The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis

Abstract

This article attempts to assess the explanatory value of the bureaucratic politics model in the case of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Drawing upon Graham T. Allison's germinal book, Essence of Decision, and the critiques that have followed, the argument of bureaucratic politics is summarized and the insights used to explain more fully President Bush's actions in the Persian Gulf.

The objective is not to show that the bureaucratic politics model explains "the" government's decisions. Rather, an examination of bureaucratic and political forces uncovers otherwise unrecognized features of the policy decisions of the Bush Administration and coalition member nations, offering a more comprehensive understanding of how foreign policy is crafted. Second, the model directs attention to the series of ancillary decisions that made the Persian Gulf crisis possible, as it challenges the idea of the war's inevitability. Rather, with a different set of American policies toward Iraq during the 1980s, war might have been avoided or preempted. Third, by broadening our conceptual lens, the model helps find answers to many questions or puzzles that cannot be otherwise explained. The study concludes with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a foreign policy-making process operated by bureaucratic and political forces.