The implications of Fukushima

Abstract

The effects of the tragedy at Japan’s Fukushima power plant will continue to reverberate over the upcoming weeks, months, and years. And, as the writers in this symposium explain, the consequences of the disaster go beyond Japan—like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, Fukushima will reshape nuclear agendas and policies in countries around the world. In this Global Forum, leading experts reflect on the current and future implications of Fukushima for their own countries—the United States, the European Union, and South Korea. Mark Cooper (2011) writes from the United States; Caroline Jorant from the European Union; and Soon Heung Chang (2011) from South Korea. In August, this forum will continue as a Roundtable at www.thebulletin.org.

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake, followed by a very powerful tsunami, devastated the northeastern coast of Japan. With more than 25,000 deaths, in addition to the apocalyptic destruction of buildings, homes, and industries, the toll to the country and its environment has yet to be estimated. In the quake’s aftermath, the specter of a meltdown at the country’s Fukushima nuclear plant—with long-lasting repercussions not only in the region, but across the globe—gripped the world.

As the tragedy continues to unfold in Japan, it is premature to attempt to gauge from the immediate political reactions in Europe the mid- and long-term impact of the Fukushima accident on the development or dismantling of the continent’s nuclear facilities. But it is not too soon to explore the differences of opinion on nuclear energy among the European Union member states—and to determine what common ground has been found as a result of the tragedy in Japan. From this we may be able to glean where Europe is heading.

There are currently 152 nuclear facilities located in 15 of the EU’s states, supplying about one-third of its electricity. Since the onset of the nuclear crisis in Japan, the reactions of EU governments have differed greatly. Traditionally, countries without nuclear facilities—for example, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg—have strongly opposed nuclear development. After Fukushima, such countries were only reinforced in their positions. At the same time, the countries that were already staunch supporters of nuclear energy—France, Finland, the United Kingdom, and Slovakia, among others—reiterated their support of nuclear energy.

Countries that were new to nuclear energy had a mixed reaction to the crisis. The Italian government, for example, immediately imposed a one-year moratorium and envisaged postponing a referendum on the decision to construct its first nuclear power plan. However, the referendum did take place as formerly planned on June 13, only three months after the Fukushima accident. Out of a rough 40 percent participation, an overwhelming majority voted negatively, certainly closing the perspectives for a nuclear programme in Italy for another long period of time. ¹ Poland, on the other hand, confirmed its decision to build its first nuclear power plants by 2020.

Meanwhile, countries that had once envisioned phasing out their nuclear facilities did not simply revert to old form: The Netherlands announced that it would honor its one-month-old decision to begin constructing a new reactor in 2015, while Sweden confirmed its plans to replace its power plants at the end of their lifespans.

But the resounding shift in Germany, where nuclear energy has long been a hot-button political issue, will have the greatest impact on Europe’s nuclear supply. Within days of the Fukushima tragedy, Chancellor Angela Merkel imposed a three-month moratorium on previously announced extensions for Germany’s existing nuclear power plants, while temporarily shuttering seven of the 17 reactors that had been operating since 1981. Weeks later, on May 29, Merkel’s government announced that it would close all of its nuclear power plants, which currently supply 27 percent of the country’s electricity, by 2022.

A similar current has taken hold in non-EU Switzerland, where the government has proposed not to replace the five nuclear power plants currently in operation. Adopted by the National Council, this measure means a progressive phase-out of nuclear energy between 2019 and 2034.

The EU and the nuclear safety issue

Nuclear energy in Europe benefits from a rather comprehensive and legally binding framework known as the Euratom Treaty. Adopted in 1957, this treaty was one of the three pillars in the founding of what is today the EU. It was understood from the start that in terms of economic and political development, the European community had a major stake in nuclear energy.

The treaty covers almost all aspects of nuclear power, from research and development to the supply of nuclear material, safeguards on materials, international cooperation agreements, and radiological protection. After Chernobyl, for example, the EU made several key decisions on protocol for future emergencies. Guidelines were set on contamination levels in foods, the early exchange of information, and mutual assistance in case of a future accident.

In the late 1990s, anticipating the need to find common ground for safety assessment in light of the EU’s eastward expansion, the Western Nuclear Regulator Association (WENRA) was established. WENRA promotes safety based on the non-binding standards and recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It now operates as a network of chief regulators from EU member states and Switzerland, offering consensus on nuclear safety issues in the absence of a specific legal framework.

Even after the creation of the association, however, the EU nuclear community lacked a formal political and institutional body. In 2007, the European Commission created the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group, which advises the commission on political and institutional matters related to nuclear safety. ² But a debate remained over the EU’s legal capacity to address nuclear issues, so in May 2009 a legally binding safety directive was adopted. Now, for the first time, there is a legal text that defines the nuclear principles that every EU country must respect and empowers the commission to hold member states accountable. This is the basis for the EU’s common response to a nuclear disaster—and this was put into practice with the announcement of “stress tests” in response to Fukushima.

The stress test approach

Within days of the tragedy in Japan, the European Commission organized an extraordinary meeting to discuss the repercussions. Energy ministers and nuclear regulators, along with some experts and industry representatives, agreed on principle to perform a series of stress tests to assess the safety and risk at 143 nuclear power plants across Europe. The goal was to draw early lessons from Japan’s nuclear crisis and ensure that similar troubles would not befall Europe’s nuclear reactor sites.

A stress test is defined as a targeted reassessment of safety aspects of nuclear power plants. Separately and independently performed by both operators and regulators, the assessments will ensure that adequate preventive measures are in place and evaluate how each nuclear plant would respond when faced with extreme situations. The idea is to test the facility’s “defense-in-depth” logic—its layers of safeguards covering everything from the initial event (earthquake, flood) and the consequential loss of key functions (control of reactivity, fuel cooling, confinement of radioactivity) to the most desperate accident management situations (loss of electrical power and loss of heat absorption). Each system will be analyzed independent of the others.

Despite some controversy over what kind of security breaches—such as sabotage and terrorist acts—would be included in the tests, an agreement was ultimately reached to consider all types of accidents, whether caused naturally or by human error, though not to address security issues as such. The tests began on June 1 and will be completed and analyzed before the results are made public in April 2012.

What’s next?

The Fukushima accident promises to have an adverse impact on the development of nuclear energy in the EU, at the very least slowing its expected pace and magnitude. While no lives were lost in the crisis, its environmental consequence should not be underestimated and will take many years of hard work to mitigate. The crisis has also made clear the need to improve international cooperation and preparedness.

The EU initiative for a systematic safety review, however, should help to rebuild confidence in the capacity of the nuclear industry and its regulators to cope with the unexpected. The EU’s desire to address the potential weaknesses of its reactors and to improve their capacity for crisis response shows that, in the aftermath of Fukushima, the right lessons are being learned.

This response is consistent with the EU’s long-standing drive to strengthen nuclear safety. Given the diversity of positions on nuclear energy within the EU’s ranks, the reaction has been bold and quick. Other countries should seek to emulate this mindset and contribute to a proactive and positive debate that puts international focus on how best to keep nuclear power safe. Nuclear energy in Europe should continue to contribute to a safe, secure, and low-carbon emission energy supply in the future. Although the German decision may steer a renewed debate in the next election campaigns in European countries about the nuclear and energy mix, it remains to be seen whether, in the long term, these sudden phase-out decisions will be reversed, as has been the case in the Netherlands and Sweden.