Nanotechnology in Japan: A route to energy security after Fukushima?

Abstract

This article reviews the recent shift in Japan’s nanotechnology policy and regulation, analyzing policy documents and government guidelines as well as interviews with prominent scientists and government officials. The authors consider the potential role of nanotechnology in addressing Japan’s pressing energy security challenges after the Fukushima nuclear accident. They find that Japan’s regulatory focus on preventing and controlling exposure to nanoparticles, rather than on merely reporting and registering the use of nanomaterials, arguably provides greater flexibility and societal support for scientists to experiment with a variety of ideas for using nanomaterials—particularly solar power technologies for distributed energy generation, such as artificial photosynthesis. Japan provides a valuable case study of two major economic and political challenges to the development of energy-related nanotechnologies: industry pressure to continue investing primarily in centralized electricity generation from sources that are environmentally risky but profitable to major power companies, such as nuclear power and fossil fuels; and growing public interest in the research, development, and rapid rollout of nanotechnology-enhanced renewable energy sources that are well suited for distributed energy generation, while the effectiveness of nanotechnology regulation is still being tested.

In his laboratory at the University of Tokyo, chemical engineer Kazunari Domen and his team are searching for the holy grail of solar power: an efficient, affordable photocatalytic material that enables sunlight to split water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen (Chen et al., 2010; Maeda et al., 2006). Domen (and researchers in similar labs around the world) hopes to someday create an artificial leaf of sorts, which would not only split water but also use the gases generated by this process to produce hydrogen and methanol fuels that could sustainably power homes and vehicles. To find the perfect photocatalyst, Domen’s team is experimenting with nanoparticles that are 1/50,000 the width of a human hair. These tiny particles, in aggregate, provide a huge surface on which the water-splitting reaction can take place. They could be the solution to Japan’s energy problems, and to the world’s climate crisis. But the widespread use of such nanomaterials could itself cause health and environmental problems unless appropriately regulated.

Since the March 2011 triple disasters of a massive earthquake, a tsunami, and subsequent nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima, Japan has faced a renewed debate over the reliability, cost-effectiveness, safety, and environmental sustainability of its energy sources. After the accident, all of the nation’s nuclear power plants temporarily suspended operation (Legewie, 2012). This highlighted a structural energy problem in Japan, which now relies on imported fossil fuels for 81 percent of its energy needs (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2011). Japan’s energy security outlook is likely to deteriorate further due to increased energy demands across Asia, international pressure to reduce carbon emissions, and potential instabilities in the nation’s fossil fuel supply (Japan Forum on International Relations, 2006).

Japan has been attempting to address these security challenges through an energy policy that emphasizes the development of new energy sources (Dickie and Soble, 2012). Japan leads the world, for example, in many aspects of artificial photosynthesis research (Umena et al., 2011). The nation’s nanotechnology policy has also shifted, in order to explore applications in the renewable energy sector while still attempting to prevent and control exposure to toxic engineered nanomaterials. This shift in nanotechnology policy and regulation has the potential to move Japan away from its traditional, centralized approach to energy generation, which relies heavily on a small number of energy companies. However, the significant political influence of these powerful companies, coupled with potential public concerns about the effectiveness of nanotechnology regulation, may hinder such a structural shift.

Nanotechnology regulation in Japan

In Japan, nanotechnology has been regulated within the existing legislative frameworks for the safe treatment of small particles, such as Roudou Anzen Eisei Ho (the Industrial Safety and Health Act) and Haikibutsu Shori Ho (the Chemical Substances Control Act) (Bowman and Hodge, 2007). While there is no nanotechnology-specific legislation, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2009) and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2008a) have been actively involved in studying safety measures in relation to nanomaterials. Engineered nanomaterials pose unusual safety risks because of their potential toxic effects on humans, particularly when inhaled, and because these materials can persist in the environment and accumulate in biological tissues. For example, carbon nanotubes have effects similar to asbestos when inhaled and therefore may cause lung injury, and nanosilver particles can cause cellular damage that is distinctly related to their small size, rather than to their capacity for ionization (Faunce and Wattal, 2010).

Five years ago, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2008b) issued a tsuuchi (notice) on safety measures intended to prevent workplace exposure during the manufacturing and treatment of nanomaterials. A year later, the Independent Study Group on Environmental Impacts of Nanomaterials (2009), a panel of Japanese experts from industry and academia, published a “Guideline for the Prevention of Environmental Impact with Regard to Industrial Nanomaterials.” It is interesting to note that Japan’s regulatory focus has been on preventing and controlling exposure to nanomaterials—through, for example, guidelines on wearing masks, installing ventilation, and monitoring aerosolized nanoparticles. This is in sharp contrast to the regulatory moves observed in the rest of the world, particularly in the European Union (Nasu and Faunce, 2011), the United States (Naidu, 2009), and Australia (National Industrial Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme, 2010), where the regulatory focus has been on reporting and registering the use of engineered nanomaterials. Japan’s focus on creating systems for preventing and controlling exposure arguably promotes public and industry confidence in the innovative use of nanotechnology, and hence provides greater flexibility and societal support for scientists to experiment with a variety of ideas for using nanomaterials as catalysts in alternative energy sources. However, it remains to be seen whether this regulatory approach can prevent a public health disaster (Nasu, forthcoming).

Reformulated nanotechnology policy

Japan’s latest nanotechnology policy is subservient to four basic societal goals set out in the “Fourth Science and Technology Basic Plan of Japan,” for fiscal years 2011 to 2015: (1) recovery and reconstruction from the 2011 tsunami disaster; (2) promotion of green innovation and environmental sustainability; (3) promotion of innovations to improve the quality of life; and (4) reform of industry and education systems to encourage innovation in science and technology (Council for Science and Technology Policy, 2010). This policy represents a marked shift from Japan’s previous policy, which emphasized the strategic prioritization of research and development in nanotechnology and nanomaterials separately from other societal goals such as environmental sustainability (Council for Science and Technology Policy, 2006).

The current plan’s promotion of green innovation involves research and development in the areas of renewable energy, carbon emissions reduction, energy efficiency, and creating infrastructure to facilitate the development of the green energy industry. This energy security policy is aligned with the objectives of the Japanese Energy Supply Structural Enhancement Act, which was enacted two years before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, with a view to increasing the use of non-fossil energy sources. The original implementation plan envisaged the building of new nuclear power plants and the increased use of existing nuclear facilities (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2010). After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, however, policy makers were forced to review Japan’s reliance on nuclear power. Japanese energy policy experts now widely agree that nanotechnology must play an important role in the effort to find a solution to the nation’s energy and environmental challenges, because of its applications in solar power (Sato and Horie, 2012). Nanotechnology is particularly essential for artificial photosynthesis, an area where Japanese scientists are making significant advances in the fundamental characterization of the photosynthetic process, particularly in understanding how solar energy might be harnessed to convert carbon dioxide into fuels such as methanol (Faunce et al., 2013a).

Speaking to the Japanese media last year about the future of Japan’s energy policy, the Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Yukio Edano, said that Japan should seek “a desirable mix of energy sources,” incorporating policy and community interests such as sustainability and safety, as opposed to seeking “the best mix of energy sources,” which, as had been the policy in the past, focused primarily on economic efficiency and security (Maeda, 2012). Edano also advocated for a more competitive energy supply enabling multiple suppliers to enter the market.

After his landslide election victory in December 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared to revert to a more traditional policy line relying on nuclear power, which is not surprising given the strong ties between Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party and major energy industries. More recently, however, the Abe government has endorsed proposals to restructure the energy sector, increase competition, and make it easier to integrate wind and solar energy into the transmission grid (Watanabe and Inajima, 2013). Japan’s nanotechnology policy, which focuses on fundamental research, is not likely to affect the economically dominant mix of energy sources in the near future, but it could have a beneficial impact on Japan’s energy security and climate change obligations over the long term.

Japan’s future energy supply

At the moment, there are two future energy supply models vying for public policy preference in Japan. The first is the traditional centralized-electricity-generation model, which continues to rely on existing high-voltage transmission assets while diversifying energy sources with investments in, for example, large-scale solar plants, geothermal power generation facilities, and industrial-size wind turbines.

The second model emphasizes the development of distributed, small-scale energy sources (particularly solar technologies)—many of which would be completely off the grid. These energy sources would enable individual households to generate their own electricity and vehicle fuel by producing hydrogen or methanol (Faunce et al., 2013b; Lewis and Nocera, 2006). Japanese scientists are already leaders in developing the components that would be needed to transform households into mini-utilities under this model.

One of the most interesting areas in which nanotechnology could be relevant to energy security is in the production of solar fuel. Setting aside biological options (such as genetically engineering algae to produce biofuels), solar fuel can be produced by using nanomaterials to help sunlight split water molecules. The tiny particles in nanomaterials provide a vast surface area for capturing photons of sunlight, which provide the solar energy needed to break down water—a process that mimics the way trees and other plants convert light energy to chemical energy during the natural photosynthetic process (Faunce et al., 2013a, 2013b).

In their search for a suitable, abundant, and robust water-splitting catalyst, scientists are focusing on cobalt, doped iron oxide, and manganese as the most likely candidates to be developed at the nanoscale (Sanderson, 2008; Hurst, 2010; Kanan and Nocera, 2008). The scientists hope that these nanomaterials could replace expensive and difficult-to-extract rare earth elements, such as dysprosium and neodymium, that are currently used in solar panels, wind turbine generators, and hybrid-electric vehicles. China’s control of rare earth elements in the global market has created a security dilemma that could impede the development of renewable energy sources (Alonso et al., 2012).

Japan has been at the forefront of research on nanomaterials for artificial photosynthesis. In addition to Domen’s work at the University of Tokyo, Nobuo Kamiya and his team at Osaka City University have painstakingly analyzed the molecular structure of a protein complex central to the photosynthetic process (Hashimoto et al., 2012; Umena et al., 2011). A better understanding of how this complex splits water into hydrogen and oxygen could help scientists mimic photosynthesis in the lab.

These nanotechnology-based research activities have the potential to foster a scientific and technological environment in which distributed energy generation can become mainstreamed in Japan’s energy security policy. Decentralized generation is less reliant upon the existing transmission infrastructure, so it may help ensure greater energy security in the event of a natural disaster or war.

However, there are two challenges to the use of nanotechnology for distributed energy generation in Japan and elsewhere. First, if engineered nanomaterials are widely deployed in the development of new energy sources (for example, using microscopic cobalt particles in solar panels), it may be difficult to control for human toxicity and environmental damage even with an enhanced ability to monitor and detect nanoparticles (Gottschalk and Nowack, 2011; Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2008). Second, government policy will continue to be susceptible to the influence of major energy companies with vested interests in preventing nanotechnology from disrupting their profitable centralized power generation and distribution networks. There is no doubt that nanotechnology could also make significant contributions in assisting the introduction of renewable energy (namely photovoltaics and wind power) into centralized energy networks, but that would be a missed opportunity for Japan to develop off-the-grid energy generation and enhance its energy security.

A regulatory shift to off-the-grid energy?

Reformulating Japanese energy security policy, so that it can build on cutting-edge nanotechnology research to achieve greater energy security, will require policy decisions about how nanotechnologies should be incorporated in Japan’s energy infrastructure. The cautious approach to nanotechnology regulation—focusing on the prevention and control of exposure to toxic engineered nanomaterials, rather than on their use—may have given scientists flexibility and societal support to experiment with nanomaterials for alternative energy applications. Japan’s recent move toward liberalization of the energy sector, too, may make it easier to adopt off-the-grid renewable energy systems that incorporate innovative applications of nanotechnology research. A shift toward distributed, renewable energy generation would enhance Japan’s national energy security. However, the significant political influence of the existing energy companies and their interest in maintaining a centralized energy infrastructure, as well as potential public concerns about the toxicity of engineered nanomaterials, are likely to be major barriers to nanotechnology—and, by extension, to greater energy security for Japan.