In the zone? Chemical weapons and the Middle East

Abstract

In 2012, an effort to establish a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction ran out of momentum. In 2013, a chemical attack in the outskirts of Damascus nearly brought about US armed intervention in the Syrian civil war and ultimately led to Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Against this backdrop, some have suggested that the time is right to establish in the region a zone free of chemical weapons. Authors from three countries—Emily B. Landau of Israel (2014), Mostafa Elwi Saif of Egypt (2014), and John Hart of the United States—explore whether a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Middle East might contribute to regional security and whether it could revitalize the initiative to rid the region of all weapons of mass destruction.

The 2010 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) produced a mandate to convene a 2012 conference on establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Ultimately, the conference was scrapped. Many who are involved in promoting international peace and security, whether in government, civil society, or elsewhere, continue to work toward establishing a WMD-free zone. But lack of progress toward establishing such a zone—along with Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013 and international efforts to verifiably destroy that country’s chemical weapons and associated infrastructure—have led some to suggest (again) that a chemical-weapon-free zone be established in the region.

In the Middle East, however, weapons of mass destruction represent only one aspect of a fractious security situation. Regional arms control efforts tend to be undermined by deep political and social divisions that appear unlikely to be resolved soon. Israel, when it discusses modalities for bringing all Middle Eastern states into the major arms control and disarmament treaties, generally emphasizes the importance of comprehensively addressing the region’s geopolitical tensions first (or at least addressing these tensions in parallel). Some countries, meanwhile, have refused to negotiate directly with Israel at all. Others have made their participation in arms control processes contingent on Israel’s first becoming a party, as a non-nuclear weapon state, to the NPT.

Amid all this—especially Egypt’s unwillingness to join the Chemical Weapons Convention unless Israel accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Israel’s unwillingness to do so—it appears very challenging to establish a WMD-free zone, or even a chemical-weapon-free zone, at this time. But political differences need not prevent cooperation and consultation, at the operational level, on technical matters related to security and defense. Irritants and “incidents” needn’t escalate to the point that they become open political disputes. Regional peace and security issues, rather than being allowed to interfere with arms control efforts, should themselves be seen as something requiring comprehensive attention—at all levels, and through a variety of instruments and processes, including multilateral arms control.

In concrete terms, what could be done now to hasten the day when chemical weapons are verifiably eliminated from the Middle East? One productive avenue might be for Egypt and Israel—the only nations in the region that are not parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention—to pursue confidence-building measures intended to clarify the nature and status of each nation’s chemical defense establishment (if any exists). In the past, both countries have communicated informally with officials from the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and perhaps these interactions could help form a basis for a confidence-building process. (Indeed, Israel has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, though it hasn’t ratified it.)

In particular, the two countries could negotiate toward a memorandum of understanding that would include three specific points. First, the memorandum could include a statement of principles regarding chemical warfare—that is, an acknowledgment that chemical warfare is both unethical and illegal under international law. Second, it could contain a list of the types of information that, if known, would enhance each side’s confidence that the policies, programs, and activities of the other side’s chemical defense establishment are only for “defensive” purposes. Third, it could include a framework for information exchanges and site visits (which would probably have to follow a later agreed understanding and information exchange).

A subsequent objective could be to develop a document that provided more specific information about the nature of each side’s chemical defense establishment. A model for achieving this could be the 1989 US–Soviet memorandum of understanding on chemical weapons (Federation of American Scientists, 2014), which entailed a “verification experiment” and a two-phase data exchange. This memorandum called on the two sides, first, to exchange general data about relevant capabilities and to arrange site visits; and second, to exchange detailed data that were to be verified via on-site inspections.

For Egypt and Israel to initiate a confidence-building process, both sides would have to express willingness to limit discussions to chemical arms control only (at least on a provisional basis). Even so, the process would be politically sensitive, and it would be necessary, as much as possible, to insulate it from underlying political disputes. Therefore, the process should be facilitated by a third party from outside the region—Argentina, Brazil, and Kazakhstan might make good candidates. Many of the meetings should be held on the facilitator’s territory. Moreover, it might be best if the discussions’ initial focus were limited to technical problems such as achieving a common understanding of the distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” program activities.

As stores of chemical weapons are destroyed, and as these weapons’ moral unacceptability becomes farther consolidated, their relevance (whether perceived or actual) will decline in the Middle East. But nuclear weapons programs and ambiguous nuclear holdings will continue to exacerbate regional tensions in ways that will be difficult to manage—much less predict.