Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment for War: The Iceland Experience of 1940

Abstract

Current Canadian defense policies envision not only defense of the national territory, but a possible commitment of military forces overseas either through Canada's obligations as a member of NATO or the United Nations. In meeting these potential responsibilities, Ottawa would have to rely upon the reserves since the country's regular forces are small and time is required to raise, organize, equip, and train forces from a nonexisting prior base. Government declarations about the reserves have noted defects of which officers, regular and militia, are very cognizant. What would happen if Canada must send nonregular forces overseas under such conditions? This has occurred twice in the twentieth century; at the beginning of each conflict, Canadian forces were sent abroad, unprepared for war. This article will examine, as a case study, what happened in summer and autumn 1940 when one such brigade, "Z" Force, deployed to Iceland. Events are viewed from the perspective of an infantry ground force, "from the bottom up." An analysis of what occurred then can provide insight into what could happen when and if militia forces are again mobilized and deployed abroad before they are operationally ready for such service.