Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very obscure political code. By watching and decoding Xinwen Lianbo, cadres can see that Xi Jinping is firmly in power. They can also gain insight into the policy directions favored by the CCP. Xinwen Lianbo thus acts as a mechanism for communication within the party using a code that can only be deciphered by insiders.
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