The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward

Abstract

As the writers in this symposium illustrate, dealing with Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most important foreign policy issues of the day. Years of stalled talks, diplomatic dead-ends, and sanctions have made it difficult to see exactly where progress has been made and what efforts are worth pursuing. In this Global Forum, leading foreign policy experts weigh in from around the world on the options for how to move forward with Iran—from diplomacy to fuel swaps to military strikes. Whatever their proposed solutions, the writers express one common theme: We ignore Iran at our own peril. From the US, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence J. Korb (2010), and Bennett Ramberg (2010); from Turkey, Mustafa Kibaroglu (2010); from Iran, Kayhan Barzegar (2010); and from Israel, Emily B. Landau (2010). Over the months of November and December, this forum will continue at www.thebulletin.org.

We are in the midst of a recurring debate. Will Iran build a bomb? What can be done about it? Why not use military force? The issue is complex, politically fraught, longstanding, and not easy to deal with from any perspective. But in an attempt to find answers, it might help to look at what we know—or think we know—with some certainty. Then we might be able to look clearly at the options we face.

What we know or think we know

Iran has a nuclear program, the key elements of which are attuned to the development of civil nuclear facilities for the production of electrical power, medical isotopes, and the like.

Iran is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has been since the days of the Shah. Under the treaty it has committed to not building nuclear weapons, and, in return, is permitted to engage in nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Iran accepts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on its program. And in December 2003, it signed the IAEA Additional Protocol inspection regime, but the agreement is still pending ratification by the Iranian Parliament.

Iran has developed or is developing nuclear activities that experts deem sensitive because they can be used both for weapons programs and for the civil nuclear fuel cycle. These activities include enrichment of uranium in the U235 isotope by the use of centrifuges. Iran has also indicated an interest in producing heavy water, constructing a heavy water reactor, and reprocessing spent fuel from that reactor to recover plutonium that could be used for weapons. These activities per se are not prohibited by the NPT. But Iran’s enrichment has been prohibited since 2006, when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1696 in a form binding on Iran.

Iran has conducted aspects of its program in secrecy, including centrifuge enrichment development at Natanz since at least 2002 ( GlobalSecurity.org, 2010), and the fairly recent construction of a future underground enrichment facility near Qom, which was announced at the end of 2009. The latter facility appears to be the “right size” (White House, 2009) to increase levels of enrichment from those appropriate for civil use (4.5-5 percent) to those that could be used for weapons purposes (more than 90 percent). The IAEA has reported that Iran has produced enough low-level material that, if further enriched, would make one to two bombs (Sanger and Broad, 2010. Recent reports, including a conversation with a senior US government official, indicate the amount has increased to over 3000 kg, enough with further enrichment for three to four weapons). The IAEA still has questions about the Iran program for which it requires answers.

For years, discussions on this issue were initially held between Iran and the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) plus 2 (China and Russia); The United States is now included. The purpose has been to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the issue.

That group, the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P5 + 1), has sponsored and/or supported a series of sanctions resolutions in the council. The same group has also passed and encouraged others to pass legislation incorporating domestic sanctions. This effort is to try to persuade (or pressure) Iran to go along with a cessation of enrichment. The scope and duration of such a UN-mandated cessation has remained unclear and will perhaps be subject to negotiation. From 2004 to 2006, Iran accepted a cessation of enrichment in response to a P5 + 1 request to begin serious negotiations. But when Iran concluded that there had been little or no progress with the P5 + 1 on resolving its differences, it resumed its enrichment activities in 2006.

On October 1, 2009, the P5 + 1 suggested, and Iran agreed to consider, a proposal that would see Iran send a significant portion of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment to 19.5 percent and later conversion into fuel elements in France for a Tehran reactor producing medical isotopes; that proposal was not accepted by Iran. Subsequently, it was revived in a somewhat different form through the intervention of Brazil and Turkey in May 2010. Although the new version did not meet with immediate success with the US, the Brazil-Turkey approach has continued to be the subject of comment and discussion between Iran and the P5 + 1 and appears to be a possible basis for future dialogue with Iran.

In late August 2010, Russia and Iran began fueling the Bushehr civil power reactor with Russian fuel. The Bushehr plant has been under construction for many years as a result of Russia’s agreement to help build the plant in 1992. Russia requires that this reactor’s spent fuel is returned to Russia.

What are the options?

The uncertainties remain: Is the Iran program purely a civil effort, as Iran claims, or is it a path toward nuclear weapons, as the US and others, including the other P5 members, fear?

A number of options have been pursued and still more might be pursued to deal with the issue.

Iran says it has no interest in a nuclear weapon; key leaders in Iran have said that acquiring such weapons contradicts the tenets of Islam. But the P5 members and the IAEA note the problems and inconsistencies in Iran’s nuclear program, such as the secret construction of enrichment facilities, and say that, at a minimum, these issues need to be resolved. Meanwhile, Security Council resolutions have proscribed further enrichment for Iran, at least until the country can remedy those problems. If Iran were to demonstrate a period of open activity in its nuclear activities, it would help instill confidence that its programs are not intended to develop a military capability. The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate said that Iran had ceased work on activities related to nuclear weapons in 2003. There are reports that a new estimate is being prepared, however, there is no clear indication yet of what it will say on this subject.

Time is a factor. US official sources recently indicated that it will take Iran a year, once the decision to do so has been made, to build a nuclear weapon. Further, the sources say they see no indication that Iran has made a decision to build a nuclear weapon.

There are disputes as to what Iran’s own endgame might be among those harboring concerns about its program. At least two outcomes, similar in their impact, are projected: one is a nuclear weapon deliverable by missile or other means, and the other is the technology, material, and capacity to assemble a weapon in a short time.

The options:

Accept that Iran, despite all future steps, will develop a nuclear weapon. Begin now to take steps to try to deal with that eventuality. These steps might include new arrangements with Iran’s neighbors to reinforce their security and reduce their vulnerability. Such a strategy would also discourage efforts on the part of Iran’s neighbors and others toward further nuclear proliferation. These states include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. US and other military deployments to the region would make it clear that the US expects to deter any Iranian use of such a weapon. The US would indicate that should Iran make available, or allow a weapon to come into terrorists’ hands, it would hold Iran fully responsible, including in the exercise of the US retaliatory capability. This option is seen by many as capitulatory, less than ideal, and premature. Some elements of this option have already been put in place, such as force deployments to the region. Other elements, such as nuclear guarantees to the non-nuclear weapons states in the region, could be introduced without conveying the notion of pre-emptive capitulation to Iranian proliferation, but to guard against the consequences should other options fail. Some see this as a form of containment, while others believe containment or isolation of Iran should be part of a more active effort to stop the acquisition of a weapon.

Continue with economic and other sanctions in an effort to bring Iran to agree to measures that would provide adequate insurance that it is not engaged in a military nuclear program and will not be in the future. Continue to do whatever can be done to assure Iran’s nuclear program is technically unsuccessful. Some observers believe economic steps, if taken to the level of stopping all Iranian exports of oil and gas, would have the desired effect. The “demand” here, which remains on the table, is the cessation of enrichment. This is tempered by the possibility of allowing for some resumption of enrichment under conditions and circumstances that are now not specified but would have to be to assure success. This process seems to involve or would have to involve negotiations with Iran over the endgame agreement. This option is perhaps closest to what is now being done.

Enhance the above negotiating option (No. 2) with the following specific additions:

A willingness on the part of Iran and the US to discuss all outstanding issues on the Iran-US agenda, including Afghanistan, drugs, Iraq, regime change, monetary settlements, regional arrangements, as well as all other issues, including nuclear. These talks should be without precondition on either side.

An effort by the parties to assure that the end result of the nuclear discussion will be a full and adequate international inspection of Iran based on an elaboration of the IAEA Additional Protocol. In return, full clarity on continuing enrichment (perhaps under multilateral management) would need to be established for Iran that is consistent with its effort to develop a civil nuclear program under IAEA supervision and safeguards.

The commitment to advance such an effort in a climate of mutual respect and dignity.

A willingness to encourage such an effort through confidence-building steps, some of which could take the form of a relaxation of sanctions as progress is made.

A commitment by the P5 + 1 to support this effort fully. And, in the event that progress on a fair agreement consistent with the NPT were not achieved, a commitment by the P5 + 1 to support more far-reaching steps toward isolating Iran in an effort to press it to reach a satisfactory agreement over nuclear weapons.

For the United States and Iran, the long-term objective would be a resolution of outstanding issues and the concurrent development of a relationship that could lead to the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations.

Use military force to end permanently any Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons. The likely sources of such force would be Israel and the United States. It is generally agreed that were Israel or the US to act alone, the perception in the region (and beyond) would still be that they had taken joint action. Iranian threats against Israel are of major concern to many advocates of military force. Many in Israel see the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran as an existential threat. On the other hand, some argue that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the main purveyor of these threats, has softened his attacks, using them for electoral purposes in Iran and for gaining popularity in the Muslim world, while apparently becoming a strong advocate in Iran for working with the US on the Brazil-Turkey brokered nuclear proposal. Many accept that even if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, Israel’s capacity to deter the use of such a weapon would still prevail, and Iran would be unlikely to use a nuclear weapon against Israel. Others are less sanguine, believing Iran might seek to pass a weapon to terrorists seeking to attack Israel, although it seems highly unlikely Iran would be able to escape the consequences of such action, including nuclear retaliation.

Those in favor of military action argue that time is running out and military action is the only sure (or almost sure) way to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program. They say the consequences of that program—the threat to Israel, the region, and the US—and the potential for a nuclear weapon falling into terrorist hands is so horrendous that all other considerations and difficulties should be set aside in favor of military action now or very soon. A few now advocate the use of nuclear weapons against the Iranian program to ensure a significant chance of “success” in eliminating the Iranian nuclear program.

The arguments made against the use of the military option are numerous and can be summarized as follows:

The US has time to see whether non-military options can work. There are other options (listed above) to test before resorting to military force.

If the consequences of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons are so great, the US should consider moving from the present option to one closer in content to negotiating option No. 3. The US should further consider the potential of opening discussions through the Brazil-Turkey proposal as one starting point for engagement.

Given the number of targets and concerns about imperfect intelligence on the possible locations of Iran’s nuclear program, military action is not certain to end it.

Even if military action could set back Iran’s program for several years, it is not worth the risk and cost (below).

The use of force by nuclear states against Iran would put Iran in a position to claim that it is fully justified to develop such weapons as a future deterrent. Indeed, it might well compel Iran to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

The Muslim world would see this as an unprovoked and illegitimate attack on a fellow Muslim country. Public opinion and governmental responses would be harsh and punitive—and likely long lasting.

Iran would undoubtedly exploit its available connections with terror and other organizations, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, to retaliate against both the US and Israel through asymmetrical and other forms of attack.

Al Qaeda would exploit military action in its recruiting efforts to gain support from future affiliates worldwide and in exploiting and gaining the support of public opinion in its conflicts with the US and others.

Even friendly Arab states in the region will be put under significant domestic and external pressure from their citizens and colleagues to separate themselves from the US and Israel.

Iran will exploit its options for intervention against US interests in Afghanistan and Iraq, putting our troops, allies, and accomplishments at serious risk.

The US public and military show little appetite for another conflict in the region, particularly one that might involve a third ground campaign there.

While aerial attack seems to be the military alternative most discussed publicly, the certainty of eliminating Iran’s possible weapons program increases only if the US were to carry out a land invasion and occupation, with all the attendant difficulties in terms of potential US losses. This approach does not pass the risk vs. gains test.

Iran could selectively or generally stop oil and gas shipments abroad. It could attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, as it has threatened to do, itself an act of war subject to US and other action to keep the waterway open. The resulting impact on petroleum prices would be significant, certainly for a period of time while Iran raises the specter of continuing and deepening conflict.

Such an attack, whether by the US or Israel, would be seen as a joint operation in the Arab world, and would certainly be a severe setback for successful peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.

Conclusion

There is time—not a whole lot, but enough to test diplomatic options. The US should use that time wisely. There are useful options to consider in the area of diplomacy set out above.

There is no certainty military force will destroy Iran’s military nuclear program. Neither are there ways to overcome the many major negative consequences attending the use of military force. The present debate seems fueled by a new series of media articles raising (once again) the use of military force while ignoring or setting aside the potential consequences of such use. Even more egregious has been the absence of public discussion of alternative diplomatic options.

The US should be concerned as well about the other side of the issue: Iran has continued to signal an interest in discussion. The Obama administration feels frustrated that its openings and offers in this direction do not seem to have been picked up or found acceptable.

Both sides will need to make new, serious efforts to break through what several years ago an Iranian friend said to me was the central curse on these efforts: “When we have been ready, you have not; when you have been ready, we have not.” The US, as the larger and more powerful state, may well have to take the lead.

Both sides have much to lose if there is no diplomatic effort to seek a resolution. Both sides also need to understand that they have much to gain if they can make that effort successful.