Herd theory may be useful for understanding the activities of interest groups in the American states. If interest groups are as powerful as most of the literature claims, it should become increasingly easy to statistically explain certain public policy outcomes. The analysis shows this is not the case, and therefore a reexamination of interest group behaviors may be in order. To a large extent, the hiring of lobbyists by interest groups does not seem to result in a greater level of explained variance. If the number of interest groups in a category pressures administrators, such a reaction may be misplaced.
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