The classical concept that reconciles a free and sovereign people with the authority of government is the social contract. Increasingly, governments are pursuing alternative approaches to public service delivery with the hope of achieving greater effectiveness and efficiency. This article posits that market-based reforms reduce traditional conceptualizations of the social contract between citizens and government to one between citizens, government, and private-sector interests—the “social subcontract.” The relationship between citizens and government seems to have evolved into one where government sublets its responsibilities to private entities on behalf of the sovereign. With the social contract as our theoretical lens, we examine the evolution and development of the citizen-government relationship, as well as the challenges to this relationship when economic and political forces lead to a greater reliance on market-based policy and public management approaches. Finally, we seek to investigate the theoretical implications for legitimacy and accountability in public administration of moving toward a social subcontract.
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