Abstract
The predominant theories explaining civil-military relations in China are the interest group model and the factionalism model. Both assume politically significant conflict either between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership (and its commissars) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership, or within them. This study demonstrates that the factional tension triggered by the longstanding doctrinal debate between "lines" about "red" and "expert" in the PLA is on the way to resolution. This has happened because of the post-Cultural Revolution redefinition of the functions of the commissar system in the PLA, leading to its transformation from an instrument of doctrinal debate to one of PLA administration. The administrative role of commissars sharing values, interests and skills with commanders, on the other hand, invalidates the premises of the interest group model: contrasting values, interests and skills between the two, direct conflict as a result, and the need for one to "control" the other. This study proposes a bureaucratic behavior model, which assumes that political conflicts that arise from the horizontal boundaries separating superiors (including both commanders and commissars) and subordinates tend to diffuse the vertical tension between commanders and commissars, or within them.
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