As profit-seeking corporations, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have incentives to maximize profits from economic activities. However, subject to state ownership, SOEs are expected also to be more accountable for public welfare than their private counterparts. This study examines whether SOEs’ relative provincial dominance reinforces government’s demand to reduce air pollution in China, in the context of anticorruption and performance management. The results suggest that greater relative SOE dominance reduces sulfur dioxide emissions, but this effect is significant only in provinces with a low level of corruption case investigations. Performance management has no discernible moderating impact on the effect of SOE relative dominance.
AndersonC.TeverdovaY. (2003). Corruption, political allegiances and attitudes towards government in contemporary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 47, 91–109.
4.
AndrewsR.BoyneG. A.WalkerR. M. (2011). Dimensions of publicness and organizational performance: A review of the evidence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21, i301–i319.
5.
AngristJ. D.PischkeJ.-S. (2008). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton University Press.
6.
AroraS.GangopadhyayS. (1995). Toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 28, 289–309.
BachmanD. (2017). China is corrupt, but there is more to the story. Asia Policy, 23, 158–162.
9.
BolívarM. P. R.SánchezR. G.HernándezA. M. L. (2015). Managers as drivers of CSR in state-owned enterprises. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 58, 777–801.
10.
BozemanB. (1987). All organizations are public: Bridging public and private organizational theories. Jossey-Bass.
11.
BozemanB.MolinaJ. A. L.KaufmannW. (2018). Angling for sharks, not pilot fish: Deep corruption, venal corruption, and public values failure. Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, 1, 5–27.
12.
BuraniN.RaggiD. (2017). Productivity crowding-out in labor markets with motivated workers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 151, 199–218.
13.
CaiY. (2014). State and agents in China: Disciplining government officials. Stanford University Press.
14.
CarterN. T.MolA. P. (2006). China and the environment: Domestic and transnational dynamics of a future hegemon. Environmental Politics, 15, 330–344.
15.
ChanH. S.GaoJ. (2009). Preventing corruption through performance measurement: The case of China. In GongT.MaS. K. (Eds.), Preventing corruption in Asia: Institutional design and policy capacity (pp. 97–112). Routledge.
16.
ChengW. (2004). An empirical study of corruption within China’s state-owned enterprises. China Review, 4, 55–80.
DongK.YangH.WangX. (2010). Public service ethics and anticorruption efforts. In BermanE.MoonM.ChoiH. (Eds.), Public administration in East Asia, Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (pp. 95–116). Taylor and Francis.
19.
DownieC. (2014). Transnational actors in environmental politics: Strategies and influence in long negotiations. Environmental Politics, 23, 376–394.
20.
DownieC. (2017). Fighting for king coal’s crown: Business actors in the US coal and utility industries. Global Environmental Politics, 17, 21–39.
21.
EatonS.KostkaG. (2014). Authoritarian environmentalism undermined? Local leaders’ time horizons and environmental policy implementation in China. The China Quarterly, 218, 359–380.
22.
EatonS.KostkaG. (2017). Central protectionism in China: The “central SOE problem” in environmental governance. The China Quarterly, 231, 685–704.
23.
ESRI. (2017). ArcGIS desktop, release 10.5.
24.
FreyB. S. (2017). Policy consequences of pay-for-performance and crowding out. Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, 1, 55–59.
FryxellG. E.LoC. W. (2001). Organizational membership and environmental ethics: A comparison of managers in state-owned firms, collectives, private firms and joint ventures in China. World Development, 29, 1941–1956.
27.
FuH. (2015). Wielding the sword: President Xi’s new anti-corruption campaign. In SusanR. A.LagunesP. (Eds.), Greed, corruption, and the modern state: Essays in political economy (pp. 134–160). Edward Elgar.
28.
GaoJ. (2009). Governing by goals and numbers: A case study in the use of performance measurement to build state capacity in China. Public Administration and Development, 29, 21–31.
29.
GaoW.SmythR. (2010). Job satisfaction and relative income in economic transition: Status or signal? The Case of Urban China. China Economic Review, 21, 442–455.
30.
GeallS.ShenW.Gongbuzeren. (2018). Solar energy for poverty alleviation in China: State ambitions, bureaucratic interests, and local realities. Energy Research & Social Science, 41, 238–248.
31.
GeorgellisY.IossaE.TabvumaV. (2010). Crowding out intrinsic motivation in the public sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21, 473–493.
32.
GerrishE. (2016). The impact of performance management on performance in public organizations: A meta-analysis. Public Administration Review, 76, 48–66.
33.
GibbonsR.KatzL. F.LemieuxT.ParentD. (2002). Comparative advantage, learning, and sectoral wage determination (NBER Working Paper Series 8889). National Bureau of Economic Research.
34.
GongT. (2015). Managing government integrity under hierarchy: Anti-corruption efforts in local China. Journal of Contemporary China, 24, 684–700.
35.
GreenT. C.ZhouD. (2019). Pay inequality, job satisfaction, and firm performance (Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper No. 2019-07-03). http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3415937
GuoS. (2001). The party-state relationship in post-Mao China. China Report, 37, 301–315.
38.
GuttmanD.YoungO.JingY.BrambleB.BuM.ChenC.ZeidanR. (2018). Environmental governance in China: Interactions between the state and “nonstate actors.”Journal of Environmental Management, 220, 126–135.
39.
HaqG.BaileyP. D.ChadwickM. J.ForresterJ.KuylenstiernaJ.LeachG.VillagrasaD.FergussonM.SkinnerI.OberthurS. (2001). Determining the costs to industry of environmental regulation. European Environment, 11(3), 125–139.
40.
HolmbergS.RothsteinB. (2016). Trusting other people. Journal of Public Affairs, 17, Article e1645.
41.
HultsD. R. (2012). Hybrid governance: State management of national oil companies. In VictorD. G.HultsD. R.ThurberM. C. (Eds.), Oil and governance state-owned enterprises and the world energy supply (pp. 62–120). Cambridge University Press.
42.
JohansonJ.VakkuriJ. (2018). Hybrid governance, organization and society exploring diversity of institutional life. Routledge.
43.
JohnstonM. (2011). Why do so many anti-corruption efforts fail?N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law, 67, 467–496.
44.
KamienieckiS. (2006). Corporate America and environmental policy: How often does business get its way?Stanford University Press.
45.
KarplusV. J.HuangY.ZhangD. (2017). State control as a substitute for environmental regulation? Evidence from Chinese cities. SSRN Electronic Journal. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3054141
46.
KarplusV. J.ShenX.ZhangD. (2020). Herding cats: Firm non-compliance in China’s industrial energy efficiency program. The Energy Journal, 41. https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.41.4.vkar
47.
KimB. H.HongS. (2019). Political change and turnovers: How do political principals consider organizational, individual, and performance information?Public Choice, 181, 291–308.
48.
KoppellJ. G. S. (2003). The politics of quasi-government hybrid organizations and the dynamics of bureaucratic control. Cambridge University Press.
49.
KoppellJ. G. S. (2007). Political control for China’s state-owned enterprises: Lessons from America’s experience with hybrid organizations. Governance, 20, 255–278.
50.
KostkaG. (2017). China’s local environmental politics. In SternfeldE. (Ed.), Routledge handbook of environmental policy in China (pp. 31–47). Routledge.
51.
KraftM. E.KamienieckiS. (2007). Business and environmental policy: Corporate interests in the American political system. MIT Press.
52.
LangbeinL.LiangJ.BuenemannM. (2020). Comparing the effects of changes in performance incentives and implementation activities on policy outcomes: Evidence from air pollution emissions in China. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2020.1726708
53.
LangbeinL.SanabriaP. (2017). Independent professional bureaucracies and corruption: Evidence from Latin America. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 19, 435–451.
54.
LazearE. P. (1991). Labor economics and the psychology of organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 89–110.
55.
LemosM. C.AgrawalA. (2006). Environmental governance. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 31, 297–325.
56.
LiC.McLindenC.FioletovV.KrotkovN.CarnS. A.JoinerJ.StreetsD.HeH.RenX.LiZ.DickersonR. (2017). India is overtaking China as the world’s largest emitter of anthropogenic sulfur dioxide. Scientific Reports, 7, Article 14304.
57.
LiangJ. (2018). Regulatory effectiveness and social equity in environmental governance: Assessing goal conflict, trade-off, and synergy. The American Review of Public Administration, 48, 761–776.
58.
LiangJ.LangbeinL. (2015). Performance management, high-powered incentives, and environmental policies in China. International Public Management Journal, 18, 346–385.
59.
LiangJ.LangbeinL. (2018). Linking anticorruption threats, performance pay, administrative outputs, and policy outcomes in China. Public Administration, 97, 177–194.
60.
LiangJ.MaL. (2020). Ownership, affiliation, and organizational performance: Evidence from China’s results-oriented energy policy. International Public Management Journal, 23, 57–83.
61.
LieberthalK. (2004). Governing China: From revolution through reform (2nd ed.). W. W. Norton.
62.
LinK. J.LuX.ZhangJ.ZhengY. (2020). State-owned enterprises in China: A review of 40 years of research and practice. China Journal of Accounting Research, 13, 31–55.
63.
LiuX.LinB.ZhangY. (2016). Sulfur dioxide emission reduction of power plants in China: Current policies and implications. Journal of Cleaner Production, 113, 133–143.
64.
LiuY. (2009). A comparison of China’s state-owned enterprises and their counterparts in the United States: Performance and regulatory policy. Public Administration Review, 69, S46–S52.
65.
LoC. W.TangS. Y. (2006). Institutional reform, economic changes, and local environmental management in China: The case of Guangdong province. Environmental Politics, 15, 190–210.
66.
LorentzenP.LandryP.YasudaJ. (2014). Undermining authoritarian innovation: The power of China’s industrial giants. The Journal of Politics, 76, 182–194.
67.
LuessenA. (2018). Why “killing the tigers and swapping the flies” does not succeed: A multi-criteria analysis of the persistence of corruption in the people’s Republic of China [Thesis]. University of Twente.
68.
MaL.LiangJ. (2018). The effects of firm ownership and affiliation on government’s target setting on energy conservation in China. Journal of Cleaner Production, 199, 459–465.
69.
ManionM. (2015). Institutional design and anti-corruption in mainland China. In HeywoodP. M. (Ed.), Routledge handbook of political corruption (pp. 242–252). Routledge.
MéonP. G.SekkatK. (2005). Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?Public Choice, 122, 69–97.
73.
NasiritousiN. (2017). Fossil fuel emitters and climate change: Unpacking the governance activities of large oil and gas companies. Environmental Politics, 26, 621–647.
74.
NgoT. W. (2008). Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China. Crime, Law and Social Change, 49, 27–44.
75.
OrdóñezL. D.SchweitzerM. E.GalinskyA. D.BazermanM. H. (2009). Goals gone wild: The systematic side effects of overprescribing goal setting. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 23, 6–16.
PeiM. (2009, October20). The dark side of China’s rise. Foreign Policy, 153, 32–40.
78.
PortneyK. E. (2007). Local business and environmental policies in cities. In KraftM. E.KamienieckiS. (Eds.), Business and environmental policy: Corporate interests in the American political system (pp. 299–325). MIT Press.
79.
PriceL.WangX.YunJ. (2010). The challenge of reducing energy consumption of the top-1000 largest industrial enterprises in China. Energy Policy, 38, 6485–6498.
80.
RabeB. G.MundoP. A. (2007). Business influence in state-level environmental policy. In KraftM. E.KamienieckiS. (Eds.), Business and environmental policy: Corporate interests in the American political system (pp. 265–297). MIT Press.
RaineyH. G. (2014). Understanding and managing public organizations (5th ed.). John Wiley.
83.
RiggsF. (1964). Administration in developing countries: The theory of prismatic society. Houghon Miffin.
84.
RothsteinB. (2015). The chinese paradox of high growth and low quality of government: The cadre organization meets max weber. Governance, 28, 533–548.
85.
RyanR. M.DeciE. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.
State Council of China. (2011). State council’s notice concerning the comprehensive work plan on energy conservation and pollution emissions reduction during the twelfth five-year plan. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm
88.
SteffenB.KarplusV. J.SchmidtT. S. (2020). State ownership and technology adoption: The case of electric utilities and renewable energy (CEEPR Working Paper 2020-016). MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
89.
SzamosszegiA.KyleC. (2011). An analysis of state-owned enterprises and state capitalism in China. United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
90.
TaylorJ.TaylorR. (2011). Working hard for more money or working hard to make a difference? Efficiency wages, public service motivation and effort. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 31, 67–86.
91.
ThomsonV. E. (2017). Climate of capitulation: An insider’s account of state power in a coal nation. MIT Press.
92.
van derA. R. J.MijlingB.DingJ.KoukouliM. E.LiuF.LiQ.MaoH.TheysN. (2017). Cleaning up the air: Effectiveness of air quality policy for SO2 and NOx emissions in China. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 17, 1775–1789.
93.
VictorD. G.HultsD. R.ThurberM. C. (2012). Introduction and overview. In VictorD. G.HultsD. R.ThurberM. C. (Eds.), Oil and governance state-owned enterprises and the world energy supply (pp. 3–31). Cambridge University Press.
94.
ViscusiW. K.HamiltonJ. T. (1999). Are risk regulators rational? Evidence from hazardous waste cleanup decisions. American Economic Review, 89, 1010–1027.
95.
WangA. L. (2016). Chinese state capitalism and the environment. In LiebmanB. L.MilhauptC. J. (Eds.), Regulating the visible hand? The institutional implications of Chinese state capitalism (pp. 251–284). Oxford University Press.
WangH.ZhengF.ZhangW.WangS. (2018). Analysis of SO2 pollution changes of Beijing-Tianjin_Hebei Region over China based on OMI observations from 2006 to 2017. Advances in Meteorology, 2018, Article 8746068. https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/8746068
98.
WangY. (2015). Politically connected polluters under smog. Business & Politics, 17, 97–124.
99.
WedemanA. (2012). Double paradox: Rapid growth and rising corruption in China. Cornell University Press.
100.
WhitfordA. B. (2005). The pursuit of political control by multiple principals. Journal of Politics, 67, 29–49.
101.
WilliamsonC. (2009). Informal institutions rule: Institutional arrangements and economic performance. Public Choice, 139, 371–387.
102.
World Bank. (2007). Cost of pollution in China: Economic estimates of physical damages.
103.
YangD. L. (2017). China’s illiberal regulatory state in comparative perspective. China Political Science Review, 2, 114–133.
104.
YangK. (2009). Institutional congruence, ideas, and anticorruption policy: The case of China and the United States. Public Administration Review, 69, S142–S150.
105.
ZengS. X.XuX. D.YinH. T.TamC. M. (2012). Factors that drive Chinese listed companies in voluntary disclosure of environmental information. Journal of Business Ethics, 109, 309–321.
106.
ZhaoX.LiH.WuL.QiY. (2014). Implementation of energy-saving policies in China: How local governments assisted industrial enterprises in achieving energy-saving targets. Energy Policy, 66, 170–184.
107.
ZhuB. (2017). MNCs, rents, and corruption: Evidence from China. American Journal of Political Science, 61, 84–99.
