A Different Perspective: Cohesion,Morale,and Operational Effectiveness in the GermanArmy,Fali 1944

Abstract

This article analyzes cohesion, morale and operational effectiveness of the German LXXIV Korps during late 1944. Unlike other studies, this inquiry does not examine "elite" units such as panzer, falschirmjäger, SS, or divisions formed before the outbreak of war. Instead it examines those that, in Fall 1944, might be considered the norm for the German Army on the Western Front. The findings contradict portions of earlier studies conducted by Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, Martin van Creveld, and Omar Bartov. It suggests that the portion of the Germany Army that was not refitting for the Ardennes Campaign was not only organizationally deficient but possessed morale reminiscent of the German Army in August 1918. The only difference was the willingness of the high command in 1944 to intimidate soldiers to continue the fight through threats against their families and through executions.