CFE II: A Quest for Stability

Abstract

A second round of conventional arms-control negotiations should aim toward solidifying, prolonging, and increasing stability rather than simply toward making more reductions for their own sake. Additional, proportional reductions would actually be destabilizing because they would deprive NATO of the minimum force-to-space ratio necessary to defend against a possible renewed threat and would also feed the fears of those in Eastern Europe who see or profess to see a danger of invasion from the West. The goals of arms-control policy should be to devise force structures and workable operational plans that deter attack by promising effective defense, fortify populations (especially in Western Europe) against coercion, and do not appear threatening to other countries. A defense might consist of several thousand small, mobile teams of regulars or highly ready reserves to exploit the defensive advantages of European terrain and contemporary weapons; sufficient firepower, either conventional or possibly nuclear, to make the defense effective; and one or more operational reserves of heavy mechanized units strong enough to cope with breakthroughs but too small for a general strategic offensive. Such a defensive posture would be stabilizing if adopted by either coalition, more so if adopted by both.