Expertise is a common rational for relying on third-party intermediaries in the administration of regulatory standards. Yet, little is known regarding how perceived competence varies across the diversity of intermediaries observed in empirical regulatory settings. This article offers a better understanding of perceived intermediary expertise through an examination of regulatee perceptions of certifier competence in the administration of U.S. organic regulations. From the results of a nationwide organic producer survey, the article concludes that what intermediaries look like matters less than how they fulfill their regulatory functions. These results suggest that diverse intermediaries have the potential to be similarly effective at supporting regulatory program goals, and that program credibility is not inherently threatened by an administratively diverse third-party landscape.
AakerJ.VohsK. D.MogilnerC. (2010). Nonprofits are seen as warm and for-profits as competent: Firm stereotypes matter. Journal of Consumer Research, 37, 224-237.
2.
AbbottK. W.Levi-FaurD.SnidalD. (2017). Introducing regulatory intermediaries. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 670(1), 6-13.
3.
AmirkhanyanA. A.MeierK. J.O’TooleL. J. (2016). Managing in the regulatory thicket: Regulation legitimacy and expertise. Public Administration Review, 77, 381-394.
4.
ArcuriA. (2015). The transformation of organic regulation: The ambiguous effects of publicization. Regulation & Governance, 9, 144-159.
5.
BardachE.KaganR. A. (1982). Going by the book: The problem of regulatory unreasonableness. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
6.
BlackJ. (2002). Critical reflections on regulation. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 27, 1-27.
7.
BlackJ. (2008). Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. Regulation & Governance, 2, 137-164.
8.
CarpenterD. P. (2010). Reputation and power: Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
9.
CarterD. P. (2016). Public, nonprofit, and private sector regulatory approaches in third-party regulatory administration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26, 726-744.
10.
CarterD. P. (2017a). Service diversification and service quality differences in the third-party administration of US organic regulations. Public Management Review, 19, 802-819.
11.
CarterD. P. (2017b). Role perceptions and attitudes toward discretion at a decentralized regulatory frontline: The case of organic inspectors. Regulation & Governance. Advance online publication. doi:10.1111/rego.12143
12.
CashoreB. (2002). Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: How non–state market–driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule–making authority. Governance, 15, 503-529.
13.
CoglianeseC.LazerD. (2003). Management-based regulation: Prescribing private management to achieve public goals. Law & Society Review, 37, 691-730.
14.
DiasJ. J.Maynard-MoodyS. (2007). For-profit welfare: Contracts, conflicts, and the performance paradox. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17, 189-211.
15.
DownsA. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
16.
EberleinB.AbbottK. W.BlackJ.MeidingerE.WoodS. (2014). Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis. Regulation & Governance, 8, 1-21.
17.
EtienneJ. (2013). Ambiguity and relational signals in regulator-regulatee relationships. Regulation & Governance, 7, 30-47.
18.
GulbrandsenL. H. (2014). Dynamic governance interactions: Evolutionary effects of state responses to non-state certification programs. Regulation & Governance, 8, 74-92.
19.
HeinrichC. J.LynnL. E. L.Jr. (2001). Means and ends: A comparative study of empirical methods for investigating governance and performance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11, 109-138.
20.
HerlingR. W. (2000). Operational definitions of expertise and competence. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 2(1), 8-21.
21.
KruckA. (2017). Asymmetry in empowering and disempowering private intermediaries: The case of credit rating agencies. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 670, 133-151.
22.
Levi-FaurD. (2011). Regulation and regulatory governance. In Levi-FaurD. (Ed.), Handbook on the politics of regulation (pp. 3-21). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
23.
Levi-FaurD.StarobinS. M. (2014). Transnational politics and policy: From two-way to three-way interactions (Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 62). Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
24.
LyttonT. D. (2017). The taming of the stew: Regulatory intermediaries in food safety governance. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 670(1), 78-92.
25.
MarshallR. S.StandifirdS. S. (2005). Organizational resource bundles and institutional change in the US organic food and agricultural certification sector. Organization & Environment, 18, 265-286.
26.
MayP. J. (2005). Regulation and compliance motivations: Examining different approaches. Public Administration Review, 65(1), 31-44.
27.
MayP. J. (2007). Regulatory regimes and accountability. Regulation & Governance, 1, 8-26.
28.
MayP. J.BurbyR. J. (1998). Making sense out of regulatory enforcement. Law & Policy, 20, 157-182.
29.
MayP. J.WinterS. (2000). Reconsidering styles of regulatory enforcement: Patterns in Danish agro-environmental inspection. Law & Policy, 22, 144-173.
30.
MayP. J.WoodR. S. (2003). At the regulatory frontlines: Inspectors’ enforcement styles and regulatory compliance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13, 117-139.
31.
National Organic Program (NOP) Rule, C.F.R. 7 §205.504 (2016).
OsborneD.GaeblerT. A. (1993). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the government sector. New York, NY: Plume.
35.
PageE. C. (2010). Bureaucrats and expertise: Elucidating a problematic relationship in three tableaux and six jurisdictions. Sociologie du Travail, 52, 255-273.
36.
PenningsJ. M.IrwinS. H.GoodD. L. (2002). Surveying farmers: A case study. Review of Agricultural Economics, 24, 266-277.
37.
PotoskiM.PrakashA. (2011). Voluntary programs, compliance, and the regulation dilemma. In Levi-FaurD. (Ed.), Handbook on the politics of regulation (pp. 84-95). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
38.
RaineyH. G.PandeyS.BozemanB. (1995). Research note: Public and private managers’ perceptions of red tape. Public Administration Review, 55, 567-574.
39.
SchmidH. (2003). Rethinking the policy of contracting out Social Services to non-governmental organizations. Public Management Review, 5, 307-323.
40.
ScholzJ. T. (1994). Managing regulatory enforcement in the United States. In RosenbloomD. H.SchwartzR. D. (Eds.), Handbook of regulation and administrative law (pp. 423-465). New York, NY: Marcel Dekker.
van der HeijdenJ. (2008). Competitive enforcement: Comparative analysis of Australian building regulatory enforcement regimes. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press.
44.
van der HeijdenJ. (2010). On peanuts and monkeys: Private sector involvement in Australian building control. Urban Policy and Research, 28, 195-210.
45.
van der HeijdenJ. (2017). Brighter and darker sides of intermediation: Target-oriented and self-interested intermediaries in the regulatory governance of buildings. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 670, 207-224.
46.
Van SlykeD. M. (2003). The mythology of privatization in contracting for social services. Public Administration Review, 63, 296-315.
47.
Van SlykeD. M. (2007). Agents or stewards: Using theory to understand the government-nonprofit social service contracting relationship. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17, 157-187.
48.
WeimerD. L. (2006). The puzzle of private rulemaking: Expertise, flexibility, and blame avoidance in U.S. regulation. Public Administration Review, 66, 569-582.
49.
WinterS. C.MayP. J. (2001). Motivation for compliance with environmental regulations. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20, 675-698.
