Abstract
As NATO's membership and function widen, it transits from a "latent war community" to something akin to an international regime aimed at collective security. During and after such a process, successful integration into the "new" alliance will have little to do with a state's military contribution or strategic advantage. Instead, principal emphasis will be placed on how a state and its army behave. This discussion concerns the behavioral standards of a "civil army"—an ideal type to which no system can lay claim, but which allows comparative assessments. In a brief survey of east-central and southeast Europe, attention is given to signs of criminality, procurement fraud, limited civilian roles in defense, diminished public image of armies, low compliance of high commands, and other evidence that building civil armies requires further effort. Concluding comments note policy alternatives for U. S. and NATO efforts to accelerate civil-military transitions.
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