Two ongoing debates in regulation research concentrate on public-interest versus private-interest theories, and actor-centered theories versus institutionalism. The first controversy is about the origins and goals of regulation, and the latter is about the analysis of regulatory processes. A theoretical framework that combines these four concepts is suggested. Four patterns of regulation are presented; each addresses a regulatory goal as well as a regulatory process. Each pattern is associated with a different type of regulator: the selfish, the manipulative, the combative, and the coordinating. The author argues that by employing institutional considerations and tools, the coordinating regulator best serves the public interest.
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