Public Opinion and Foreign Threats: Eisenhower's Response to Sputnik

Abstract

Renewed attention to the role of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes in quantitative correlational studies indicates that opinion influences foreign policy. However, authors of these studies note that their conclusions could be flawed if elites simply manipulate public opinion, rather than responding to it. Both realist and neorealist perspectives on public opinion are consistent with a manipulation perspective.

As urged by those using quantitative data, this article examines a case using declassified archival information in order to examine responsiveness in a situation ripe for manipulation. Specifically, U.S. reactions to Soviet Sputnik launches are scrutinized. President Eisenhower was much less concerned about Soviet actions than was the general public but nonetheless substantially altered many defense programs in order to meet perceived public demands. The President acknowledged privately that at least two-thirds of a spending supplement was used to meet public fears, not real security needs. This finding is inconsistent with prevailing realist theories and standard historical interpretations.