A Unified Theory Of Civil-Military Relations

Abstract

This article's thesis is that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others. Although some responsibilities for control may merge, they are not fused. The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms, rules, and expectations concerning civil-military relations. Although a regime may be stable for long periods, it can change as basic causal factors such as values, issues, interests, personalities, and threats change. Alterations of rules and decision-making procedures account for the dynamic nature of civil-military relations, while alterations of norms and principles account for conflict in civil-military relations. Regime differences between states account for the particular national character of civil-military relations, much as like-minded regimes account for cross-cultural similarities in civil-military relations.