Knowing,Believing,and Understanding: The Social Construction of Knowledge in the O. J. Simpson Criminal Trial

Abstract

A model of knowledge is advanced that includes knowing as well as believing and understanding. The model includes two forms of knowing, knowing that (theoretical knowledge) and knowing how (practical knowledge), as well as two forms of belief, believing that and believing in. Knowing that links to believing that because whether one claims to know or to believe something is a matter of circumstance and evidence. Knowing how connects to believing in because knowing how to do something requires a teacher or someone to believe in. The O. J. Simpson criminal trial provides concrete examples of the uses of practical and theoretical knowledge and their pervasiveness in everyday life. The jury combined these different forms of knowledge into a verdict or understanding of not guilty. The reactions to the verdict polarized along racial lines and revealed the relations between knowledge and belief in the constructions of knowledge.

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