marginalization (Murphy et al., 2022; Marschke et al., 2020). Furthermore, migrant fishers experience sector-based discrimination, being only granted watered down protections in comparison to C188, while simultaneously being categorically excluded from the Labour Protection in Fishing Work Act and the Ministerial Regulation on Labour Protection in Sea Fishing Work (MWG, 2021; Auethavornpipat, 2022: 266-267).

Methodology

This article synthesizes and supplements existing scholarship by analyzing primary and secondary sources collected via a scoping review. Most of the sources were published between 2020 and 2022 during the COVID-19 pandemic, and some were published between 2014 and 2019 when Thailand’s seafood industry received significant international attention.

Primary sources examined include two international laws and regulations, three Thai laws and regulations, and two data sources published by the Thai government. The selection of the primary sources was based on laws and regulations most closely related to the seafood industry and migrant workers in Thailand. Any selection bias is due to the authors’ own scope of expertise and was mitigated by consultation with an ILO technical officer, migrant rights’ advocates and trade union specialists. Secondary sources examined include news articles, reports by local civil society organizations (CSOs), and research published by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), global union federations, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the U.S. and Thai governments. Key points are drawn from the submission of Global Labor Justice–International Labor Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF) to the U.S. Department of State and an online survey and interview study of migrant workers conducted by the Migrant Working Group (MWG) (Kerdmongkol, 2023; SWG, 2022).² Notable limitations to the article include a lack of primary data and the concentration of English-language secondary sources.

Findings

Discrimination against migrant workers prior to the COVID-19 pandemic

Discriminatory policies against migrant workers predate the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the ILO, “The disparate treatment of migrant workers […] is a reflection of larger social disparities and policies that perpetuate discriminatory treatment. This exclusion is especially hard on fishers, as their access to social protection is generally more limited […]” (ILO, 2022b: 2).

Prior to the pandemic, migrant workers were recruited to work in Thailand’s fishing and seafood processing industries based on short-term contracts, recruitment fees, and limited labor and social protections (GLJ-ILRF, 2021: 20-43). Unlike Thai nationals, migrant workers were legally barred from forming and leading trade unions under the Labour Relations Act, B.E. 2518 (1975) and faced significant limitations in joining existing unions or engaging in genuine collective bargaining (Rogovin, 2020). Moreover, migrant workers were hindered from reporting abuses and obtaining remedy “due to lack of awareness of their rights and grievance procedures, language barriers, fear of retaliation from their employers, discriminatory attitudes of government officials, and concerns about their immigration status” (Rousseau, 2020: 3; GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 29-33).

These marginalizing policies made migrant workers particularly vulnerable to exploitation for decades and are rooted in anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiments, which are marked by the rise of nativism around the world, including in Thailand. Migrant workers have historically been targets of xenophobic discrimination, in violation of their fundamental rights (Jones et al., 2021: 25-26).

Overview of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies

From March 2020 to October 2022, in response to five waves of COVID-19,³ the Thai government enacted policies to contain the spread of COVID-19, fill the national labor shortage and alleviate financial precarity for its citizens exclusively. Many of these policies affected migrant workers in the seafood industry.

COVID-19 containment policies

On 13 January 2020, the first COVID-19 case was reported in Thailand, followed by the first wave of infections, including an outbreak at a migrant detention center in Songkhla province in April 2020 (The Nation, 2020). In March 2020, Thailand closed its borders and suspended its Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with neighboring countries (ILO, 2020a), leading 193,413 migrant workers to return to their home countries (ILO, 2020a; Khemanitthathai, 2021; ILO, 2022b; Frontier Myanmar, 2022). The government also issued an Emergency Decree, enacting a national lockdown, interprovincial travel restrictions and restrictions on international travel (ARTICLE 19, 2022; ILO, 2022b). The decree additionally restricted freedom of association and collective bargaining rights by banning public gatherings, as well as protests and strikes, in May 2020 (Freedom House, 2021; GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 28).⁴ Due to physical distancing requirements, many PIPO inspections of fishing vessels were also suspended (EJF, 2021: 19).

The second wave began on 17 December 2020 with an outbreak at the Central Shrimp Market in Samut Sakhon province, a seafood hub, in which a majority (61 percent) of those hospitalized were migrants (Kunno et al., 2021). The government closed and barb-wired the market, then imposed a curfew and lockdown on the migrant community (260,000 documented persons and 140,000 undocumented) (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 11). Infected and uninfected workers alike were forced to quarantine together in dormitories. In January 2021, a provincial order required fishers arriving at Samut Sakhon port to remain onboard the vessels until they tested negative (Wongsamuth, 2021; ILO, 2022b: 8). The following month, the “Bubble and Seal” policy was introduced in Samut Sakhon, in which employers shuttled workers straight from home to work or required workers to stay in employer-provided dormitories, apart from their families (ILO, 2020c: 8). By June 2021, this policy was adopted in 10 other provinces and extended to other sectors (ILO, 2022b; GLJ-ILRF, 2022). In addition, the government introduced the “No Movement of Migrant Workers” policy at the beginning of 2021, prohibiting migrants from traveling across provinces (Khemanitthathai, 2021: 6). Only those with two doses of the COVID-19 vaccination could request travel, but it was not until November 2021 that the government allotted 500,000 vaccines for migrants. This policy was enforced in a dozen provinces during the third wave in June 2021, while similar policies were enacted in several other provinces at the start of the fourth wave (Khemanitthathai, 2021: 32).

During the fourth wave, in August 2021, the Phuket Provincial Authority Order no. 4623/2564 on “Restrictions of fishing workers on commercial boats in Phuket” confined fishers to the vessels or ports where they worked and quarantined at-risk fishers on vessels (Khemanitthathai, 2021; MWG, 2021: 86; HRDF, 2021). Other similar orders were later issued in Phuket, Prachuap Khiri Khan and Nakhon Sri Thammarat provinces. In Phang Nga, Ranong and Chumphon provinces, migrant fishers reported 14-, 20-, or 25-day quarantine periods without work, pay or sufficient food; many had 500 Thailand Baht (THB) (USD 15) wage deductions to pay for food and water (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 17).

PIPO inspections were also adapted to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (MWG, 2021: 87). Ever since the first lockdown, PIPO officers conducted labor inspections “on a more sporadic basis or with additional precautions” (EJF, 2021: 19). Beginning in August 2021, PIPO officers reduced the number of inspectors and conducted inspections over video conferencing or photographs sent electronically (MWG, 2021).

During the fourth and fifth waves, the government also further restricted workers’ rights to freedom of association as part of their COVID-19 response. Extended 19 times, the Emergency Decree banned public gatherings, as well as protests and strikes, until October 2022 (Thai PBS World, 2021; Thai PBS World, 2022; Tilleke and Gibbins, 2022).

Immigration policy cabinet resolutions

Following the border closures and suspension of bilateral agreements in terms of MoUs, Thailand experienced a national labor shortage. By August 2021, the country needed 424,703 additional migrant workers across all sectors, including the seafood industry (Ministry of Labor Thailand, 2021). Nonetheless, the government “largely allowed the fishing industry to continue to operate throughout 2020 and deemed fish an essential consumer good;” consequently, Thai seafood exports in 2020 and 2021 exceeded pre-pandemic rates (ILO, 2022b: 6).⁵ To fill the shortage, the government enacted numerous legal registration policies for migrants (HRDF and MWG, 2021). In April 2020, the Department of Fisheries (DOF) announced two registration rounds for migrant fishers (May to June 2020 and July to September 2020). Additionally, the government passed 17 cabinet resolutions from March 2020 to July 2022 to grant legal status to migrant workers whose statuses were expiring (Bangkok Business News, 2020; ILO, 2020a; Khemanitthathai, 2021). One example is the 29 December 2020 cabinet resolution, which extended migrants’ stay for two years, but also imposed excessive fees of around THB 8,680 (USD 263) on fishers: THB 1,100 (USD 33) for the health checkup, THB 2,300 (USD 70) for COVID-19 testing, THB 3,200 (USD 97) for health insurance, THB 1,900 (USD 58) for the work permit, THB 80 (USD 2) for the pink card, and THB 100 (USD 3) for the Seabook (Kerdmongkol, 2023: 12).⁶

Social protection programs

The Thai government borrowed THB 1.5 trillion to alleviate financial precarity during the pandemic (The Nation, 2022). In its March 2020 cabinet resolutions, the Ministry of Labour (MOL) issued financial relief through the Social Security Fund (SSF) for workers who became unemployed due to the pandemic, but imposed extremely strict eligibility criteria (Kunpeuk et al., 2022; Marschke et al., 2020). Meanwhile, the government required Thai nationality for several cash handout programs (GLJ-ILRF, 2022): The “No One Left Behind” scheme, which provided THB 5,000 (USD 152) monthly from April to June 2020; the “Section 33, We Love Each Other” scheme, which was approved in February 2021 and awarded THB 9.27 million (USD 280,909) total; the “We Win” scheme, which provided THB 9,000 (USD 273) from January to June 2021; and a scheme that offered an extra THB 2,500 (USD 76) subsidy for Thai workers insured under Section 33 during July and/or August 2021 (HRDF, 2022c).

The discriminatory nature of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies

Many of the Thai government’s COVID-19 policies discriminated against migrant workers either directly or indirectly. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2560 (2017), outlaws direct discrimination, or “unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of differences in origin, race, language, sex, age, disability, physical or health condition, personal status, economic and social standing, religious belief, education, or political view […] or on any other grounds […]” (Office of the Council of State of Thailand, 2017).⁷ Thailand also ratified the ILO Discrimination in Employment and Occupation Convention, 1958 (C111), committing to (1) “equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination” (C111, Article 2). C111 prohibits both direct (as noted above) and indirect discrimination, or “rules and practices which appear neutral but in practice lead to disadvantages primarily suffered by persons of one sex, race, colour or other characteristics” (ILO, 2007: 11).

Some COVID-19 policies constituted direct discrimination. For example, interprovincial travel restrictions limited migrants’ right to mobility, whereas Thai nationals could travel across provinces with official permission (Vandergeest et al., 2021; SWG, 2022: 13). The Thai nationality requirement for COVID-19 cash handout programs also exemplified direct discrimination, as the government chose to offer Thai nationals better financial support (HRDF, 2022c). On 08 June 2021, migrant workers filed a complaint alleging that Section 33, We Love Each Other constituted unjust discrimination and segregation, in violation of the Constitution. More than one million non-Thai workers insured under Section 33 had been paying contributions to the SSF at the same rate as Thai workers, totaling more than USD 1.5 billion annually, but were denied access (HRDF, 2022b). After the Ombudsman upheld the constitutionality of the scheme, the Constitutional Court and the Central Administrative Court both dismissed the suit (HRDF, 2022a). These court decisions upheld the discriminatory nature of the scheme.

Meanwhile, other COVID-19 policies indirectly discriminated against migrants by appearing neutral, yet primarily disadvantaging migrant workers who dominate the Thai seafood industry workforce. For example, Samut Sakhon province’s “targeted strategy” during the second wave chiefly harmed migrant workers who had to quarantine in unhygienic, crowded dormitories or on vessels without sufficient food or water—policies that are likely considered unacceptable for Thais (Rajatanavin et al., 2021; GLJ-IRLF, 2022: 16). Similarly, the suspension and weakening of PIPO inspections, too, disparately impacted migrant fishers by decreasing the likelihood of uncovering labor abuses on vessels (EJF, 2021).

Another example of indirect discrimination is the MOL’s relief programs for insured persons under Section 33. Many migrant workers—especially fishers, who are not covered by the SSF—face practical barriers in enrolling in the SSF, such as an unawareness of their entitlements, language limitations, and the complex and time-consuming nature of the claim process (Aziz and Basir, 2020; Marschke et al., 2020; ILO, 2022b; Siamhan and Trirath 2020; GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 21-22). If insured under Section 33, workers needed to have enrolled at least six months prior to unemployment and have quarantined due to a COVID-19 workplace closure to qualify for government assistance. Additionally, migrant fishers are often disqualified because their employers refuse to furnish documentation (e.g., copy of passport, copy of the first page of a bankbook and employer letter of certification) (Marschke et al., 2020; Permanent Secretary of Labor, 2021; ILO, 2022b; Kunpeuk et al., 2022).

The cabinet resolutions concerning migrant workers’ registration—described as “overly complicated and changing,” “unfair to the workforce,” and “disorienting even for employers”—also indirectly discriminated against migrants by posing “a high barrier for entry” to obtain legal status (Saksornchai, 2021). For example, following the December 2020 resolution, about 80,000 to 100,000 migrant workers remained unable to apply for their work permits between January 2021 to June 2022 due to the complexity and cost of the registration process (Kerdmongkol, 2023: 12). By designing its immigration policies to be largely inaccessible to migrants, the government exacerbated migrant workers’ precarious situation during an already uncertain time for all.

Lastly, the government’s discourse on COVID-19 discriminated against migrants. In response to the first wave, the government published an official statement that highlighted “the pureness of Thai nationals who were COVID-free while foreigners were importers of the disease” (Khemanitthathai, 2021: 29). Subsequently, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha blamed “illegal immigrants” from Myanmar for inciting the second wave and bringing “much grief to the country,” which fueled anti-Burmese sentiment and online hate speech (Kuhakan and Sriring, 2020). Such xenophobic remarks made migrant workers more vulnerable to exploitation during the pandemic (Marschke et al., 2020; Vandergeest et al., 2021; Havice et al., 2020).

Analysis of the impact of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies on migrant workers’ risk of forced labor in the seafood industry

Having ratified P029 in 2018, Thailand has committed to “addressing the root causes and factors that heighten the risks of forced or compulsory labor” (P029, Article 2(f)). According to the ILO, migrant workers are at higher risk of forced labor when they “are not protected by law or are unable to exercise their rights, migration is irregular or poorly governed, or where recruitment practices are unfair or unethical” (ILO, 2022a: 4). Many of the Thai government’s discriminatory policies during the pandemic heightened migrant workers’ risk of forced labor, particularly the following seven indicators of forced labor.

Debt bondage and deception

The government’s COVID-19 containment policies put migrant workers at risk of debt bondage. Financial precarity—and especially debt—increases migrants’ risk of forced labor by leaving them with little choice but to continue working for an exploitative employer (Bigio and Welch, 2020). Forced laborers thus often work to pay off a debt incurred from wage advances or loans to cover recruitment, transportation, daily living or emergency expenses (ILO, 2012). The closure of the Central Shrimp Market and the lockdown of migrant communities in Samut Sakhon caused many workers in the seafood industry to lose their jobs, and many struggled to find new employment with the strict travel restrictions in place (Marschke et al., 2020). Meanwhile, migrant fishers who were required to quarantine experienced increased financial precarity, as they could not work and received no compensation for lost income during the quarantine period, while having their wages deducted to pay for food and water on board. Moreover, migrant workers who needed to travel across provinces out of economic necessity or personal reasons, such as family emergencies, had to pay brokers thousands of Baht in fees. Some afforded these fees by borrowing money from their families or employers, incurring debt (GLJ-ILRF, 2022).

Many migrant workers also experienced increased risks of debt bondage due to the government’s immigration policies. Even prior to COVID-19, gaps in the registration system had enabled significant profits for brokers that processed immigration and work permit documents for migrant fishers and seafood processing workers (HRW, 2018). During the pandemic, the suspension of the MoU recruitment channel eliminated a major legal pathway for migrants seeking to enter Thailand, including for the tens of thousands of individuals trying to escape violence, destitution and starvation in Myanmar after the military coup in February 2021 (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 22-23; Kunpeuk et al., 2022; Frontier Myanmar, 2022). The lack of options for migrants, especially those from Myanmar, encouraged the proliferation of informal labor brokerage networks (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 24-25), where brokers could take advantage of migrants’ confusion regarding the ever-changing registration policies and deceive them by charging excessive recruitment fees, in violation of the ILO’s “zero recruitment fee” principle and section 42 of the 2018 Amendment to the Royal Ordinance Concerning Management of Employment of Foreign Workers (2017) (Musikawong and Rzonca, 2021: 180; MWG, 2022; ILO, 2019; ILO, 2020: 28-29). During the pandemic, nearly half (49 percent) of migrant workers relied on a broker to migrate, and many had to pay between THB 15,000–30,000 (USD 455–909) on average (Pakkawan, 2022; IOM, 02 June 2022, Validation Workshop of the Study on Supply Chain Dynamics;⁸ Frontier Myanmar, 2022). By May 2022, brokerage fees soared as high as THB 80,000 (USD 2,424) (Pakkawan, 2022). In some cases, brokers charged fees for fake employment, upon which the migrants fell further into debt after having to pay additional thousands of Baht to a different broker for another job (Frontier Myanmar, 2022).

Many migrant workers who remained in Thailand after the border closures also fell into debt bondage due to the costly registration process. For example, according to the study by Kerdmongkol (2023) on the impact of the 29 December 2020 cabinet resolution on migrant workers, the registration scheme rendered migrant workers “vulnerable to a cycle of debt bondage due to the incurring debt caused by the unregulated levying of fees” (Kerdmongkol, 2023). While the government-estimated fees for registration ranged between THB 8,480–8,680 (USD 257–263), workers reported paying an average of THB 12,000 (USD 364) to employers, THB 17,000 (USD 515) to brokers and THB 13,000 (USD 394) to recruitment agencies (Kerdmongkol, 2023: 7). The exorbitant costs resulted from the complexity of the registration process, which required 93 percent of migrant workers to pay extra fees to receive outside help (Kerdmongkol, 2023: 16-20). As a result, 79 percent of the 195 migrant workers surveyed incurred debt in the registration process; to service their debt, about 60 percent had their wages deducted (Kerdmongkol, 2023: 25-28). The 05 July 2022 cabinet resolution had a similar effect (Kerdmongkol, 2022).

Despite these additional financial burdens on migrant workers during the pandemic, the government effectively excluded migrant workers from financial assistance policies by requiring Thai nationality or imposing stringent prerequisites that most migrant workers could not meet. Burdened with extensive debt and lacking government support, many migrant workers in Thailand became more vulnerable to debt bondage.

Retention of identity documents and abuse of vulnerability

During the pandemic, the government’s immigration policies put migrant workers at even greater mercy of their employers for their income and legal status, which allowed employers to abuse workers’ heightened vulnerability (ILO, 2022c: 12). With the border closures, migrant workers had to choose to either return to their home countries and forfeit their outstanding wages or to remain in Thailand (ILO, 2022c: 12).

Some migrant fishers were trapped in Thailand despite their wish to return home because their employers held their passports and legal documents, in violation of the 2018 amendment to the Royal Ordinance Concerning Management of Employment of Migrant Workers (ILO, 2022c: 12; United Nations Network on Migration, 2022). One reason for this practice was that vessel owners did not want their crew to seek work on other vessels (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 36). In some cases, these workers also had to accept illegally low wages. The ILO reports, “[o]ne migrant fishing worker in Thailand recalled being paid 100 THB [3 USD] per day—less than the legal minimum daily wage—but given that the employer controlled the workers’ identification papers, the fisher had to accept these wages and continue working” (ILO, 2022c: 12).

Migrant workers who remained in Thailand had to navigate the complex and costly registration process; by January 2021, about 500,000 migrants fell into irregular status (ILO, 2022c: 16). Many employers took advantage of migrant workers’ irregular status, leaving many with no choice but to tolerate “unexplained wage cuts” and work for significantly lower wages than agreed upon in their employment contract (Frontier Myanmar, 2022; ILO, 2020c: 12; CEACR, 2022). According to the “Project to survey the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic situation,” 38 percent of fishers surveyed experienced THB 3,956 (USD 120) monthly wage deductions—nearly one-third of the average migrant fishers’ monthly wage in 2019 (Jullanan, 2021).⁹ Meanwhile, according to a survey by the CSO Coalition for Ethical and Sustainable Seafood, 58 percent of seafood processing workers in Thailand received less than the minimum wage during the pandemic (Stride, 2021). In addition, fishers in the Fishers’ Rights Network (FRN) regularly reported instances of not being paid for months, in violation of the Ministerial Regulation on Labour Protection in Sea Fishing Work and Article 23 of C188 (CEACR, 2022).

Excessive overtime

According to the ILO, “if employees have to work more overtime than is allowed under national law, under some form of threat…or in order to earn at least the minimum wage, this amounts to forced labour” (ILO, 2012: 25). As previously mentioned, border closures and suspension of MoUs during the pandemic led to a major labor shortage in Thailand (HRDF and MWG, 2021). In May 2020, the country was short 50,000 migrant fishers (Marschke et al., 2020: 92). Consequently, only six to seven fishers would staff vessels that required 10 fishers; and they would have to work harder and for longer hours, with many only receiving four to five hours of rest per day at most (ILO, 2022b; GLJ-ILRF, 2022). This practice violated Section 5 of Thailand’s Ministerial Regulation on Labour Protection in Sea Fishing Work, which mandates 10 hours of rest in a 24-hour period and not less than 77 hours every 7 days.

Meanwhile, heightened global consumer demand for seafood during the pandemic led to excessive working hours for seafood processing workers in 2020 and 2021, in violation of the Labor Protection Act (1998), which limits working hours to nine hours per day and 48 hours per week (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 39). Workers reported exhaustion from working from 5:00 AM to 8:00 PM, 7 days a week, and those who asked to rest were threatened with no overtime pay for the following week (GLJ-ILRF, 2022: 39).

Abusive working and living conditions

Due to the excessive working hours, migrant fishers suffered more workplace accidents. However, they were often denied access to personal protective equipment (PPE) and sometimes denied sick leave or medical treatment—characteristics of abusive working conditions (Siamhan and Trirath, 2020; ILO, 2022b: 1; CEACR, 2022; SWG, 2022: 39). Quarantine policies also fostered abusive living conditions. In Samut Sakhon, migrant workers at high-risk and low-risk of contracting COVID-19 had to quarantine together in dormitories described as “a ghetto” with “squalid conditions,” with shared toilets and no social distancing (Wongsamuth, 2021; Khemanitthathai, 2021: 6). In addition, the “Bubble and Seal” policy caused workers to face hunger when employers did not provide sufficient provisions (ILO, 2020c: 8). Similarly, migrant fishers forced to quarantine on vessels had to inhabit cramped quarters with limited ventilation and unsanitary toilets, and they lacked access to sufficient food, clean water or medicine (Wongsamuth, 2021; Khemanitthathai, 2021; SWG, 2022: 16; EJF, 2021).

Restriction of movement

According to the ILO, “[i]f workers are not free to enter and exit the work premises, subject to certain restrictions which are considered reasonable, this represents a strong indicator of forced labour” (ILO, 2012: 9). Some of the government’s COVID-19 containment policies, such as the “Bubble and Seal” policy, required workers to remain on work premises and continue working. If workers only stayed to work as a consequence of the containment policies, then the policies may have compelled workers to remain in undesirable or abusive jobs.

Analysis of the impact of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies on the ability to address forced labor in the seafood industry

Besides increasing migrant workers’ risk of forced labor, other COVID-19 policies made it harder to address and eliminate forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry. These include restrictions on migrant workers’ union rights and the weakening of PIPO inspections.

Restrictions on union rights

Restrictions on freedom of association during the pandemic created barriers for migrant workers to address forced labor conditions in their workplaces. For example, the lack of worker representation among seafood processing workers—stemming from the continued legal ban on migrant workers’ right to form and lead unions in Thailand—precluded them from demanding better workplace protections and housing arrangements after the COVID-19 outbreak in Samut Sakhon (Rogovin, 2021). Migrant fishers who were obligated to quarantine on vessels faced similar limitations. Moreover, the bans on public gatherings and strikes, which levied fines or imprisonment for noncompliance, prevented migrant workers from receiving basic rights education from advocacy groups, who also risked arrest (SWG, 2022), and impeded them from organizing to collectively challenge discriminatory policies.

Weakened labor inspections

Modified PIPO inspections during the pandemic also made it more difficult for Thai officials to identify and remedy cases of forced labor in the seafood industry. Labor inspections are critical to identifying labor abuses, but as previously discussed, fishing vessels were not permitted to come ashore for extended periods of time, nor subject to regular onshore inspections, during the pandemic. At some PIPO centers, inspections of normal-risk vessels were not conducted (EJF, 2021), likely permitting abuses to go undetected. Even the inspections that were carried out proved to be ineffective. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) described PIPO inspections as being too “superficial” to actually identify and correct violations (ITF, 2021; see also, consensus from EJF, 2021: 5-22; HRDF, 2021; CEACR, 2022). At several inspections, no inspectors boarded the vessels, and online inspections did not involve any worker interviews (EJF, 2021: 8, 33; SWG, 2022: 53-54). Thus, on 18 January 2022 there was a Cabinet Resolution requiring the 60,288 PIPO inspections to be facilitated by the MOL from October 2020 to January 2022, but only 20 fishing vessels—or 0.03 percent of all vessels—were reported to have labor violations, none of which were for forced labor (SWG, 2022: 53-54). According to the United States (US) government’s 2022 TIP Report (U.S. Department of State, 2022: 537, 539), this was because “inconsistent and ineffective interviewing practices during labor inspections left many labor trafficking victims unidentified.”

Conclusion and recommendations

Nearly a decade after international media exposés revealed the labor abuses pervading Thailand’s seafood industry, the Thai government’s COVID-19 policies have had an alarming impact on migrant workers’ risk of forced labor. Many of the government’s policies, which intended to contain the spread of COVID-19, fill the national labor shortage and alleviate financial precarity, ended up directly or indirectly discriminating against migrant workers in the seafood industry. These discriminatory policies increased these workers’ risk of forced labor by fostering conditions for seven ILO indicators of forced labor in particular: Debt bondage, deception, abuse of vulnerability, retention of identity documents, excessive overtime, abusive working and living conditions, and restriction of movement. Meanwhile, further restrictions on migrant workers’ union rights and the weakening of PIPO inspections made it more challenging for workers to contest discriminatory practices and for the government to identify and remedy cases of forced labor.

It is time for Thailand’s seafood industry to return to the global spotlight. Months after the COVID-19 pandemic, which officially ended in May 2023, the indicators of forced labor remain prevalent in the industry (ITF-FRN, 2024). To meaningfully reduce the risk of forced labor in the post-pandemic era, the Thai government must address the deeply rooted structural discrimination facing the migrant worker population. The government should reexamine past COVID-19 policies, including public health, immigration and social protection policies, to ensure that future policies in times of emergency do not reify and normalize discrimination against migrant workers. Additionally, the government should help protect migrant workers against labor exploitation through various measures. First, as Taiwan and South Korea have done, Thailand should expand migrant workers’ union rights so that they can collectively work to improve their conditions before they amount to forced labor (Ford, 2019; Rogovin, 2021). Second, the government should promote safe migration and decent work for migrant workers by establishing a long-term, comprehensive labor migration management program that is clear and accessible with reduced administrative requirements; provides the opportunity to work and reside in Thailand for longer periods of time; offers greater flexibility in employment; and both de jure and de facto bans the charging of recruitment fees. Third, the government should increase the regularity and rigor of labor inspections in the seafood industry while ensuring protections against retaliation for workers who report abuses (SWG, 2022). Furthermore, the Thai government should enact stronger measures to hold corporations accountable for labor abuses in the Thai seafood industry. With the adoption and effective enforcement of such laws and policies, Thailand could reduce migrant workers’ risk of forced labor and promote fair labor practices in its global seafood supply chains.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Johanna Lee

Kimberly Rogovin

Sudarat Musikawong

Notes

References

ARTICLE 19 (2022) Re: Thai officials must drop all the ongoing prosecutions under the emergency decree, 08 November. Available at: https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/C.-Final081122_Letter-in-English_For-Public-Release.pdf (accessed 18 March 2024).

Auethavornpipat

(2022) Norm contestation and the weakening of migrant fisher protection in Thailand. Global Constitutionalism 11(2): 249-273. DOI: 10.1017/S2045381721000277.

Aziz

SNA

Basir

(2020) Protecting migrant worker during COVID-19 pandemic: Lessons from Malaysia and Thailand. In: Umar

ARM

Wicaksono

(eds) Small States, Strong Societies: Essays on COVID-19 Responses in Southeast Asia. Yogyakarta: ASEAN Studies Center Universitas Gadjah Mada, pp. 78-99.

Bangkok Business News (2020) กรมการจัดหางาน รับสมัคร ‘แรงงานประมง’ ยังขาดอีกกว่า 5 หมื่นอัตรา [The Department of Employment recruits ‘fishermen,’ still lack more than 50,000 positions], April 30. Available at: https://www.bangkokbiznews.com/news/878622 [In Thai] (accessed 18 March 2024).

Bigio

Welch

(2020) As the global economy melts down, human trafficking is booming. Foreign Policy, 10 August. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/10/as-the-global-economy-melts-down-human-trafficking-is-booming/.

Buckley

Pietropaoli

Rosada

et al. (2022) How has COVID-19 affected migrant workers vulnerability to human trafficking for forced labour in Southeast Asia? A narrative review. Journal of Public Health and Emergency 6(19): 19. DOI: 10.21037/jphe-21-108.

Chan

Lan

(2022) The politics of sanitization: Pandemic crisis, migration and development in Asia-Pacific. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 31(3): 205-224. DOI: 10.1177/01171968221129382.

Clark

Longo

(2021) Global labor value chains, commodification, and the socioecological structure of severe exploitation: A case study of the Thai seafood sector. The Journal of Peasant Studies 49(3): 652-676. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2021.1890041.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) (2022) Direct Request, 110^th ILC Session, Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188). Geneva: International Labour Organization. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNTRY_ID:4124412,102843.

10.

de Beukelaer

(2021) COVID-19 border closures cause humanitarian crew change crisis at sea. Marine Policy 132: 104661-104665. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104661.

11.

Department of Fisheries (DOF) (2019-2021) กลุ่มวิเคราะห์การค้าสินค้าประมงระหว่างประเทศกองนโยบายและยุทธศาสตร์พัฒนาการประมง รายงานปริมาณและมูนค่าสินค้าประมงของไทย [Report on Quantity and Value of Thai fisheries]. Report Database. Bangkok: Fisheries Development Policy and Strategy Division. Available at: https://www.fisheries.go.th/strategy-tradestat/index.php?option=com_goods&view=imports&layout=search&Itemid=140&option=com_goods&view=imports&layout=search&Itemid=140 [In Thai] (accessed 18 March 2024).

12.

Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) (2021) Thailand’s Progress in Combatting IUU, Forced Labour & Human Trafficking. EJF Observations and Recommendations 9. London: EJF. Available at: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/EJF-Technical-Report-2021_EN.pdf.

13.

European Commission (2019) Commission lifts “yellow card” from Thailand for its actions against illegal fishing, 08 January. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_61 (accessed 18 March 2024).

14.

Ford

(2019) From Migrant to Worker: Global Unions and Temporary Labor Migration in Asia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

15.

Freedom House (2021) Freedom in the world 2021: Thailand. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/thailand/freedom-world/2021 (accessed 10 December 2021).

16.

Frontier Myanmar (2022) Migrants face arrest and exploitation in Thailand’s shadow economy, 26 May. Available at: https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/migrants-face-arrest-and-exploitation-in-thailands-shadow-economy/.

17.

Guadagno

(2020) Migrants and the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Initial Analysis. Migration Research Series N° 60. Migration Research Series, 21 April. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Available at: https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-no-60-migrants-and-covid-19-pandemic-initial-analysis.

18.

Havice

Marschke

Vandergeest

(2020) Industrial seafood systems in the immobilizing COVID-19 moment. Agriculture and Human Values 37(3): 655-656. DOI: 10.1007/s10460-020-10117-6.

19.

Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF) (2021) Press release: HRDF and alliance submitting letter to Provincial Governor of Phuket opposing the Phuket Provincial Authority Order on restrictions of fishing workers in commercial boats in Phuket. Available at: https://hrdfoundation.org/?p=2628.

20.

Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF) (2022a) Court dismissed migrant workers’ plea to be included in state relief scheme. Prachatai, 12 July. Available at: https://prachatai.com/english/node/9906.

21.

Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF) (2022b) Press release: Migrant workers and stateless persons filing case with Central Administrative Court on the cash handouts scheme “Section 33, We Love Each Other” proposed by Ministry of Labour alleging its incompatibility with the Constitution and international treaties, 27 May. Available at: https://hrdfoundation.org/?p=2766.

22.

Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF) (2022c) “Leaving No One behind” Report: Relief Programs During Covid-19 and Their Challenges. Report, 23 November. Bangkok: HRDF. Available at: https://hrdfoundation.org/?p=2971.

23.

Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF) and MWG (Migrant Working Group) (2021) Joint Civil Society Report Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Report, 16 June. Bangkok: HRDF. Available at: https://mwgthailand.org/en/press/1623828275.

24.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2018) Hidden Chains. Rights Abuses and Forced Labor in Thailand’s Fishing Industry. Report, 23 January. New York: HRW. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/23/hidden-chains/rights-abuses-and-forced-labor-thailands-fishing-industry.

25.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2007) International Labour Standards on Migrant Workers’ Rights: Guide for Policymakers and Practitioners in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_bk_pb_184_en.pdf.

26.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2012) ILO Indicators of Forced Labour. Brochure, 01 October. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_203832/lang--en/index.htm.

27.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2019) General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment and Definition of Recruitment Fees and Related Costs. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_536755.pdf.

28.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020a) COVID-19: Impact on Migrant Workers and Country Response in Thailand. Briefing Note, 03 July. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/briefingnote/wcms_741920.pdf.

29.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020b) Endline Research Findings on Fishers and Seafood Workers in Thailand. Report, 10 March. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/asia/publications/WCMS_738042/lang--en/index.htm.

30.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020c) ILO Policy Brief: Protecting Migrant Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Recommendations for Policy-Makers and Constituents. Policy brief, 30 April. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_743268.pdf.

31.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2022a) Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage. Report, 12 September. Geneva: ILO, Walk Free and International Organization for Migration. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_854733/lang--en/index.htm.

32.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2022b) Rough Seas: The Impact of COVID-19 on Fishing Workers in South-East Asia. Briefing note, 19 April. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/asia/publications/issue-briefs/WCMS_842605/lang--en/index.htm.

33.

International Labour Organization (ILO) (2023) Towards Freedom at Sea: Handbook for the Detection of Forced Labour in Commercial Fishing. Report, 20 December. Geneva: ILO. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/WCMS_907250/lang--en/index.htm.

34.

International Trade Federation-Fishermen’s Right Network (ITF-FRN) (2024) ITF-FRN Thailand National Fisher Conditions Survey Results. Report, 24 January. Bangkok: ITF-FRN. Available at: https://www.itfglobal.org/en/resources/itf-frn-thailand-national-fisher-condition-survey-results (accessed 18 March 2024).

35.

International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) (2021) Fishers’ rights network calls on Thai government to enforce contract provisions, 29 June. Available at: https://www.itfglobal.org/en/news/fishers-rights-network-calls-thai-government-enforce-contract-provisions.

36.

Jones

Mudaliar

Piper

(2021) Locked Down and in Limbo: The Global Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Workers Rights and Recruitment. Report, 22 November. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-ankara/documents/publication/wcms_829614.pdf.

37.

Jullanan

(2021) Coastal lives during Covid-19: ชีวิตที่เปลี่ยนไปของแรงงานประมงข้ามชาติในอุตสาหกรรมประมง [Coastal lives during Covid-19: Changing the lives of migrant fishers in the fishing industry]. Greenpeace, 05 November. Available at: https://www.greenpeace.org/thailand/story/21480/ocean-sustainability-coastal-lives-during-covid-21419-labour-lives-change/ [In Thai] (accessed 18 March 2024).

38.

Kadfak

Widengard

(2022) From fish to fishworker traceability in Thai fisheries reform. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 6(2): 1322-1342. DOI: 10.1177/25148486221104992.

39.

Kerdmongkol

(2022) An open letter subject: An opinion and recommendation for the management of foreign workers pursuant to the cabinet resolution of 5 July 2022. Human Rights and Development Foundation, 16 August. Available at: https://hrdfoundation.org/?p=2900&lang=en.

40.

Kerdmongkol

(2023) Report on the Impact of the Thai Government’s Migrant Worker Amnesty Program and Forced Labor Risk. Report, 27 January. Bangkok: Migrant Working Group. Available at: https://www.mahidolmigrationcenter-jointresearchunit.org/database/report-the-impact-of-teh-thai-governments-migrant-worker-amnesty-program-and-forced-labor-risk.

41.

Khemanitthathai

(2021) Situation on Migrant Workers and Border Crossing During the Covid-19 Pandemic. Report, November. Bangkok: Migrant Working Group. Available at: https://mwgthailand.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/SituationonMigrantWorkersandbordercrossingDuringthecovid19pandemic.pdf.

42.

Kuhakan

Sriring

(2020) Thai PM blames virus surge on illegal migration, hints at new curbs. Reuters, 22 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-thailand-idUSKBN28W0NJ.

43.

Kunno

Supawattanabodee

Sumanasrethakul

et al. (2021) Comparison of different waves during the COVID-19 pandemic: Retrospective descriptive study in Thailand. Advances in Preventive Medicine 2021. DOI: 10.1155/2021/5807056.

44.

Kunpeuk

Julchoo

Phaiyarom

et al. (2022) Access to healthcare and social protection among migrant workers in Thailand before and during COVID-19 era: A qualitative study. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19(5): 3083. DOI: 10.3390/ijerph19053083.

45.

Lozano

AJG

Decker Sparks

Durgana

et al. (2022) Decent work in fisheries: Current trends and key considerations for future research and policy. Marine Policy 136: 1-10. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104922.

46.

Marschke

Vandergeest

(2016) Slavery scandals: Unpacking labour challenges and policy responses within the off-shore fisheries sector. Marine Policy 68: 39-46. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.009.

47.

Marschke

Vandergeest

Havice

et al. (2020) COVID-19, instability and migrant fish workers in Asia. Maritime Studies 20: 87-99. DOI: 10.1007/s40152-020-00205-y.

48.

Migrant Working Group (MWG) (2021) The Implementation of Laws and Policies Relevant to the Fisher Rights' Protection under the ILO Working in Fishing Convention 2007 (No. 188) in Thailand. Report, 08 December. Bangkok: MWG. Available at: https://mwgthailand.org/en/press/1638929322.

49.

Migrant Working Group (MWG) (2022) Report on the Impact of the Thai Government’s Migrant Worker Amnesty Program and Forced Labor Risk. Report, 27 January. Bangkok: MWG. Available at: https://minnow-oarfish-xzrt.squarespace.com/database/report-the-impact-of-teh-thai-governments-migrant-worker-amnesty-program-and-forced-labor-risk.

50.

Mileski

Galvao

Forester

(2020) Human trafficking in the commercial fishing industry: A multiple case study analysis. Marine Policy 116: 103616. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103616.

51.

Ministry of Labour (MOL) (2021) กระทรวงแรงงานเผยผลสำรวจความต้องการแรงงานต่างด้าว พบยังต้องการแรงงานกว่า 4 แสนคน [The Ministry of Labor reveals the results of the survey on the need for foreign workers. More than 400,000 workers were still needed], 08 August. Available at: https://www.doe.go.th/prd/main/news/param/site/1/cat/7/sub/0/pull/detail/view/detail/object_id/49896 [In Thai] (accessed 18 March 2024).

52.

Murphy

Doyle

Thompson

(2022) Workers’ perspectives on state-constructed vulnerability to labour exploitation: Experiences of migrant fishers in Ireland. Social & Legal Studies 32(4): 562-585. DOI: 10.1177/09646639221122466.

53.

Musikawong

Rzonca

(2021) Debt bondage in human trafficking: US agriculture and Thailand fisheries primed for labour exploitation. Archives of Criminology 43(1): 169-193. DOI: 10.7420/AK2021.11.

54.

Office of the Council of State of Thailand (2017) Unofficial Translation of Thai Constitution by the Legal Opinion and Translation Section, Foreign Law Division. Available at: https://web.parliament.go.th/assets/portals/61/filenewspar/61_1059_file.pdf.

55.

Pakkawan

(2022) Illegal migrants say job brokerage fees soaring. The Bangkok Post, 12 May. Available at: https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2308866/illegal-migrants-say-job-brokerage-fees-soaring.

56.

Permanent Secretary of Labor (2021) ระเบียบคณะกามการกองทุนสงเคราะห์ลูกจ้างว่าด้วยการจ่ายเงินสงเคราะห์ อัตราเงินที่จะจ่ายเเละระยะเวลาจ่ายกรณีการระบาดของโรคติดเชื้อไวรัสโคโรนา [Regulations of the Employee Welfare Fund Committee Concerning the Payment of Benefits Rate of Payment and Period of Payment Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak]. Available at: https://legal.labour.go.th/images/law/Protection2541/5/EWF_Covid19_29-12-65.pdf [In Thai] (accessed 18 March 2024).

57.

Phuket Provincial Authority (2021) Provincial order 4623/2564: Procedures for surveilling migrant workers in fisheries and seafood processing for Phuket province. Summary in English by human rights and development Foundation (HRDF). Available at: https://hrdfoundation.org/?p=2628&lang=th.

58.

Rajatanavin

Tuangratananon

Suphanchaimat

et al. (2021) Responding to the COVID-19 second wave in Thailand by diversifying and adapting lessons from the first wave. BMJ Global Health 6(7): e006178. DOI: 10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006178.

59.

Rani

(2021) Migrant workers’ rights from a human rights perspective. Asian Review 34(2): 63-85. Available at: https://so01.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/arv/article/download/248750/168977.

60.

Rogovin

(2020) Time for a Sea Change: Why Union Rights for Migrant Workers are Needed to Prevent Forced Labor in the Thai Seafood Industry. Report, 19 March. Washington, DC: International Labor Rights Forum. Available at: https://laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/ILRF_TimeforaSeaChange.pdf.

61.

Rogovin

(2021) Grant union rights to migrant workers. The Bangkok Post, 11 March. Available at: https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2081835/grant-union-rights-to-migrant-workers.

62.

Rojanaworarit

El Bouzaidi

(2021) International labour trafficking: A neglected social origin of COVID-19. The Lancet Regional Health. Western Pacific 8: 100121. DOI: 10.1016/j.lanwpc.2021.100121.

63.

Rousseau

(2020) Labor Abuse Complaint Mechanisms in Thailand, USAID Thailand Counter-trafficking in Persons. Report, March. Bangkok: Winrock International. Available at: https://winrock.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Thailand-CTIP-Assessment-of-Complaint-Mechanisms.pdf.

64.

Saksornchai

(2021) Migrant workers’ arrest calls attention to Thailand legal negligence. VOD, 09 November. Available at: https://vodenglish.news/migrant-workers-arrest-calls-attention-to-thailand-legal-negligence/.

65.

Seafood Working Group (SWG) (2021) Comments Concerning the Ranking of Thailand by the United States Department of State in the 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report. Report, Comments submitted by Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF), 31 March. Bangkok: GLJ-ILRF. Available at: https://laborrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/SWGThailandTIPReport2021Submission_SWGPublication_final.pdf.

66.

Seafood Working Group (SWG) (2022) Comments Concerning the Ranking of Thailand by the United States Department of State in the 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report. Report, Comments submitted by Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum (GLJ-ILRF), 22 April. Bangkok: GLJ-ILRF. Available at: https://laborrights.org/publications/comments-concerning-ranking-thailand-united-states-department-state-2022-trafficking.

67.

Siamhan

Trirath

(2020) Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic On Small-Scale Producers and Workers: Perspectives from Thailand's Seafood Supply Chain. Briefing note, 22 June. Oxford: Oxfam Publications. Available at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/handle/10546/621006.

68.

Stride

(2021) Precarity and the Pandemic: A Survey of Wage Issues and Covid-19 Impacts Amongst Migrant Seafood Workers in Thailand. Briefing Paper, 30 July. Oxford: Oxfam Publications. Available at: https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/handle/10546/621193.

69.

Suhardiman

Rigg

Bandur

et al. (2021) On the coattails of globalization: Migration, migrants and COVID-19 in Asia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 47(1): 88-109. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1844561.

70.

Thai PBS

World

(2021) Nationwide ban on public gatherings declared in Thailand from Nov 1, 29 October. Available at: https://www.thaipbsworld.com/nationwide-ban-on-public-gatherings-declared-in-thailand-from-nov-1/.

71.

Thai PBS

World

(2022) New public assembly ban imposed in Thailand to contain COVID-19, 02 August. Available at: https://www.thaipbsworld.com/new-public-assembly-ban-imposed-in-thailand-to-contain-covid-19/.

72.

The Nation (2020) First coronavirus 2019 patient found in Thailand, 13 January. Available at: https://www.nationthailand.com/in-focus/30380478.

73.

The Nation (2022) All 1.5 trillion baht in Covid borrowing now allocated, says govt, 02 September. Available at: https://www.nationthailand.com/in-focus/national/40019666.

74.

Tilleke and Gibbins (2022) Thailand lifts prohibition on lockouts and strikes, 07 October. Available at: https://www.tilleke.com/insights/thailand-lifts-prohibition-on-lockouts-and-strikes/.

75.

United Nations Network on Migration (2022) Law amendment concerning management of migrant workers in Thailand, 02 February. Available at: https://migrationnetwork.un.org/practice/law-amendment-concerning-management-migrant-workers-thailand#.

76.

U.S. Department of State (2016) 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report: Thailand. Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258876.htm.

77.

U.S. Department of State (2018) 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report: Thailand. Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-trafficking-in-persons-report/thailand/.

78.

U.S. Department of State (2022) 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Thailand. Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/thailand/.

79.

Vandergeest

Marschke

(2021) Beyond slavery scandals: Explaining working conditions among fish workers in Taiwan and Thailand. Marine Policy 132: 104685. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104685.

80.

Vandergeest

Marschke

Duker

(2021) Migrant worker segregation doesn’t work: COVID-19 lessons from Southeast Asia. The Conversation, 24 February. Available at: https://theconversation.com/migrant-worker-segregation-doesnt-work-covid-19-lessons-from-southeast-asia-155260.

81.

Verité (2020) COVID-19 and vulnerability to human trafficking for forced labor, 24 April. Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20200816031502/https://www.verite.org/covid-19-and-vulnerability-to-human-trafficking-for-forced-labor/.

82.

Wilhelm

Kadfak

Bhakoo

et al. (2020) Private governance of human and labor rights in seafood supply chains — the case of the modern slavery crisis in Thailand. Marine Policy 115: 103833. DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.103833.

83.

Wongsamuth

(2021) Migrant workers face tough quarantine in Thailand as COVID-19 cases surge. Reuters, 29 May. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-thailand-migrants/migrant-workers-face-tough-quarantine-in-thailand-as-covid-19-cases-surge-idUSKCN2D9217.

84.

Yuliantiningsih

Barkhuizen

(2021) Modern slavery in fishing industry: The need to strengthen law enforcement and international cooperation. Yustisia Jurnal Hukum 10(1): 1-15. DOI: 10.20961/yustisia.v10i1.46511.

Discrimination during COVID-19: Assessing migrant workers’ vulnerability to forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction

Literature review

Methodology

Findings

Discrimination against migrant workers prior to the COVID-19 pandemic

Overview of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies

COVID-19 containment policies

Immigration policy cabinet resolutions

Social protection programs

The discriminatory nature of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies

Analysis of the impact of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies on migrant workers’ risk of forced labor in the seafood industry

Debt bondage and deception

Retention of identity documents and abuse of vulnerability

Excessive overtime

Abusive working and living conditions

Restriction of movement

Analysis of the impact of Thailand’s COVID-19 policies on the ability to address forced labor in the seafood industry

Restrictions on union rights

Weakened labor inspections

Conclusion and recommendations

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

Funding

ORCID iDs

Notes

References