A majority of actual policy is not developed by Congress but by regulatory agencies that have been delegated the authority to interpret congressional intent. Using some of the major variables associated with interest group influence on Congress, this study examines a model of interest group influence on agency rule makings. The study uses survey data to examine how interest groups relate to regulatory agencies, how those groups participate in rule making, and how they perceive the effectiveness of their participation. The full models and certain theoretical variables support the interest group influence on rule-making hypotheses, but some major discrepancies arise concerning commonly held theories of the political science literature. The study will, it is hoped, lead to further research on the important relationship between interest groups and regulatory agencies.
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