Presidents have been found to have influence over the decisions of a number of independent regulatory commissions, but research has left unanswered the question of the mechanism of impact. In this article, the impact of appointment is studied on the ICC from 1955 to 1974. No presidential influence through appointment was detected. This lack of impact was speculated to be caused by the lack of fit between the cases that the ICC deals with and the issue positions of the parties. What may look like presidential impact on other commissions may only be the shared attitudes of presidents and commissioners on commissions that deal with partisan related issues.
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