Personnel Control and Local Officials’ Attention to Economic Development: Evidence from China

Abstract

Compared to democracies, our understanding of policy attention in authoritarian governments remains limited. Using data from 612 Chinese municipal party secretaries’ official activities, we investigate the structural factors within the authoritarian bureaucratic system influencing new officials’ attention for economic issues. The findings reveal that younger officials and those transferred from other regions exhibit a clear preference for economic issues. Moreover, higher economic growth expectations from superior governments are linked to increased attention to urban economic affairs by officials. This study enriches the literature on comparative agenda research by discussing the relationship between policy attention allocation and authoritarian cadre management.

Keywords

policy attention authoritarian government cadre management local officials China

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