This article synthesizes the ideas of image and venue, the notion that governments act as interest groups and lobby within the federal system, and inside/outside interest group strategies with neoinstitutionalism. This is necessary to explain the active, entrepreneurial behavior of institutional venues, which until now have been assumed to be passive in nature. It is well known that public administrators not only serve the public interest, but also their institutional interests. To do so, administrators must be aware that their success or failure depends on their ability to adopt a policy that is arena-specific. For purposes of illustration, the authors use two case studies that demonstrate how cities actively attempt to block base closure and defense downsizing threats to their locales.
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