This study elaborates and extends earlier work on the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that found that federal agencies differed in how well their personnel actions fared when appealed to the MSPB. The authors offer a theoretical framework for understanding cross-agency differences in MSPB appeals decisions and then test for face validity a variety of factors informing that framework. The authors argue that the important balance between managerial prerogative and protecting merit principles in the federal government could be jeopardized by the new personnel management (NPM) unless reformers and researchers consider in their work cross-agency variations in production functions, types of personnel actions taken, agency culture, agency structure, legitimate functional needs, anticipatory reactions, agency responsiveness, and agency learning curves.
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