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Abstract

While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loper Bright has immediate implications for administrative rulemaking, it may also have deleterious consequences for bureaucratic human capital. We argue constrained discretion and increased uncertainty may make bureaucrats less likely to remain in government and develop expertise. We assess the short-term effects of Loper Bright with a priming experiment conducted with state-level bureaucrats. While we find no evidence of immediate effects of Loper Bright on turnover intention or willingness to invest in expertise, human capital may erode as bureaucrats internalize how Loper Bright hampers their ability to perform their jobs in the long-term.

Keywords

bureaucracy human capital Chevron deference

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The Implications of Loper Bright for Bureaucratic Human Capital

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