Abstract
This article scrutinizes linking social capital formation between informal civil society and local administrations during and after the 2015 European refugee reception crisis. Drawing from 61 semi-structured interviews with members of civil society organizations and local administrations in two German cities, this study documents that the production of linking social capital is by no means guaranteed. Structural power asymmetries and different logics of action between volunteers and local administrative officials regularly create tensions that can serve as relational breaking points. Accepting these inherent tensions and creating platforms to work things out against the odds are essential to produce trustful and responsive relationships.
Introduction
With her much-cited “Wir schaffen das” (We can do it), then-Chancellor Angela Merkel coined an iconic “representation of [German] welcome culture” (Laubenthal, 2019, p. 12) during the refugee reception crisis in 2015. Using a collective “we,” refugee reception was publicly framed as a “matter of mutual concern” (Polletta, 2016, p. 237), playing into a broader trend of increased citizen participation in the co-production of public goods (Bennett et al., 2022; Edelenbos et al., 2018; Healey, 2015; Igalla et al., 2021). Indeed, as in many other European countries, civil society contributed significantly to addressing the challenges posed by the rapid increase in the number of refugees. 1
Although the practices and dynamics of civil society support for refugees have been studied extensively (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019; della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt et al., 2019), the intensified interactions between (local) administrations and (informal) civil society remain under-theorized. We seek to contribute to this debate by drawing on the literature on linking social capital, introduced by Woolcock (2001) to complement the society-centeredness of traditional social capital research. Despite its widely acknowledged potential for the production of common goods, the creation of linking social capital itself remains largely unexplored. 2 We argue that the intensified interactions between civil society and public agencies during the refugee reception crisis 2015 created fertile ground to advance theory building on how linking social capital is produced.
We thereby focus on interactions between local administration and informal civil society groups for both empirical and theoretical reasons. First, a large part of civil society engagement during the refugee reception crisis in Germany and other European countries was characterized by informality (della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt et al., 2019), mirroring a broader trend in structural developments in civil society (Youngs et al., 2022). Second, power imbalances between informal civil society and local administrations are especially pronounced, increasing the odds of linking social capital.
We define local administrations as municipal bodies such as job centers, immigration offices, social service agencies, and governmental entities like mayoral offices or municipal governments. These institutions wield significant authority over refugees’ lives in Germany, managing critical aspects such as housing, food supply, and general care (Eckhard et al., 2021). On the civil society side, refugee support during this period spanned a broad spectrum of actors, including non-profits, church congregations, and sports clubs. However, a defining feature of this time was the mushrooming of informal refugee-support groups. These groups were predominantly volunteer-run with no or few paid staff, characterized by horizontal, loosely organized structures—in other words, they operated with significant informality. In contrast to established and more formal organizations such as sports clubs and non-profits, these informal groups represented a novel and dynamic force in refugee and migration work. By 2015/16, it is estimated that approximately 15,000 such groups had formed across Germany (Schiffauer et al., 2017, p. 13ff.).
In a theory-oriented case-study approach (Gerring, 2006), we draw on 61 semi-structured interviews with key informants in informal civil society and local administrations. Previous work on state-civil society interactions and the co-production of the common good has focused either on the perspective of civil society actors (Ostrander, 2013) or on that of local administrations (Eckhard et al., 2021). In isolation, however, neither perspective can fully capture the interactive dynamics of this relationship. Through the dual perspective applied in this analysis, we can assess how linking social capital is produced and perceived from both sides in this vertical relationship. Given the structural asymmetries and different logics of action between the two spheres, we argue that the production of trusting relationships cannot be taken for granted; instead, the production of linking social capital is an arduous, situational, and interactive process that is open-ended.
The article is divided into four sections. First, we outline our theoretical framework bridging the literatures on linking social capital and (informal) civil society—state interactions. Second, we contextualize refugee support in Germany and provide a brief overview of the data collection and analysis. Third, we present data on interaction sequences between informal civil society groups and local administrations, carving out factors facilitating and hindering the production of linking social capital.
Dynamics of Linking Social Capital and Civil Society Involvement
To examine state-civil society interactions during the refugee reception crisis in Germany, we build on theoretical reflections on linking social capital and civil society engagement more broadly. We propose a dynamic and interactive approach that highlights both the opportunities for linking social capital production and the processes that contribute to overcoming such obstacles. In very general terms, Putnam defined social capital as “the features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al., 1994, p. 167). Theoretically, the concept echoes relational sociology, which argues that connections between individuals and groups entail “mutual obligations and sustain rules of conduct, fostering norms of reciprocity” (Szreter, 2002, p. 574). The concept has energized the field of civil society research and development studies, but it has also received two particularly articulate criticisms concerning its normative bias: its neglect of the negative effects of social capital (Portes, 1998, 2014) and its society-centeredness and silence on the role of the state (Levi, 1996; Szreter, 2002; Tarrow, 1996). The former has led Putnam in his later work to distinguish between “bonding” social capital, which refers to connections between actors with similar characteristics, and “bridging” social capital, which operates between heterogeneous groups of actors (Putnam, 2000), the latter being more likely to have beneficial effects for democracy and good governance.
In response to the second criticism of the focus on civil society, Woolcock has proposed the concept of linking social capital (Woolcock, 2001) as a third variant of social capital. Szreter and Woolcock define this “as norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society” (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004, p. 655). Following this perspective, scholars have considered the role of the state in facilitating or hindering the production of social capital.
Regarding the empirical analysis of social capital, most of the literature has examined the stock of social capital by comparing quantitative measures across space (for an overview see Stolle, 2009) and has paid less attention to “how and why (under what circumstances) social capital increases or decreases” (Szreter, 2002, p. 573). Only few scholars have addressed the dynamic nature of social capital, drawing on qualitative research to identify mechanisms that contribute to the production of linking social capital (Titeca & Vervisch, 2008). Furthermore, most studies have focused on bridging and bonding social capital but linking social capital has rarely been studied empirically (for notable exceptions see Titeca & Vervisch, 2008; Woolcock, 2001).
Against this background, our analysis contributes to the understanding of the dynamic production of linking social capital and its ambiguous nature. Like other types of social capital, linking social capital is not necessarily beneficial. To unfold its positive effects, it is not the networks between individuals and groups per se that matter, but their quality (Levi, 1996). Putnam has accordingly distinguished between “ʽresponsive’ linking and ‘unresponsive’ or ‘exploitative’ linking” social capital (Putnam, 2004, p. 669). In a similar vein, Szreter argues that linking social capital “takes on a democratic and empowering character where those involved are endeavoring to achieve a mutually agreed beneficial goal (or set of goals) on a basis of mutual respect, trust, and equality of status, despite the manifest inequalities in their respective positions” (Szreter, 2002, p. 579).
These reflections on state-civil society interactions across gradients of power resonate with a broad literature on participatory citizen engagement. Such forms of “co-production” by public administration and civil society have become en vogue because many expect they will foster democracy and the production of public goods at the same time (Alford, 2014; Nabatchi et al., 2017). In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward citizens taking a more active role in addressing public issues through self-organization (Bennett et al., 2022; Edelenbos et al., 2018; Healey, 2015; Igalla et al., 2019). Often, these efforts respond to the perceived inadequacy of local administrative agencies in addressing public concerns such as land use, school governance, or the reception and inclusion of migrants (Teasdale, 2012).
Research in this area has primarily followed two different paths. On the one hand, public administration and public policy scholars have tended to adopt a top-down perspective, focusing on the effectiveness and feasibility of government (Adams, 2004; McComas et al., 2010). On the other hand, civil society scholars have flipped the coin, critically examining how citizens perceive their involvement and whether their involvement implies citizen empowerment (Doerr, 2018; Lee, 2015; Polletta, 2016). Although both approaches offer valuable insights, curiously scholars have refrained from engaging with the literature on linking social capital. Moreover, this research has emphasized either the of either state or civil society.
We seek to complement and further integrate these bodies of scholarship. Understanding the production of linking social capital as a laborious, dynamic, and open-ended task requires an approach that considers both state and civil society perspectives as well as the dynamics through which such relationships are made or broken.
We focus on the informal segments of civil society, thus on the looser forms of engagement that depend less dependent on formal registration or paid staff members. Scholars have observed “a transition from ‘traditional,’ ‘classical’ and ‘old’ to ‘modern’ or ‘new’” forms of volunteering (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003, p. 167), mirrored in a declining ability of traditional civil society organizations to bind their members and a proliferation of more informal, networked and fluid forms of engagement (Hustinx, 2005, 2010; Simsa et al., 2019; Youngs et al., 2022). Based on a recent comparative analysis of civil society in European countries, Youngs et al. conclude that “[c]ivil society activities are becoming more ad hoc and self-organized rather than following agendas set by professional staff of civil society organization” (Youngs et al., 2022). Due to their more flexible nature as spontaneous networks, informal initiatives have taken on crucial roles in various crises, including the financial crisis (Lahusen & Grasso, 2018), Hurricane Katrina (Boersma et al., 2021) and the refugee reception crisis of 2015 (Boersma et al., 2019; della Porta, 2018; Rast et al., 2020; Simsa et al., 2019).
When informal civil society actors and state officials interact, the power asymmetries between the two may be accentuated. Although local administrative officials may normatively value citizen participation, different logics of action and organization create structural tensions. The fixed and often slower routines of bureaucracies do not fit easily with the action-oriented impetus of spontaneous volunteers. For example, in a study of participatory processes in Spain, Fernández-Martínez et al. (2020) found that the relationship between public administrations and civil society can also deteriorate due to such interactions. Inflated expectations and lack of policy impact were among the factors they identified that led to frustration in local participatory processes. In a similar vein, Toubøl (2019) found that state-volunteer interactions during refugee support can lead to the erosion of institutional trust instead of strengthening vertical relationships between civil society and public institutions.
From a theoretical perspective, sustained interactions “on the basis of mutual respect, trust, and equality of status, despite the manifest inequalities in their respective positions” (Szreter, 2002, p. 579) are anything but self-evident. For linking social capital to be built and sustained, these difficulties must be overcome via repeated interactions in which both sides acknowledge their differences and are willing to address them. Before we examine specific civil society-state interactions, we present our strategy of data collection and analysis and provide context on local refugee support in Germany around the year 2015.
Data and Methods
Adopting a theory-oriented case study approach (Gerring, 2006), we seek to identify the processes underlying the making and breaking of linking social capital. To explore the vertical relationships between state and informal civil society actors, we draw on extensive qualitative fieldwork conducted in two medium-sized cities 3 in Germany: Lauda in the South and Altenau in the North. City names have been anonymized to protect the confidentiality of our interviewees and the organizations involved.
When sampling interlocutors, we first identified key actors in (informal) civil society and local administration in each city during the refugee reception crisis of 2015/2016 through a mix of online research, expert interviews, and document reviews. We recruited additional interlocutors through snowballing until saturation was reached. Given the medium size of the two cities, the set of relevant actors was relatively small from the outset. We conducted a total of 61 semi-structured qualitative interviews between 2020 and 2021. 4 Interviewees included local administrative officials from various public agencies (e.g., local immigration agency, job center, mayors’ office) and volunteers from informal civil society initiatives that began around 2015 with the explicit aim of refugee support. Furthermore, we conducted interviews with representatives of sports clubs, church congregations, and welfare associations to gain additional insights in state-civil society interactions. With selected key actors in civil society and local administration in both cities, we conducted multiple interviews to gain deeper insights into the interaction dynamics over time. Due to health hazards and restrictions related to the Covid-19 pandemic, the initial round of interviews was conducted online, followed by on-site interviews in both cities as soon as the pandemic context permitted it. Interlocutors chose the location of the on-site interviews.
The efforts needed to gain access to relevant persons differed between actor types. Members of citizen initiatives generally were enthusiastic about discussing state-civil society relations. In contrast, local administrative officials approached initial contact with more caution and often required supervisor approval before agreeing to interviews. They were also more measured in their responses. Nonetheless, most key actors in both cities eventually agreed to participate in the study. Informed consent was obtained from all interlocutors. Given that the interviewees from both local administrations and civil society were mostly native Germans with an academic background and not members of marginalized communities, status hierarchies between the research team and respondents were limited and did not emerge as obstacles during fieldwork.
Interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The interviews explicitly addressed the evolution of state-civil society interactions since 2015, paying particular attention to critical events. All interviews were systematically analyzed using the coding software MaxQDA. All direct quotes used in this article were translated from German by the authors. The interview data are supplemented by meeting minutes, brochures, local media reports and other secondary material.
The 2015 Refugee Reception Crisis as a Catalyst for (Informal) Civil Society
In many European countries, the rapid increase in asylum applications in 2015 sparked a broad mobilization in civil society (della Porta, 2018; Feischmidt et al., 2019). While some regions predominantly witnessed mobilization against the reception of refugees (Rea et al., 2019), Germany became associated with an unparalleled “welcome culture” and hospitality toward refugees (The Economist, 2015). This was owed to then-Chancellor Angela Merkel’s asylum policy, which was liberal, at least by European standards (Laubenthal, 2019), but even more so in the midst of a dynamic of “mass mobilization for refugees” (Niebergall, 2016). Indeed, as the number of refugees increased in Germany, more people than ever before organized support for refugees in a variety of ways, ranging from reception committees at train stations to more sustained forms of civic engagement, including the provision of language courses, recreational activities, mentoring and legal support. Quantitative data substantiate the anecdotal suggestion of mushrooming citizen initiatives. Although only one percent of the German population was volunteering for refugees in the spring of 2014 (Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2014, p. 19), this number jumped to eleven percent in the fall of 2015 (Ahrens, 2016). Between 2015 and the summer of 2017, one in four adults in Germany engaged in civil society activities to support refugees (BMFSFJ, 2017).
This rapid emergence of a new cititzens’ movement that stepped in where public agencies had failed to provide basic necessities such as clothing, food, or shelter, has been referred to as a “magical moment” (Sternstunde) for civil society in Germany (Schiffauer et al., 2018, p. 9). Accordingly, scholars have articulated high expectations for how this historic moment might serve as a reservoir for the production of social capital in a diversifying German society (Han-Broich, 2015; Nagel & El-Menouar, 2017). This unprecedented catalyst for volunteering in 2015 makes the German case particularly interesting regarding its lasting implications for civil society-state relations. The summer of 2015 marked the beginning of a period in which new citizen initiatives and local public administrations came together to organize the reception of refugees as an issue of “mutual concern” (Polletta, 2016, p. 237).
Many mayors invited citizens to public events to recruit volunteers, as public administrations were stretched to their limits. Thus, the very real challenge of refugee reception led to a sudden intensification of interactions between citizen initiatives and local administrations. Yet, the production of linking social capital is complex, and the inherent frictions of state-civil society interactions were ever-present. Volunteers and local administrative officials alike described this context, characterized by mutual dependency, distinct roles, and conflicting logics of action, as inherently conflictual (Daphi, 2017; Schammann & Kühn, 2018). Against this backdrop, we draw on qualitative data to examine the processes by which the unprecedented mobilization of civil society did and did not lead to the production of linking social capital at the local level.
The (Un)Making of Linking Social Capital in Local Refugee Reception
In the following, we examine the making and breaking of linking social capital in local settings. Adopting an interactive perspective, we examine interactions between local administrative agencies and the main civil society initiatives that emerged in 2015 to support refugees.
The first case study is located in a medium-sized city in a prosperous, rural area in southern Germany. 5 The political culture and government in the city and the surrounding county have had long-standing conservative majorities. The city’s ethnic diversity is limited compared to other areas in Germany, and there is a lack of experience in hosting large groups of migrants. Against this background, the public infrastructure for professional integration services was limited when the first refugees arrived in 2015. At that time, the citizen initiative “Solidarity for Refugees” was founded. One of the group’s founders, a local pastor, recruited many volunteers from his congregation. The response to their efforts was “tremendous,” with more than 180 volunteers joining the newly formed initiative. With the local administration soon overwhelmed by the numerous arrivals of refugees, the initiative stepped in to fill the gap. Volunteers became deeply involved in a variety of refugee support activities, gaining in-depth knowledge of the latest asylum laws and managing many aspects of refugee reception, such as providing German language classes, childcare, and assistance in dealing with local administrative agencies. From the beginning, the initiative operated in an informal, self-organized and independent manner, outside of established and professional structures such as welfare organizations.
The second case study is located in a medium-sized city in a moderately prosperous region of northern Germany. Although the region also has a conservative tradition, the city was governed by a Social Democratic majority until the conservatives regained the mayor’s office shortly after 2015. In contrast to the first case study, this city is home to a large migrant population, and issues of forced migration were already evident. These experiences are reflected in established administrative processes and a range of existing public services in the field of local integration policies prior to 2015. As in the first case study, the city saw the establishment of a citizen initiative with around 100 volunteers in 2015. The first call for volunteers was made by the incumbent social democratic mayor. She wanted to inform citizens and find volunteers willing to accompany refugees during their first months in a centralized refugee shelter. The volunteers initially expected the local administration to coordinate this new civic engagement, but when the local administration failed to take a leadership role, they decided to move forward as a group of about 100 volunteers and create a self-organized initiative called “Welcome Refugees.” They set up a café where refugees and locals could meet, provided language classes, and offered support with bureaucratic processes. In the first phase, in 2015 and 2016, most of these activities took place in a designated room in a centralized refugee shelter.
Thus, in both cases, the limited capacity of local administrative agencies provided a new opportunity for volunteers to create a new, self-organized field of civic engagement. In the immediate “crisis” period, these spontaneous citizen initiatives were able to create new structures of engagement much faster than any of the more professional civil society organizations. Moreover, through their intensive involvement and direct contact with refugees, volunteers quickly acquired knowledge about their needs. They familiarized themselves with the legal and administrative context, thus narrowing the usual knowledge gap with professionals working for local administrative agencies and welfare organizations. All in all, the new volunteers quickly concluded that their commitment was needed, and that the reception of refugees could only be managed if the local administrative agencies accepted them as important partners in the provision of refugee support. Below, we show how this relationship evolved after 2015. For analytical purposes, we divide the interaction into three phases.
Table 1 summarizes three phases of interaction in the two local settings and highlights the making or breaking linking social capital connections between 2015/16 and 2021/2022. In the first case study, we document a dynamic between citizen initiatives and local administrations in which initial mistrust and suspicion gradually transformed into a cooperative and trusting relationship over six years. Conversely, the second case study describes a scenario in which an initial period of mutual appreciation between the citizen initiative and the local administration was followed by a deterioration over time, eventually leading to frustration and resignation. The evolution of interactions including critical events are subsequently described in detail.
Phases of Interaction and Linking Social Capital Development in Refugee Reception.
Case Study I: Producing Linking Social Capital Against the Odds
Phase 1: Suspicion and Frustration
The relationship between the citizen initiative “Solidarity for Refugees” and local administrative officials had a difficult start, marked by a deep distrust of the local administration by the volunteers. In the eyes of the volunteers, the local administration rarely used its leeway to interpret asylum laws in favor of refugees. Disputes arose over the restrictive issuance of work permits, deportations, and Internet access in refugee shelters. Luisa, one of the first volunteers and co-founder of the citizen initiative recalled the problems with the issuance of work permits: For a while we had serious problems with the work permits because we couldn’t understand how the local administration made its decisions about who would get a work permit and who wouldn’t. (ID 5)
Some refugees received work permits, while others had to wait years for a work permit and sometimes never received one.
Despite these tensions, the initiative quickly became an integral part of the local refugee reception process, as it quickly immersed itself in the issue and developed significant expertise in assisting refugees. Volunteers soon learned about the legal situation and understood how much legal leeway there was regarding the immigration status of refugees. This was in stark contrast to the local administration, which had no relevant experience in receiving migrants or refugees and was slower to respond when the number of refugees increased sharply around 2015.
The visibility and influence of the initiative was enhanced by its ability to coordinate other citizen initiatives in the county, pooling expertise and gaining a knowledge advantage over the local administration, which struggled due to the lack of staff and expertise in this area. As this increasingly assertive actor entered the scene, disputes over funding and responsibilities arose. While the volunteers wanted to receive public funding yet still remain autonomous, the county representatives wanted more coordination. According to the head of the county’s administration office, “opposing fronts clashed” (ID 46) in this initial phase, underscoring the irritation on both sides that dominated the interaction.
Maria, one of the volunteers of the citizen initiative, confirmed the initial perception of opposition between the volunteers on the one side and the local administration on the other: “[The local administration] has other interests than us volunteers. (. . .) We are on the side of the refugees and have other goals in mind than the local administration with all its regulations. (. . .) And there have been disputes about this recently”. (ID 10)
Although volunteers felt deterred in their enthusiasm for helping, stifled by administrative and in their view outdated rules, local administrative officials often were uncertain and challenged by the emergence of this well-organized citizen initiative. Overall, deep mistrust and seemingly irreconcilable logics of action were an unlikely starting point for the production of linking social capital.
Phase II: Mediation
Things changed in the following phase. Despite the initial tensions, representatives from both sides continued to perceive the local reception of refugees as a matter of mutual concern.
In the words of one influential civil society representative, “it was not always easy, and of course we [and the local administration] had different interests, but it was still clear from the beginning that we could only do it together” (ID 2). This admission did not end the interaction; instead, both sides engaged in open negotiations about their different interests and viewpoints. In the terminology of Hirschman’s classic work (Hirschman, 1970), the actors opted for “voice” rather than “exit” and opened channels for discussion.
Similarly, the county governor recalled that the initial tension of opposing fronts gradually decreased by “slowly coming closer” and “trying to accept the other’s way of thinking” (ID 46). The combination of conflict and a shared understanding of interdependence led both sides to work things out and to engage in active efforts to build trust and reconcile conflicting viewpoints and organizational logics. Informal meetings between local administrative officials and volunteers proliferated, preparing the ground for deeper interaction.
Phase III: Cooperation
The first informal meetings soon were supplemented by regular exchange forums, institutionalized in the form of specialized expert roundtables on various topics related to refugee housing. These fora regularly brought together actors from local civil society, business, local politics, and local administration to exchange ideas and develop common approaches. Later, these expert roundtables provided the framework for discussing and formulating a new integration strategy for the county in close cooperation between the initiative, other civil society actors and the public sector. At the same time, they emphasized that the process of negotiating the integration strategy and reaching a final agreement was not entirely problem-free. One of the local administrative officials mentioned that interactions between the initiative and the local administration initially were very contentious. He found it all the more surprising that volunteers and officials then began to work on a new integration strategy for the county.
The funny thing is that people who used to be our biggest opponents were actually involved in creating this integration strategy. [. . .] The initiatives are not on our side now, but they are working with us to see how we can bring the best together. And in the integration strategy, we have not only the views of the county administration, but also of all the supporters [i.e. civil society organizations, initiatives]. (ID 46)
According to one volunteer, the initiative and the local administration began to meet more often in the context of weekly exchange meetings between members of the initiative and local administrative agencies. Both sides believed that the challenges of hosting refugees could only be solved together.
And it wasn’t always easy and of course we had different interests, the county office and us, but it was still clear from the beginning that we could only do it together. And that’s why the county office was happy for our support, and we were happy for their support. (ID 5)
Both sides also recognized the productivity of these forms of integrating the expertise of different actors and negotiating differences. As a result, the interaction continued even after the task of housing the refugees had lost its immediate urgency.
The fact that interaction continued did not mean that there was no conflict. On the contrary, the different interests remained. Deciding on a new integration strategy required hard compromises, and some attempts to reach agreement failed.
But we can at least say that it has a broad basis. And again, sometimes we had arguments where we said, “we see this very differently, this absolutely has to go in” [for example, allowing Muslim women wearing a headscarf to work in a public institution], but the county office said, “No, that’s too hot for us, we are leaving that out” (ID 1).
Despite such failures, the actors involved did not opt for “exit” but made efforts to maintain the interaction against all odds.
Taken together, these three phases of interaction illustrate how unfavorable initial conditions were successfully overcome, resulting in enhancement, however fragile, of the mutual understanding, trust, and formalized cooperation that characterize responsive forms of linking social capital. Conflicts acted as catalysts for rapprochement because of the willingness of the actors involved to address them. Looking back on the evolution of the relationship, some local administration representatives came to appreciate the challenging tone of the new citizen initiative, which was initially met with irritation, admitting that “it’s good to have a bit of external pressure” (ID 47) to reflect on institutional roles and routines, while highlighting the efforts of the volunteers to see the bigger picture and engage in debates from different points of view.
Case Study II: A failed Opportunity to Produce Linking Social Capital
Phase I: Mutual Appreciation
In contrast to the conflictual start in case study I, the relationship between the citizen initiative “Refugees Welcome” and the local administration in the second case initially was characterized by mutual appreciation and respect. Both the local administrative officials and the volunteers of the initiative believed that the reception of refugees was a common challenge that could only be met through close cooperation between civil society and the state. While the volunteers saw the local administration as having a duty to care for and integrate refugees, they also saw refugee support as a project too large to be solved by public administration alone.
The consensual start is illustrated by the following email excerpt in which one of the volunteers thanks the staff of the local administration for an information event in 2015: It was nice to see how friendly and relaxed (. . .) and how calmly and unpretentiously you [administrative officers] handled the incredibly heavy workload last night (. . .). I thought that was really great! And I think that also encourages all the volunteers to see when they experience that not every employee does their job by the book but is as committed as you obviously are. (ID 38)
The volunteers underscored the mutual appreciation and trust they experienced from the local administration, particularly the mayor. With this trust came a certain latitude for the initiative, allowing the volunteers to organize and consolidate themselves. First, the local administrative officials at the refugee shelter gave the volunteers leeway and allowed for a great deal of agency and self-organization. Second, the mayor provided the initiative with its own space when the local administration distributed most of the refugees to the different neighborhoods. Since one of the neighborhoods housed a vast number of refugee families and since the proportion of migrants in this part of the city had previously been low, the mayor asked the initiative to use one of the buildings as an information point. The idea was to provide a shared space for volunteers, refugees, and local residents to mediate and prevent potential conflicts between these groups.
The volunteers appreciated the local administration’s support, and, in turn, the mayor showed his interest in their activities, including attending one of the initiative’s parties: The mayor stood at the barbecue and actively helped and that was an important experience for us, because in the beginning we experienced a lot of rejection and hostility from the neighborhood (. . .). (ID 38)
Overall, and in contrast to the initial constellation in the first case, this first phase of interaction was characterized by the mutual perception that the local administration and the volunteers were pulling in the same direction. Thus, at the outset, the conditions seemed favorable for producing linking social capital. Volunteers and public authorities shared this impression, and regular information meetings were set up to exchange ideas. Actors on both sides were happy to see the other taking on responsibility and understood the reception of refugees as a common task.
Phase II: Resentment
However, this harmony did not last. By the end of 2016, discontent grew among the volunteers. As the focus shifted away from initial emergency relief to education, employment, and housing issues, the initiative “Refugees Welcome” became increasingly vocal about refugees’ difficult conditions. Although the local administration and the citizen initiative initially appeared to be on the same team, the different areas of responsibility and logic of action between the state and civil society became more apparent in the second phase. In particular, the shift in focus from emergency reception to integration issues fueled conflicts. While local administrative officials and the volunteers at the citizen initiative agreed on the importance of providing emergency relief and humanitarian aid, they began to disagree on long-term integration strategies. When the volunteers raised their concerns about how many refugees were being treated, including a lack of social resources and care, they did not believe local administrators heard them.
The volunteers openly expressed their discontent. In a public letter from the initiative to the local administration, the volunteers claimed: “There is a lack of integration courses! There is a lack of kindergarten places! There is a lack of support for schools! There is a lack of language mediators in offices and authorities!.”
Throughout 2017 and 2018, the volunteers pointed out problems and made demands in numerous letters to the local and regional administrations. In addition, they repeatedly emphasized that the local administration did not address the volunteers’ demands and needs during the city’s information and exchange meetings. Lisa, one of the long-time volunteers in the initiative, thought that the local administration’s exchange meetings were designed to convey official information rather than provide a space for peer-to-peer discussion: [. . .] I don’t want to be unfair to the city, but there were also invitations from the central reception point for the volunteers to meet, but the main topic was the passing on of information by the social workers. In the end, we always had the opportunity to share information, but not in a way that brought our experiences to the fore. It was more about being informed about something, and people from other areas were always invited, like the Order of Malta or Caritas [central welfare organizations], who then reported, which was interesting of course, but it wasn’t really possible for us to present our problems and challenges. (ID 39)
The central concern of the volunteers was that they wanted to be heard. While established welfare organizations were invited to share their experiences in information meetings with the city, the initiative was only supposed to listen. This new situation did not correspond to the initiative’s self-image, which increasingly perceived itself as a group of experts who had been immersed in the topic of refugee support and therefore deserved to be taken seriously. As a result of numerous disputes between the volunteers and the city officials, the fronts hardened. The common public concern of refugee reception turned into an escalating conflict that destroyed the trusting relationship of the first interaction phase.
Phase III: Escalation and Resignation
Eventually, the conflict escalated to the point where a controversial decision by the local administration ended the interaction. Two years after the mayor had offered the building, which had then served as the initiative’s information point, the local administration canceled the agreement for temporary use. The closure was a major setback for the initiative. The volunteers had planned projects for several years, and they had established strong relationships internally and with the residents of the surrounding neighborhood. As a result, many of the “Refugees Welcome” volunteers resigned and gave up their involvement in the initiative.
The closure was the result of two key developments. First was a change of mayor. Although the previous mayor had been open to refugee reception and the volunteer projects, his successor was hardly interested in this form of civic engagement. In the interviews, both volunteers and local administrative officials lamented this loss of interest. Second, the support structures in the local administration had become more formalized and professionalized. Over time, the local administrative officials came to see volunteers not as a source of support but rather as “annoying troublemakers” (ID 61). Their autonomy was no longer seen as an asset, but as a threat to the city’s claim to holistic management. The local administration reacted with notable discomfort: Some of the volunteers were a bit invasive. They were just doing things. They interfered. They wrote letters. They published e-mails that had been exchanged between them and us within the local administration. They took positions that we did not take (ID 61).
Although in the first case volunteers used their knowledge advantage over the local administration to become indispensable actors in the local reception of refugees, in the second case the growing professionalization of refugee reception left no room for volunteers. As a result, the importance and visibility of the initiative declined.
From the volunteers’ point of view, the closure of their central meeting location was an inexplicable intrusion into their self-organized activities. The volunteers were hardly involved in the local administration’s decision and had little opportunity to advocate for the preservation of the building. From then on, the lack of a central and open meeting place forced the initiative to meet in private homes, which made it difficult to stick together, share experiences, and sustain the common commitment: What we were promised, in 2016 the city gave us the building rent-free for five years, and then they just said quite early, no, the buildings have to be returned to the city, you have to get out of here (ID 40).
Volunteers expected local administrative officials to treat them as equals. After their initial support, however, volunteers later believed that their engagement was no longer needed but rather seen as an obstacle in the official refugee assistance system. After the conflict escalated, neither local administrative officials nor the volunteers were willing to return to a common understanding. While mutual respect was a favorable starting point for the production of linking social capital, the interaction dynamics were subsequently dominated by a perceived lack of appreciation. Even a key figure in the local administration admitted: “I don’t think the volunteers feel that their commitment is sufficiently appreciated. I felt that way. I have had many conversations about this.” (ID 58)
Discussion: The Production of Linking Social Capital Against the Odds
This analysis of interaction sequences between informal civil society actors and local administrations in two medium-sized German cities during and after the refugee reception crisis in 2015 documents, first, the arduous and contentious nature of linking social capital production. It requires a continuous effort on the part of all parties since the odds are varied: Distinct routines and power asymmetries between volunteers and local administrative officials created structural tensions that served as breaking points to produce linking social capital. Even favorable initial conditions, such as in our second case study, do not guarantee the emergence of lasting mutually responsive relationships. Linking social capital is a fragile and dynamic process rather than a resource that can be taken for granted. Accordingly, assessing the societal potential of linking social capital requires attention to how the actors involved deal with the tensions inherent in the interaction between the different spheres of local administration and informal civil society.
Our article thereby, second, contributes not only to relatively scarce empirical scholarship on linking social capital but also to debates on the potentials and challenges of rising informality in civil society more broadly. Youngs et al. argue that “informality is reshaping European civil society and bringing about new and welcome forms of political engagement” yet also recall the “kinds of issues that will need to be tackled if this activism is to provide a truly effective booster shot to European democracy” (Youngs et al., 2022). While the advantages of informal civil society to react in volatile moments of crisis have been widely discussed (Hustinx, 2010; Simsa et al., 2019), our study unveils the challenges that need to be dealt with to strengthen (local) democracies rather than contributing to alienation from public institutions (Toubøl, 2019).
We find evidence that self-confident volunteers with the courage to confront can be essential to encourage public officials to experiment with new forms of responsive encounters. The first case study illustrates how mediation and more institutionalized exchanges eventually led to mutual understanding and close cooperation after severe conflict in the initial interaction phase. Frictions were proactively integrated into multi-actor forums to continue interacting against apparent odds and moments of (mutual) frustration. In contrast, in the second case study, the relationship between the citizen initiative and the local authorities deteriorated after promising initial cooperation and mutual understanding. Both sides need to recognize their differences and be willing to engage with each other to work things out. Local administrative officials may shy away from such a process because it challenges established routines. Such rejection, however, further alienates volunteers. Volunteers intuitively sense whether their efforts are taken seriously, or in social capital terms, whether vertical ties are “responsive” or more instrumental or even “exploitative” in nature (Putnam, 2004, p. 669). The experience of not being taken seriously is a significant driver of discouragement, in which volunteers choose to drop out, resulting in a rapid breakdown of ties. At the same time, the production of linking social capital also requires the willingness on the part of informal civil society actors to partly adapt. As Youngs et al. have noted, “groups often lack the structures and clear aims needed to engage constructively with authorities and negotiate tangible policy gains” (Youngs et al., 2022). Thus, striking a balance between sufficient spaces for self-organization and, if needed, some degree of capacity building with external support can be essential (Gesemann & Roth, 2016; Mende et al., 2021) for linking social capital to emerge. Drawing upon two previously largely separate academic fields, civil society and public administration studies, this article thus contributes to a recent effort in bridging these literatures (see Bennett et al., 2022; Edelenbos et al., 2018; Healey, 2015; Hu & Zhu, 2021; Thomsen & Jensen, 2020).
Third, although not the article’s focus, variation in contextual conditions merit discussion. The two local cases differ notably in previous experience with migration and, consequently, with the degree of professionalization of public services in local integration policies. Contributions from organizational theory suggest that this has implications for the incentives for members of civil society to get involved. According to the “crowding-out” argument (Gundelach et al., 2010, p. 627), the more professionalized public integration services are, the less necessary civic engagement is from the perspective of local administrators. From the perspective of volunteers, a context of professionalization reduces the incentives to get involved, as their role is expected to remain marginal. According to the opposite “crowding in” argument, the more professionalized and comprehensive public integration services are, the greater the likelihood that volunteer arrangements will be strengthened, as authorities know how to manage and reap the benefits of citizen engagement. We find tentative support for this line of argument. In case study I, volunteers developed an assertive role because of a vacuum of expertise and capacity in the local administration. In this vacuum, volunteers became indispensable actors in local integration arrangements. In the second case study, in contrast, the local administration and the various welfare organizations became increasingly professionalized and no longer felt dependent on volunteer support for their work. Instead, from the point of view of the local administration, the considerable professionalization made volunteer work superfluous and even obstructive. Even though a systematic comparison of contextual factors is beyond the scope of this article, this suggests that interaction sequences through which linking social capital is built or broken do not unfold in a vacuum but are spatially and organizationally situated, opening avenues for further research.
Fourth, this article complements contemporary scholarship on the local reception of refugees. While previous research has made significant contributions to better understanding of the refugee reception crisis of 2015/16, the majority of studies have not focused on the more lasting effects of this period on local civil society (but see Dinkelaker et al., 2021). Furthermore, research has primarily examined three key areas: the changes and evolution of local administrations, the impact on the lives of refugees, and the motivations and challenges faced by individual volunteers, activists, and refugees (Bagavos & Kourachanis, 2022; Bergfeld, 2017; Eckhard et al., 2021; Feischmidt & Zakariás, 2020; Gundelach & Toubøl, 2019).
Lastly, while pointing at the odds of linking social capital production, our analysis also echoes other studies that have highlighted the value that successful cases can create for local democracies. Referring to the city of Nuremberg, Schiffauer concludes that “a synergy between citizens’ efforts and urban institutions emerged, which made citizens’ engagement particularly efficient. The joint effort of municipal authorities and citizens produced strong feelings of communal identity and local pride” (Schiffauer, 2022, p. 292). Accordingly, there is much to win for local communities from investing in the arduous process of establishing trustful and lasting vertical relations between informal civil society and (local) public administrations.
Footnotes
Appendix
Data Availability Statement
The interview data that support the findings of this article (entitled “Against the Odds: On the Arduous Production of Linking Social Capital”) are available upon request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to restrictions on the inclusion of information that could compromise the privacy of research participants.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This article is a product of the “aktivzivil” project, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).
