Saddam Surprises the United States: Learning from "The Revolution of August 2"

Abstract

Little attention has been paid to Saddam Hussein's strategic surprise in the invasion of Kuwait. This is unfortunate, because in Saddam's invasion lies an exceptionally useful extension of what is known about surprise in strategy and diplomacy, an extension of particular value in the post-Cold War world where the risks of nuclear proliferation and the possible spread of other weapons of mass destruction heighten the importance of properly understanding surprise. This article argues that Saddam surprised Kuwait and its allies because they had deceived themselves about his intention to attack. It also argues that decision-makers and analysts are especially likely to indulge in self-deception when they believe they have found a way to avoid the dangers of their chosen path. American decision-makers minimized Saddam's rapacity and unpredictability because they thought the policy of tilting toward Iraq would convert him into a responsible international actor. The article first examines the literature on surprise attack for guidance in understanding Saddam's achievement of surprise. It then develops the concept of self-deception and illustrates the part it played in preparing for Saddam's surprise. The article. concludes with some advice to policymakers on how to avoid self-deception in evaluating another state's intentions.