The Choice of Target Populations

Abstract

Public policy almost always seeks to change the behavior of one or more target populations who are ostensibly linked to the problems the policy is seeking to address. This paper argues that statutory designers and agency officials almost always have a choice from among several potential target groups, and that institutional factors often influence them to make inappropriate choices. Statutory designers, who it is assumed are sensitive to electoral conditions, will tend to oversubscribe some policies by identifying too many targets, including some who are not linked to policy objectives at all. Under other conditions, they will under subscribe, excluding some target groups who would contribute considerably to achievement of policy goals. The institutional conditions and incentives faced by agencies differ from those of elected officials. Therefore, they tend to target policies differently. Under some conditions, agencies will attempt to correct problems introduced by statutory designers, but in other situations, the institutional incentives faced by agencies will only exacerbate the problems. Agencies are most likely to correct problems introduced by statutory designers when agencies have a high degree of professionalism and receive budgets and other rewards on the basis of "value added" evaluations.