Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Soviet State: "Loose Coupling" Uncoupled?

Abstract

In order to understand the incompletely reconstituted civil-military balance within an independent Russia, this article begins by re-evaluating the "loose coupling" model of Soviet civil-military relations. After examining two instances of civil-military interaction under Gorbachev through the lens of "loose coupling," it then describes the attempt to "tighten" the relationship between civil and military authority as part of overall political and economic reform. The "tightening" of authority over the military that accompanied apparent political democratization suggests a linkage between the nature of civil-military "coupling" and regime type. The article then proceeds to examine the current civil-military balance in Russia to assess whether "loose" or "tighter coupling" has persisted. It concludes by arguing in the absence of strong civil authority in the state and robust mechanisms of civilian dominance over defense decision-making that the role for the military in Russian politics will inevitably increase.